IMPORTENT JUDGMENTS
 (SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) 

Party(ies)'s Name(s) Short Notes Citations

HIS HOLINESS KESAVANANDA BHARATI SRIPADAGALAVARU -V.- STATE OF KERALA

AIR1973SC1461 MANU/SC/0445/1973 [1973]SuppSCR1 (1973)4SCC225

Constitution - basic structure of Constitution - Sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8 (1), 18, 29 and 291 of Criminal Procedure Code, Constitution of India, Section 29 (1) of Indian Evidence Act and Indian Contract Act - batch of six writ petitions challenging validity of Twenty-fourth, Twenty-fifth and Twenty-ninth Amendments of Constitution - majority upheld validity of twenty-fourth Amendment which inserted Clauses (3) and (4) in Article 13 - all Judges opined that by virtue of Article 368 as amended by twenty-fourth Amendment Parliament had power to amend any or all provisions of Constitution including those relating to fundamental rights although the same was not unlimited - majority were of view that power of amendment under Article 368 was subject to certain implied and inherent limitations - in exercise of amending power Parliament cannot amend basic structure or framework of Constitution - right to property did not form part of basic structure - individual freedom secured to citizens was basic feature of Constitution - grant of power is always qualified by implications of context and considerations arising out of general scheme of statute - inherent limitations under unamended Article 368 would still hold true even after amendment of Article 368 - Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b) and first part of Section 3 of twenty-fifth Amendment held valid - majority invalidated second part of Article 31-C introduced by twenty-fifth Amendment which excluded jurisdiction of Courts to inquire whether law protected under that Article gave effect to policy of securing directive principles mentioned therein - validity of twenty-ninth Amendment which inserted Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1969 and Kerala Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1971 was upheld.


MANEKA GANDHI-v.-UNION OF INDIA

AIR1978SC597 (1978)2CompLJ62(SC) MANU/SC/0133/1978 (1978)1SCC248 [1978]2SCR621

Case Note: (i) Constitution - validity of provision - Articles 14, 19 and 21 of Constitution of India and Section 10 (3) (c) of Passports Act, 1967 - validity of Section 10 (3) (c) challenged - procedure in Article 21 means procedure which conforms to principles of natural justice - power conferred under Section 10 (3) (c) not unguided and it is implied in it that rules of natural justice would be applicable - held, Section 10 (3) (c) not violative of Article 21. (ii) Right of dignity - right to live is not merely confined to physical existence - it includes within its ambit right to live with human dignity. (iii) Inter-relationship - principle of reasonableness provided under Article 14 must apply to procedure as contemplated under Article 21 - Article 21 controlled by Article 19 also - in case a law does not infringe Article 21 even then it has to meet challenges of Articles 14 and 19. (iv) Post-decisional hearing - petitioner's passport impounded and not given pre-decisional notice and hearing - Government contended that rule audi alteram partem must be excluded because it may have frustrated very purpose of impounding passport - concept of post-decisional hearing developed to maintain balance between administrative efficiency and fairness to individual - Court stressed that fair opportunity of being heard following immediately Order impounding passport would satisfy mandate of natural justice. Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (25.01.1978 - SC) : MANU/SC/0133/1978


MINERVA MILLS· I:.TD. & ORS,-v.-UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

AIR1986SC2030 [1987]61CompCas466(SC) JT1986(1)SC375 MANU/SC/0523/1986 1986(2)SCALE381 (1986)4SCC222 [1986]3SCR718 1987(1)UJ308


SHARAD BIRDHI CHAND SARDA-v.-STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

AIR1984SC1622 1984(86)BomLR536 1984(2)Crimes235 1984CriLJ1738 MANU/SC/0111/1984 1984(2)SCALE445 (1984)4SCC116 [1985]1SCR88


A.R. ANTULAY-v.-R.S. NAYAK & ANR

AIR1988SC1531 1988 (25) ACC 448 1988(90)BomLR312 1988(2)Crimes753(SC) 1988CriLJ1661 JT1988(2)SC325 MANU/SC/0002/1988 [1988]Supp1SCR1 (1988)2SCC602


KIHOTO HOLLOHAN-v.-ZACHILLHU AND OTHERS

AIR1993SC412 JT1992(1)SC600 MANU/SC/0753/1992 1992Supp(2)SCC651 1992(1)SCALE338 [1992]1SCR686

Case Note: Constitution - validity of amendment - Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985 - petition challenging insertion of 10th schedule to Constitution - para 7 of 10 Schedule which brings about change in operation of Articles 136, 226 and 227 made without ratification of State Legislature as provided under Article 368 (2) invalid - non observance of such condition precedent does not affect severability of Para 7 from other parts of amendment - 52nd amendment excluding para 7 valid - para 2 of 10th Schedule neither violate democratic rights of elected members nor freedom of speech and freedom of vote and conscience - Para 2 is not violative of Articles 105 and 194 - Speakers/Chairmen under 10th Schedule exercise power of Tribunal to adjudicate rights and obligations of elected members and their decisions amenable to judicial review - judicial review does not cover any stage prior to making decisions by Presiding Officers - interlocutory interference can be made when interlocutory disqualifications or suspension may have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussion and consequence - concept of statutory finality of decisions of Presiding Officers in Para 6 (2) does not affect right of judicial review under Articles 136, 226 and 227 based on violation of constitutional mandates, mala fides, non-compliance with Rules of natural justice and perversity - deeming provision in Para 6 (2) would attract immunity analogous to that of Articles 122 (1) and 212 (1) as explained in Kesav Singh's case. Kihoto Hollohan vs. Zachillhu and Ors. (18.02.1992 - SC) : MANU/SC/0753/1992


INDRA SAWHNEY AND ORS -V- UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

JT1992(6)SC673 MANU/SC/0641/1990 1992Supp(3)SCC210


S.R. BOMMAI AND ORS.-v.-UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

AIR1994SC1918 JT1994(2)SC215 MANU/SC/0444/1994 1994(2)SCALE37 (1994)3SCC1 [1994]2SCR644


L. CHANDRA KUMAR -VS- UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

AIR1997SC1125 1997(1)BLJR735 (1997)1CALLT55(SC) (1998)1CompLJ385(SC) 83(1997)CLT815(SC) 1997(69)ECR401(SC) 1997(92)ELT318(S.C.) 1997GLH(1)692 [1997]228ITR725(SC) JT1997(3)SC589 1997LabIC1069 1997(2)LLN482(SC) 1997-2-LW414 1997(1)MPLJ621 1997(2)MhLJ198(SC) MANU/SC/0261/1997 1997(I)OLR(SC)408 1997(1)PLJR84 [1997]105STC618(SC) 1997(2)SCT423(SC) 1998(2)SLJ124(SC) 1997(2)SLR1(SC) 1997(3)SCALE40 (1997)3SCC261 (1997)SCC(LS)577 [1997]2SCR1186 (1997)1UPLBEC712

Case Note: Held: Judicial Review - Power of judicial review over legislative action vested in High Courts and Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 32 of the Constitution is integral to our constitutional scheme and an essential feature comprising the basic structure of Constitution. "......To express our opinion on the issue whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we must first attempt to understand what constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution. The Doctrine of basic structure was evolved in Kesavananda Bharati's case. However, as already mentioned, that case did not lay down that the specific and particular features mentioned in that judgment alone would constitute the basic structure of our Constitution. Indeed, in the judgments of Shelat & Grover, JJ., Hegde & Mukherjee, JJ. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., there are specific observations to the effect that their list of essential features comprising the basic structure of the Constitution are illustrative and are not intended to be exhaustive. In Indira Gandhi's case, Chandrachud, J. held that the proper approach for a Judge who is confronted with the question whether a particular facet of the Constitution is part of the basic structure, is to examine, in each individual case, the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of our Constitution as a fundamental instrument for the governance of the country. (supra at pp. 751-752). This approach was specifically adopted by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mill's case (supra at pp. 651-672) and is not regarded as the definitive test in this field of Constitutional Law. "....We find that the various factors mentioned in the test evolved by Chandrachud, J. have already been considered by decisions of various Benches of this Court that have been referred to in the course of our analysis. From their conclusions, many of which have been extracted by us in toto, it appears that this Court has always considered the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in this Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively, enabling legislative action to be subjected to the scrutiny of superior courts, to be integral to our constitutional scheme." 2. Interpretation of Constitution--Powers of the Judges of High Court & Supreme Court--The power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislation and to interpret the constitution can never be ousted or excluded. "......The Judges of the superior Courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate Courts and Tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man Tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the functions of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded." 3. Judicial superintendence--Powers vested in High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals in their jurisdiction, are a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and divesting of the same to be avoided. The subordinate judiciary or Tribunals not to exercise power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of High Courts & Supreme Court, "......We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdiction is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided. "...However, it is important to emphasise that though the subordinate judiciary or Tribunals created under ordinary legislations cannot exercise the power of judicial review of legislative action to the exclusion of the High Courts and the Supreme Court, there is no constitutional prohibition against their performing a supplemental--as opposed to a substitutional--role in this respect." 4. Tribunals--Jurisdictional Powers--Competence to test the constitutional validity of a statutory provision/rule--The Tribunals constituted either under Article 323A or under Article 323B of the Constitution competent to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules, but debarred to entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes--Even in matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned the function of the Tribunals is only supplementary and appeals against their orders to lie before the Division Bench of High Courts--Order to come into effect prospectively. "......If the power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has been described as the "heart" and "soul" of the Constitution, can additionally conferred upon "any other court", there is no reason why the same situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution. So long as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and that of this Court under Article 32 is retained, there is no reason why the power to test the validity of legislations against the provisions of the Constitution cannot be conferred upon Administrative Tribunals created under the Act or upon Tribunals created under Article 323B of the Constitution." ".....we may summarise our conclusions on the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will, however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal." "The directions issued by us in respect of making the decisions of Tribunals amenable to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts will, however, come into effect prospectively i.e. will apply to decisions rendered hereafter. To maintain the sanctity of judicial proceedings, we have invoked the doctrine of prospective over-ruling so as not to disturb the procedure in relation to decisions already rendered." 5. Tribunals--Malfunctioning--An independent agency should be set up for the administration of all the Tribunals and till such agency is set up the Tribunals should be under a single nodal Ministry to oversee their working. "....We are of the view that, until a wholly independent agency for the administration of all such Tribunals can be set-up, it is desirable that all such Tribunals should be, as far as possible, under a single nodal Ministry which will be in a position to oversee the working of these Tribunals. For a number of reasons that Ministry should appropriately be the Ministry of Law. It would be open for the Ministry, in its turn, to appoint an independent supervisory body to oversee the working of the Tribunals. This will ensure that if the President or Chairperson of the Tribunal is for some reason unable to take sufficient interest in the working of the Tribunal, the entire system will not languish and the ultimate consumer of justice will not suffer. The creation of a single umbrella organisation will, in our view, remove many of the ills of the present system. If the need arises, there can be separate umbrella organisations at the Central and the State levels. Such a supervisory authority must try to ensure that the independence of the members of all such Tribunals is maintained." 6. Setting up of Tribunals--Under our constitutional scheme constitution of various Tribunals is permitted. "....That the various Tribunals have not performed upto expectations is a self-evident and widely acknowledged truth. However, to draw an inference that their unsatisfactory performance points to their being founded on a fundamentally unsound principle would not be correct. The reasons for which the Tribunals were constituted still persist; indeed, those reasons have become even more pronounced in our times. We have already indicated that our constitutional scheme permits the setting up of such Tribunals. However, drastic measures may have to be resorted to in order to elevate their standards to ensure that they stand up to constitutional scrutiny in the discharge of the power of judicial review conferred upon them." 7. Tribunals--Power to hear matters involving constitutional issues--Tribunals competent to handle matters involving constitutional issues but such matters not to be handled by a single Member Bench and should be referred to a Bench consisting of at least two members one of whom being a Judicial Member. "....To hold that the Tribunals have no power to handle matters involving constitutional issues would not serve the purpose for which they were constituted. On the other hand, to hold that all such decisions will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls will serve two purposes. While saving the power of judicial review of legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, it will ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through the process of adjudication in the Tribunal. The High Court will also have the benefit of a reasoned decision on merits which will be of use to it in finally deciding the matter." "We wish to make it clear that where a question involving the interpretation of a statutory provision or rule in relation to the Constitution arises for the consideration of a single Member Bench of the Administrative Tribunal, the proviso to Section 5(6) will automatically apply and the Chairman or the Member concerned shall refer the matter to a Bench consisting of at least two Members, one of whom must be a judicial Member. This will ensure that question involving the vires of a statutory provision or rule will never arise for adjudication before a single Member Bench or a Bench which does not consist of a Judicial Member. So construed, Section 5(6) will no longer be susceptible to charges of unconstitutionality." 8. Appeals--Appeals against the orders of the Tribunals to lie before the Division Bench of High Courts. "....We may add here that under the existing system, direct appeals have been provided from the decisions of all Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In view of our above-mentioned observations, this situation will also stand modified. In the view that we have taken, no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division Bench of the High Court the aggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution." "......we hold that all decisions of Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, will be subject to the High Court's writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular Tribunal falls." 9. Administrative Tribunals--Appointment of administrative Members--The Tribunal not to consist of only judicial members, administrative members being officers having grass-roots experience, to be selected from amongst those who have some background to deal such cases. "......In the case of Administrative Tribunals, it has been pointed out that the administrative members who have been appointed have little or no experience in adjudicating such disputes." ".....It is stated that in the short tenures that these Administrative Members are on the Tribunal, they are unable to attain enough experience in adjudication and in cases where they do acquire the ability, it is invariably on the eve of the expiry of their tenures. For these reasons, it has been urged that the appointment of Administrative Members to Administrative Tribunals be stopped. We find it difficult to accept such a contention. It must be remembered that the setting-up of these Tribunals is founded on the premise that specialist bodies comprising both trained administrators and those with judicial experience would, by virtue of their specialised knowledge, be better equipped to dispense speedy and efficient justice. It was expected that a judicious mix of judicial members and those with grass-roots experience would best serve this purpose. To hold that the Tribunal should consist only of judicial members would attack the primary basis of the theory pursuant to which they have been constituted. Since the Selection Committee is now headed by a Judge of the Supreme Court, nominated by the Chief Justice of India, we have reason to believe that the Committee would take care to ensure that administrative members are chosen from amongst those who have some background to deal with such cases." 10. Exclusion of the Jurisdiction of High Courts--Article 323A clause 2(d); Article 323B clause 3(d); Sec. 28 of Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and Clauses in other legislations stipulating exclusion of the jurisdiction of High Courts held to be unconstitutional. ".....In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323A and clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated." L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (18.03.1997 - SC) : MANU/SC/0261/1997


VELLORE CITIZENS WELFARE FORUM -VS- UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

AIR1996SC2715 (1996)5CompLJ40(SC) JT1996(7)SC375 MANU/SC/0686/1996 [1996]Supp5SCR241 (1996)5SCC647


D.K. BASU-v.-STATE OF WEST BENGAL

AIR1997SC610 2001 (Suppl.) ACC 912 1997(21)ACR277(SC) 1997(1)ALD(Cri)248 1998(1)BLJR161 1996(4)Crimes233(SC) 1997CriLJ743 I(1997)CCR81(SC) (1997)2GLR1631 JT1997(1)SC1 MANU/SC/0157/1997 RLW1997(1)SC94 1997(1)RCR(Criminal)372 [1996]Supp10SCR284 1996(9)SCALE298 (1997)1SCC416


MAFATLAL INDUSTRIES LTD. ETC. ETC.-v. UNION OF INDIA ETC. ETC.

2002(83)ECC85 1997(68)ECR273(SC) 1997(89)ELT247(S.C.) JT1996(11)SC283 MANU/SC/1203/1997 [1998]111STC467(SC) [1996]Supp10SCR585 1996(9)SCALE457 (1997)5SCC536


VISHAKA AND ORS.-v.-STATE OF RAJASTHAN AND ORS.

AIR1997SC3011 1997((2))ALT(Cri)579 1997(2)ALT(Cri)579 1997(5)ALT14(SC) 1997(2)ALD(Cri)604 1998(1)BLJR228 [1997]27CLA321(SC) 1997(3)Crimes188(SC) III(1997)CCR126(SC) [1997(77)FLR297] JT1997(7)SC384 2013(3)KarLJ546 1997LabIC2890 1998(2)LLN965(SC) 1997-2-LW(Crl)604 MANU/SC/0786/1997 RLW1997(3)SC373 1997(4)RCR(Criminal)187 [1997]Supp3SCR404 1997(5)SCALE453 (1997)6SCC241


GITHA HARIHARAN AND ANR -v.-RESERVE BANK OF INDIA AND ANR

1999(1)HLR160 AIR1999SC1149 1999(2)ALLMR(SC)416 1999 (38) ACC 463 1999 (35) ALR 518 1999(2)ALT1(SC) 1999(1)BLJR777 1999(2)BLJ642 2000(1)BomCR251 [1999]95CompCas913(SC) 1999(1)CTC481 (1999)152CTR(SC)479 I(1999)DMC337SC [1999]236ITR380(SC) JT1999(1)SC524 1999-2-LW723 1999(2)MPLJ1 (1999)IIMLJ62(SC) 1999(2)MhLJ703 MANU/SC/0117/1999 1999(1)PLJR97 1999(2)RCR(Civil)59 1999(1)SCALE490 (1999)2SCC228 [1999]1SCR669 [1999]104TAXMAN220(SC) 1999(2)UJ916


RUPA ASHOK HURRA-v.-ASHOK HURRA AND ANR.

AIR2002SC1771 (2002)2CompLJ193(SC) (2002)IIIGLR2138 (2002)3GLR290 JT2002(3)SC609 MANU/SC/0910/2002 2002(3)SCT527(SC) 2002(3)SCALE406 (2002)4SCC388 [2002]2SCR1006


PRADEEP KUMAR BISWAS AND ORS.-v.-INDIAN INSTITUTE OF CHEMICAL BIOLOGY AND ORS.

2002(2)BLJR1197 (2002)3CompLJ20(SC) JT2002(4)SC146 MANU/SC/0330/2002 2002(4)PLJR81 2002(2)SCT1067(SC) 2002(3)SLJ42(SC) 2002(3)SLJ58(SC) 2002(3)SLR433(SC) 2002(3)SCALE638 (2002)5SCC111 [2002]3SCR100 (2002)2UPLBEC1798


P. RAMA CHANDRA RAO-v.- STATE OF KARNATAKA

[ 2002]3 SCR 60

Constitution of India, 1950-Article 21-Right to speedy trial-Criminal Proceedings-Limitation bar provided by judgment of smaller Benches of Supreme Court-Held, such bar contrary to law laid down by larger Bench in Antulay's case-Limitation bars not good law, since the same would amount to impermissible legislation and contrary to law of precedent-To effectuate the right to speedy trial, powers under Sections 309, 311, 258 and 482 of D Code of Criminal Procedure and Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution could· be exercised-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Sections 309, 311, 258 and 482. Doctrines: E Doctrine of precedent-Pronouncements by smaller Benches contrary F to law laid down by larger Bench-Smaller Bench is bound by view expressed by larger Bench. Judicial Review: Held, is restricted to declaring and interpreting law and removing obvious 1.:icunae and filling the gaps-Not to entrench upon the field of legislation which is meant for legislature-Constitution of India, ...J950-Articles 32, 21, 141, 142-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Chapter XXXVl G In Common Cause v. Union of India, [1996) 4 SCC 33, (Common Cause ~ I); Common Cause v. Union of India, [1996) 6 SCC 775 (Common Cause 11); Rajdev Sharma v. State of Bihar, [1998) 7 SCC (Raj Dev Sharma I); Raj Dev Sharma II v. State of Bihar, [1999) 7 SCC 604 (Raj Dev Sharma II), the Court had issued direction fixing outer time limits for conclusion of certain nature of criminal proceedings. H 60 )__ r. - -- P. RAMA CHANDRA RAO v. STA TE OF KARNAT AKA 61 In the instant appeals, accused facing corruption charges were acquitted A by special courts in terms of directions in Raj Dev Sharma I case as there was failure of commencement of trial despite lapse of two years from the date of framing of the charges. The appeals of the State against the acquittal were allowed by High Court without issuing notice to the respective accused. In appeal to this Court, the question for consideration arose as to B whether earlier decisions of this Court, in Common Cause I. Common Cause l/, Ra.i Dev Sharma I Raj Dev Sharma II cases would apply to prosecution " under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and other economic offences. The case was, therefore, referred to a Constitution Bench. During the hearing, the Constitution Bench was of the opinion that the C directions in the Common Cause cases and Raj Dev Sharma cases ran counter to Constitution Bench directions in A.R. Antulay 's case, which had laid down the law that an outer time limit for conclusion of all criminal proceedings should not be drawn or prescribed. Since A.R Antu/ay's case was decided by Bench of 5 Judges the instant case was referred to seven Judges Bench. D The question for consideration therein was whether a Court in its zeal to protect the right to speedy trial of an accused, can devise and almost enact such bars oflimitation though the legislature and the statutes have not choosen to do so. Answering the question and allowing the appeals, the Court


T.M.A. PAI FOUNDATION AND ORS.-v.-STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

2003(1)AIC809 AIR2003SC355 2003(1)BLJR158 JT2002(9)SC1 2003(1)KarLJ1 MANU/SC/0905/2002 2003(1)PLJR1 2003(1)SCT236(SC) 2002(6)SLR627(SC) 2002(8)SCALE1 (2002)8SCC481 (2002)3UPLBEC2817

Case Note: Constitution of India - Articles 14, 15, 25, 26, 28, 29 (2) and 30--Education--Right of minorities to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice--Scope of Article 30 (1)--Meaning of 'minority'--Whether Article 29 (2) and Article 30 (1) applies to aided/ unaided minority educational institutions?--How and when State can regulate minority educational institutions?--Majority answering questions as follows -- S. S. Mohammed Quadri, J. concurring with majority except on interplay between Articles 29 (2) and 30 (1) and concurring with Ruma Pal, J.--Ruma Pal, J. differing from majority on its view on Articles 29 (2) and 30 (1) and also on determination of 'minority status' with reference to State--S. N. Variava, J. concurring with majority, differing from S. S. Mohammed Quadri and Ruma Pal, JJ. and also from majority on final conclusion on balancing. B. N. Kirpal, C.J.I. (Majority view) : (1) Linguistic and religious minorities are covered by the expression "minority" under Article 30 of the Constitution. Since reorganization of the States in India has been on linguistic lines, therefore, for the purpose of determining the minority, the unit will be the State and not the whole of India. Thus, religious and linguistic minorities, who have been put at par in Article 30, have to be considered State-wise. (2) Article 30 (1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The use of the words "of their choice" indicates that even professional educational institutions would be covered by Article 30. (3) Admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions, viz., schools and undergraduate colleges where the scope for merit-based selection is practically nil, cannot be regulated by the concerned State or university, except for providing the qualifications and minimum conditions of eligibility in the interest of academic standards. The right to admit students being an essential facet of the right to administer educational institutions of their choice, as contemplated under Article 30 of the Constitution, the State Government or the university may not be entitled to interfere with that right, so long as the admission to the unaided educational institutions is on a transparent basis and the merit is adequately taken care of. The right to administer, not being absolute, there could be regulatory measures for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excellence thereof, and it is more so in the matter of admissions to professional institutions. A minority institution does not cease to be so, the moment grant-in-aid is received by the institution. An aided minority educational institution, therefore, would be entitled to have the right of admission of students belonging to the minority group and at the same time, would be required to admit a reasonable extent of non-minority students, so that the rights under Article 30 (1) are not substantially impaired and further the citizens' rights under Article 29 (2) are not infringed. What would be a reasonable extent, would vary from the types of institution, the courses of education for which admission is being sought and other factors like educational needs. The concerned State Government has to notify the percentage of the non-minority students to be admitted in the light of the above observations. Observance of inter se merit amongst the applicants belonging to the minority group could be ensured. In the case of aided professional institutions, it can also be stipulated that passing of the common entrance test held by the State agency is necessary to seek admission. As regards non-minority students who are eligible to seek admission for the remaining seats, admission should normally be on the basis of the common entrance test held by the State agency followed by counselling wherever it exists. (4) A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of admission as well as selection of students, but such a procedure must be fair and transparent, and the selection of students in professional and higher education colleges should be on the basis of merit. The procedure adopted or selection made should not be tantamount to mal-administration. Even an unaided minority institution ought not to ignore the merit of the students for admission, while exercising its right to admit students to the colleges aforesaid, as in that event, the institution will fail to achieve excellence. (5) While giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by-rules or regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the State qua non-minority students. The merit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the concerned university or the Government followed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by individual institutions - the method to be followed is for the university or the Government to decide. The authority may also devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the university to provide that consideration should be shown to the weaker sections of the society. (6) So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of administration are concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the conditions of recognition as well as the conditions of affiliation to an university or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day-to-day management, like the appointment of staff, teaching and non-teaching, and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a rational procedure for the selection of teaching staff and for taking disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself. For redressing the grievances of employees of aided and unaided institutions who are subjected to punishment or termination from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved, and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and till then, such tribunals could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge. The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualification, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher or a principal of any educational institution. Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State, without interfering with the overall administrative control of the management over the staff. Fees to be charged by unaided institutions cannot be regulated but no institution should charge capitation fee. (7) The basic ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the St. Stephen's College case, (1992) 1 SCC 558, is correct, as indicated in this judgment. However, rigid percentage cannot be stipulated. It has to be left to authorities to prescribe a reasonable percentage having regard to the type of institution, population and educational needs of minorities. (8) The scheme framed by the Supreme Court in Unni Krishnan's case, (1993) 1 SCC 645 and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facilities does not, however, amount to profiteering. (9) The expression "education" in the Articles of the Constitution means and includes education at all levels from the primary school level upto the postgraduate level. It includes professional education. The expression "educational institutions" means institutions that impart education, where "education" is as understood hereinabove. The right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 26, and to minorities specifically under Article 30. All citizens have a right to establish and administer educational institutions under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 26, but this right is subject to the provisions of Articles 19 (6) and 26 (a). Ruma Pal, J. (Minority view) : (1) The protection under Article 30 is against any measure, legislative or otherwise, which infringes the rights granted under that Article. The right is not claimed in a vacuum - it is claimed against a particular legislative or executive measure and the question of minority status must be judged in relation to the offending piece of legislation or executive order. If the source of the infringing action is the State, then the protection must be given against the State and the status of the individual or group claiming the protection must be determined with reference to the territorial limits of the State. If however the protection is limited to State action, it will leave the group which is otherwise a majority for the purpose of State Legislation, vulnerable to Union Legislation which operates on a national basis. When the entire nation is sought to be affected, surely the question of minority status must be determined with reference to the country as a whole. (2) The right to admit mi­nority students to a minority educational institution is an intrinsic part of Article 30 (1). To say that Article 29 (2) prevails over Article 30 (1) would be to infringe and to a large extent wipe out this right. There would be no distinction between a minority educational institution and other institutions and the rights under Article 30 (1) would be rendered wholly in-operational. It is no answer to say that the rights of unaided minority institutions would remain untouched because Article 29 (2) does not re­late to unaided institutions at all. Whereas, if one reads Article 29 (2) as subject to Article 30 (1) then effect can be given to both. And it is the latter approach which is to be followed in the interpretation of constitutional provisions. In other words, as long as the minority educational institution is being run for the benefit of and catering to the needs of the members of that community under Article 30 (1), Article 29 (2) would not apply. But once the mi­nority educational institution travels beyond the needs in the sense of requirements of its own community, at that stage it is no longer exercis­ing rights of admission guaranteed under Article 30 (1). To put it differ­ently, when the right of admission is exercised not to meet the need of the minorities, the rights of admission given under Article 30 (1) is to that extent removed and the institution is bound to admit students for the balance in keeping with the provisions of Article 29 (2). Article 29 (2) pertains to the right of an individual and is not a class right. It would, therefore, apply when an individual is denied admission into any educational institution maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State funds, solely on the basis of the ground of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. It does not operate to create a class interest or right in the sense that any educational institution has to set apart for non-minori­ties as a class and without reference to any individual applicant, a fixed percentage of available seats. Unless Articles 30 (1) and 29 (2) are allowed to operate in their separate fields then what started with the voluntary 'sprinkling' of outsiders, would become a major inundation and a large chunk of the right of an aided minority institution to operate for the benefit of the community it was set up to serve, would be washed away. Whether there has been a violation of Article 29 (2) in refus­ing admission to a non-minority student in a particular case must be re­solved as it has been in the past by recourse to the Courts. It must be em­phasised that the right under Article 29 (2) is an individual one. If the non-minority student is otherwise eligible for admission, the decision on the issue of refusal would depend on whether the minority institution is able to establish that the refusal was only because it was satisfying the requirements of its own community under Article 30 (1). I cannot, therefore, subscribe to the view expressed by the majority that the requirement of the minority community for admission to a minority educational in­stitution should be left to the State or any other Governmental authority to determine. If the executive is given the power to determine the re­quirements of the minority community in the matter of admission to its educational institutions, we would be subjecting the minority educational institution in question to an "intolerable encroachment" on the right under Article 30 (1) and let in by the back door as it were, what should be denied entry altogether. S. N. Variava, J. : (1) Linguistic and religious minorities are covered by the expression "minority" under Article 30 of the Constitution. Since re-organization of the States in India has been on linguistic lines, therefore, for the purpose of determining the minority, the unit will be the State and not the whole of India. Thus, religious and linguistic minorities, who have been put at par in Article 30, have to be considered State-wise. (2) Article 30 (1) gives religious and linguistic minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice. The use of the words "of their choice" indicates that even professional educational institutions would be covered by Article 30. (3) Admission of students to unaided minority educational institutions, viz., schools where scope for merit based selection is practically nil, cannot be regulated by the State or the university (except for provid­ing the qualifications and minimum conditions of eligibility in the interest of academic standards). Right to admit students being an essential facet of right to administer educational institutions of their choice, as contemplated under Article 30 of the Constitution, the State Government or the university may not be entitled to interfere with that right in respect of unaided minority insti­tutions provided however that the admission to the unaided educational institutions is on transparent basis and the merit is the criteria. The right to administer, not being an absolute one, there could be regulatory measures for ensuring educational standards and maintaining excel­lence thereof and it is more so, in the matter of admissions to under­graduate colleges and professional institutions. The moment aid is received or taken by a minority educational insti­tution, it would be governed by Article 29 (2) and would then not be able to refuse admission on grounds of religion, race, caste, language or any of them. In other words it cannot then give preference to students of its own community. Observance of inter se merit amongst the applicants must be ensured. In the case of aided professional institutions, it can also be stipulated that passing of common entrance test held by the State agency is necessary to seek admission. (4) A minority institution may have its own procedure and method of admission as well as selection of students, but such procedure must be fair and transparent and selection of students in professional and higher educational colleges should be on the basis of merit. The proce­dure adopted or selection made should not tantamount to mal-adminis­tration. Even an unaided minority institution, ought not to ignore merit of the students for admission, while exercising its right to admit stu­dents to the colleges aforesaid, as in that event, the institution will fail to achieve excellence. (5) Whilst giving aid to professional institutions, it would be permissible for the authority giving aid to prescribe by-rules or regulations, the conditions on the basis of which admission will be granted to different aided colleges by virtue of merit, coupled with the reservation policy of the State. The merit may be determined either through a common entrance test conducted by the university or the Government fol­lowed by counselling, or on the basis of an entrance test conducted by in­dividual institutions - the method to be followed is for the university or the Government to decide. The authority may also devise other means to ensure that admission is granted to an aided professional institution on the basis of merit. In the case of such institutions, it will be permissible for the Government or the university to provide that consideration should be shown to the weaker sections of the society. (6) So far as the statutory provisions regulating the facets of adminis­tration is concerned, in case of an unaided minority educational institution, the regulatory measure of control should be minimal and the con­ditions of recognition as well as conditions of affiliation to an univer­sity or board have to be complied with, but in the matter of day-to-day management, like appointment of staff, teaching and non-teaching and administrative control over them, the management should have the freedom and there should not be any external controlling agency. However, a rational procedure for selection of teaching staff and for tak­ing disciplinary action has to be evolved by the management itself. For redressing the grievances of such employees who are subjected to pun­ishment or termination from service, a mechanism will have to be evolved and in our opinion, appropriate tribunals could be constituted, and till then, such tribunal could be presided over by a judicial officer of the rank of District Judge. The State or other controlling authorities, however, can always prescribe the minimum qualifications, salaries, experience and other conditions bearing on the merit of an individual for being appointed as a teacher of an educational institution. Regulations can be framed governing service conditions for teaching and other staff for whom aid is provided by the State without interfering with overall administrative control of management over the staff, Gov­ernment/university representative can be associated with the selection committee and the guidelines for selection can be laid down. In regard to unaided minority educational institutions such regulations, which will ensure a check over unfair practices and general welfare, of teachers could be framed. There could be appropriate mechanism to ensure that no capitation fee is charged and profiteering is not resorted to. The extent of regulations will not be the same for aided and unaided institutions. (7) The ratio laid down in St. Stephen's College case (supra) is not correct. Once State aid is taken and Article 29 (2) comes into play, then no question arises of trying to balance Articles 29 (2) and 31. Article 29 (2) must be given its full effect. (8) The scheme framed by this Court in Unni Krishnan's case (supra) means institutions that impart education and the direction to impose the same, except where it holds that primary education is a fundamental right, is unconstitutional. However, the principle that there should not be capitation fee or profiteering is correct. Reasonable surplus to meet cost of expansion and augmentation of facil­ities does not, however, amount to profiteering. (9) The expression "education" in the Articles of the Constitution means and includes education at all levels from the primary school level up to the postgraduate level. It includes profes­sional education. The ex­pression "ed­ucational institutions" means institution that impart education. The right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under the Constitution to all citizens under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 26, and to mi­norities specifically under Article 30. All citizens have a right to establish and administer educational in­stitutions under Articles 19 (1) (g) and 26, but this right will be subject to the provisions of Articles 19 (6) and 26 (a). However, minority institutions will have a right to admit students belong­ing to the minority group. Per Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J. (Minority view) In his separate judgment--See p. 3427, infra : The right conferred on the student community under Article 29(2) is a truncated right though it is available to each student and against all the institutions maintained by the State or receiving aid from the State funds. Nevertheless, the right under Article 30(1) is a special right conferred on minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and to administer educational institutions of their choice and with that goes the special right of the minority students to seek admission in such institutions. Article 29(2) even if regarded as a special right in regard to the student community is of general application in regard to all the institutions main­tained by the State or receiving aid from the State funds when compared to special right conferred on minorities under Article 30. A provision may be special in one aspect and general in other aspect. The minority educational institutions established and administered under Article 30(1) for the benefit of the students of their community have the right to admit the students of their choice of their community and without prejudice to the right of the minority students to admit students of the non-minority. They have a right to claim aid under clause (2) of Article 30, if the State decides to grant aid to other educational institutions in the State. The grant of aid by the State cannot alter the character of a minority insti­tution, including its choice of the stu­dents. Unlike Article 337, there is nothing in clause (2) of Article 30 to suggest that grant of aid will result in making a percentage of seats avail­able for non-minority students or be subject to Article 29(2). From the point of view of the minority students who seek admission in the minority educational institutions, it hardly makes a difference whether the institution is an aided institution or an unaided institution. In the case of a rich minor­ity not getting aid under clause (2) of Article 30 for the minority educational institution established and adminis­tered under clause (1) of Article 30, the right of the minority students seek­ing admission therein cannot be dif­ferent from the right of poor minority students seeking admission in educational institutions established and administered by poor minorities which are aided. On the institutions deciding to take aid from the State, the right of minority students to seek admission in such institutions cannot be affected. It follows that the concomitant special right of students who belong to minority community which established the institution and is administering it under Article 30(1), to seek admission in such an institution has precedence over the general right of non-minority students under Article 29(2). So having regard to the right of the minority educational institutions to admit the students of their choice as well as the right of the students of the minority community to seek admission in such institutions, it is difficult to comprehend that merely on the ground that the institution is receiving aid out of State funds, their rights can be set at naught with reference to Article 29(2). Therefore, it appears that on grant of aid by the State, Article 29(2) does not control Article 30(1). The right conferred under Article 29(2) is an individual right. The difficulty is arising because it is sought to be converted into a collective right of non-minority students vis-a-vis minority educational institutions so as to take away a slice of the seats available in such institutions. In an institution established and administered under Article 30(1), the need of minority students is foremost as it is for their benefit that the institution exists. The grant of aid to the institution is to fulfil its objective and not to deviate from the object and barter the right of the minority students. It is only when the need of the minority students is over that in regard to the remaining seats that the institution can admit students of non-minority. In each year in a given course the same number of minority students may not apply. The minority educational institutions can admit non-minority students of their choice in the left over seats in each year as Article 29(2) does not override Article 30(1). If the need of the minority is to be given its due, the question of determining the need cannot be left to the State. Article 30 is intended to protect the minority educational institutions from interference of the State so they cannot be thrown at the mercy of the State. The State cannot be conferred with the power to determine the need of each minority institution in the country which will be both unrealistic and impracticable apart from abridging the right under Article 30(1). The best way to ensure compliance with Article 29(2) as well as Article 30(1) is to consider individual cases where denial of admission of a non-minority student by a minority educational institution is alleged to be in violation of Article 29(2) and provide appropriate relief. To create inroads into the constitutional protection granted to minority educational institutions by forcing students of dominant groups of the choice of the State or agency of the State for admission in such institutions in preference to the choice of minority educational institutions will amount to a clear violation of the right specifically guaranteed under Article 30(1) of the Constitution and will turn the fundamental right into a promise of unreality which will be impermissible. Right of minorities to admit students of non-minority of their choice in their educational institutions set up under Article 30 is one thing but thrusting students of non-minority on minority educational institutions, whatever may be the percentage, irrespective of and prejudicial to the need of the minority in such institution, is entirely another. It is the former and not the latter course of action which will be in conformity with the scheme of clause (2) of Article 29 and clauses (1) and (2) of Article 30 of the Constitution. T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka and Ors. (31.10.2002 - SC) : MANU/SC/0905/2002


P.A. I NAMDAR v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

2005(36)AIC239 AIR2005SC3226 2005(5)ALLMR(SC)1030 2005 (4) AWC 3864B (SC) 2005(5)ALT1(SC) 2005(5)BomCR859 2005(107(3))BomLR900 2005(4)CTC81 2005(3)ESC373(SC) 2005GLH(3)224 [2005(4)JCR164(SC)] JT2005(7)SC313 2005(5)KarLJ161 (2005)3MLJ158(SC) MANU/SC/0482/2005 2005(4)PLJR77 RLW2005(3)SC450 [2005]Supp(2)SCR603 2005(3)SCT697(SC) 2005(5)SLR409(SC) (2005)6SCC537 2005(2)UJ1176

Case Note: (1) Constitution of India - Articles 19 (1) (g), 29 (2) and 30 (1)--Educational Institutions--Unaided minority or non-minority institutions --Certain controversies resolved in 11-Judge Bench in T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (4) AWC 3297 (SC) : (2002) 8 SCC 481 (Pai Foundation), as explained and clarified in 5-Judge Bench in Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, 2003 (4) AWC 3119 (SC) : 2004 (1) SCCD 125 : (2003) 6 SCC 697 (Islamic Academy)--As follow-up certain controversies cropped up which have been resolved as under : (A) Extent to which State can regulate admissions made by unaided minority or non-minority educational institutions--Whether State can enforce its policy of reservation and/ or appropriate to itself any quota in admissions to such institutions?--Held, "no"--Reservation of 15% seats for Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) permissible. States have no power to insist on seat sharing in the unaided private professional educational institutions by fixing a quota of seats between the management and the State. The State cannot insist on private educational institutions which receive no aid from the State to implement State's policy on reservation for granting admission on lesser percentage of marks, i.e., on any criterion except merit. Neither in the judgment of Pai Foundation nor in the Constitution Bench decision in Kerala Education Bill, (1958) SCR 995, which was approved by Pai Foundation, there is anything which would allow the State to regulate or control admissions in the unaided professional educational institutions so as to compel them to give up a share of the available seats to the candidates chosen by the State, as if it was filling the seats available to be filled up at its discretion in such private institutions. This would amount to nationalization of seats, which has been specifically disapproved in Pai Foundation. Such imposition of quota of State seats or enforcing reservation policy of the State on available seats in unaided professional institutions are acts constituting serious encroachment on the right and autonomy of private professional educational institutions. Such appropriation of seats can also not be held to be a regulatory measure in the interest of minority within the meaning of Article 30 (1) or a reasonable restriction within the meaning of Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. Merely because the resources of the State in providing professional education are limited, private educational institutions, which intend to provide better professional education, cannot be forced by the State to make admissions available on the basis of reservation policy to less meritorious candidate. Unaided institutions, as they are not deriving any aid from State funds, can have their own admissions if fair, transparent, non-exploitative and based on merit. Observation in para 68 of Pai Foundation merely permit unaided private institutions to maintain merit as the criterion of admission by voluntarily agreeing for seat sharing with the State or adopting selection based on common entrance test of the State. There are also observations saying that they may frame their own policy to give free-ships and scholarships to the needy and poor students or adopt a policy in line with the reservation policy of the State to cater to the educational needs of weaker and poorer sections of the society. Nowhere in Pai Foundation, either in the majority or in the minority opinion, have we found any justification for imposing seat sharing quota by the State on unaided private professional educational institutions and reservation policy of the State or State quota seats or management seats. The observations in Pai Foundation in paragraph 68 and other paragraphs mentioning fixation of percentage of quota are to be read and understood as possible consensual arrangements which can be reached between unaided private professional institutions and the State. In Pai Foundation, it has been very clearly held at several places that unaided professional institutions should be given greater autonomy in determination of admission procedure and fee structure. State regulation should be minimal and only with a view to maintain fairness and transparency in admission procedure and to check exploitation of the students by charging exorbitant money or capitation fees. For the aforesaid reasons, we cannot approve of the scheme evolved in Islamic Academy to the extent it allows States to fix quota for seat sharing between management and the States on the basis of local needs of each State, in the unaided private educational institutions of both minority and non-minority categories. That part of the judgment in Islamic Academy, does not lay down the correct law and runs counter to Pai Foundation. Therefore, neither the policy of reservation can be enforced by the State nor any quota or percentage of admissions can be carved out to be appropriated by the State in a minority or non-minority unaided educational institution. Minority institutions are free to admit students of their own choice including students of non-minority community as also members of their own community from other States, both to a limited extent only and not in a manner and to such an extent that their minority educational institution status is lost. If they do so, they lose the protection of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India. A limited reservation of seats, not exceeding 15% may be made available to NRIs depending on the discretion of the management subject to two conditions. First, such seats should be utilized bona fide by the NRIs only and for their children or wards. Secondly, within this quota, the merit should not be given a complete go-by. The amount of money, in whatever form collected from such NRIs, should be utilized for benefiting students such as from economically weaker sections of the society, whom, on well-defined criteria, the educational institution may admit on subsidized payment of their fee. To prevent misutilisation of such quota or any mal-practice referable to NRI quota seats, suitable legislation or regulation needs to be framed. So long as the State does not do it, it will be for the Committees constituted pursuant to Islamic Academy's direction to regulate. Observation in Islamic Academy contained in later part of para 19 of judgment on quota and fixation of percentage by State Government, overruled. (B) Admission procedure of unaided educational institutions--Common entrance test to be held--State can also provide procedure of holding common entrance test in interest of securing fair and merit-based admissions and preventing mal-administration. So far as the minority unaided institutions are concerned, to admit students being one of the components of "right to establish and administer an institution", the State cannot interfere therewith. Upto the level of undergraduate education, the minority unaided educational institutions enjoy total freedom. However, different considerations would apply for graduate and post-graduate level of education, as also for technical and professional educational institutions. Such education cannot be imparted by any institution unless recognised by or affiliated with any competent authority created by law, such as a University, Board, Central or State Government or the like. Excellence in education and maintenance of high standards at this level are a must. To fulfil these objectives, the State can and rather must, in national interest, step in. The education, knowledge and learning at this level possessed by individuals collectively constitutes national wealth. Pai Foundation has already held that the minority status of educational institutions is to be determined by treating the States as units. Students of that community residing in other States where they are not in minority, shall not be considered to be minority in that particular State and hence their admission would be at par with other non-minority students of that State. Such admissions will be only to a limited extent, that is, like a 'sprinkling' of such admissions, the term we have used earlier borrowed from Kerala Education Bill, 1957. In minority educational institutions, aided or unaided, admissions shall be at the State level. Transparency and merit shall have to be assured. Whether minority or non-minority institutions, there may be more than one similarly situated institutions imparting education in any one discipline, in any State. The same aspirant seeking admission to take education in any one discipline of education shall have to purchase admission forms from several institutions and appear at several admission tests conducted at different places on same or different dates and there may be a clash of dates. If the same candidate is required to appear in several tests, he would be subjected to unnecessary and avoidable expenditure and inconvenience. There is nothing wrong in an entrance test being held for one group of institutions imparting same or similar education. Such institutions situated in one State or in more than one State may join together and hold a common entrance test or the State may itself or through an agency arrange for holding of such test. Out of such common merit list, the successful candidates can be identified and chosen for being allotted to different institutions depending on the courses of study offered, the number of seats, the kind of minority to which the institution belongs and other relevant factors. Such an agency conducting Common Entrance Test (CET, for short) must be one enjoying utmost credibility and expertise in the matter. This would better ensure the fulfilment of twin objects of transparency and merit. CET is necessary in the interest of achieving the said objectives and also for saving the student community from harassment and exploitation. Holding of such common entrance test followed by centralised counselling or, in other words, single window system regulating admissions does not cause any dent in the right of minority unaided educational institutions to admit students of their choice. Such choice can be exercised from out of list of successful candidates prepared at the CET without altering the order of merit inter se of the students so chosen. Pai Foundation has held that minority unaided institutions can legitimately claim unfettered fundamental right to choose the students to be allowed admissions and the procedure therefor subject to its being fair, transparent and non-exploitative. The same principle applies to non-minority unaided institutions. There may be a single institution imparting a particular type of education which is not being imparted by any other institution and having its own admission procedure fulfilling the test of being fair, transparent and non-exploitative. All institutions imparting same or similar professional education can join together for holding a common entrance test satisfying the abovesaid triple test. The State can also provide a procedure of holding a common entrance test in the interest of securing fair and merit-based admissions and preventing mal-administration. The admission procedure so adopted by private institution or group of institutions, if it fails to satisfy all or any of the triple tests, indicated hereinabove, can be taken over by the State substituting its own procedure. It needs to be specifically stated that having regard to the larger interest and welfare of the student community to promote merit, achieve excellence and curb mal-practices, it would be permissible to regulate admissions by providing a centralised and single window procedure. Such a procedure, to a large extent, can secure grant of merit based admissions on a transparent basis. Till regulations are framed, the admission committees can oversee admissions so as to ensure that merit is not the casualty. (C) Fee chargeable--Capitation fee for professional courses cannot be charged--Permissible to regulate admission and fee structure. To set up a reasonable fee structure is also a component of "the right to establish and administer an institution" within the meaning of Article 30 (1) of the Constitution, as per the law declared in Pai Foundation. Every institution is free to devise its own fee structure subject to the limitation that there can be no profiteering and no capitation fee can be charged directly or indirectly, or in any form (Paras 56 to 58 and 161 (Answer to Q. 5 (c)) of Pai Foundation are relevant in this regard). Capitation fee cannot be permitted to be charged and no seat can be permitted to be appropriated by payment of capitation fee. 'Profession' has to be distinguished from 'business' or a mere 'occupation'. While in business, and to a certain extent, in occupation, there is a profit motive, profession is primarily a service to society wherein earning is secondary or incidental. A student who gets a professional degree by payment of capitation fee, once qualified as professional, is likely to aim more at earning rather than serving and that becomes a bane to the society. The charging of capitation fee by unaided minority and non-minority institutions for professional courses is just not permissible. Similarly, profiteering is also not permissible. Despite the legal position, the Supreme Court cannot shut its eyes to the hard realities of commercialisation of education and evil practices being adopted by many institutions to earn large amounts for their private or selfish ends. If capitation fee and profiteering is to be checked, the method of admission has to be regulated so that the admissions are based on merit and transparency and the students are not exploited. It is permissible to regulate admission and fee structure for achieving the purpose just stated. (D) Committees formed pursuant to Islamic Academy--Permissive as regulatory measures--Scheme evolved of setting up two committees for regulating admissions and determining fee structure cannot be faulted with for alleged infringement of Articles 19 (1) (g) and 30 (1). The two committees for monitoring admission procedure and determining fee structure in the judgment of Islamic Academy, are, permissive as regulatory measures aimed at protecting the interest of the student community as a whole as also the minorities themselves, in maintaining required standards of professional education on non-exploitative terms in their institutions. Legal provisions made by the State Legislatures or the scheme evolved by the Court for monitoring admission procedure and fee fixation do not violate the right of minorities under Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India or the right of minorities and non-minorities under Article 19 (1)(g). They are reasonable restrictions in the interest of minority institutions permissible under Article 30 (1) and in the interest of general public under Article 19 (6) of the Constitution. Unless the admission procedure and fixation of fees is regulated and controlled at the initial stage, the evil of unfair practice of granting admission on available seats guided by the paying capacity of the candidates would be impossible to curb. Non-minority unaided institutions can also be subjected to similar restrictions which are found reasonable and in the interest of student community. Professional education should be made accessible on the criterion of merit and on non-exploitative terms to all eligible students on an uniform basis. Minorities or non-minorities, in exercise of their educational rights in the field of professional education have an obligation and a duty to maintain requisite standards of professional education by giving admissions based on merit and making education equally accessible to eligible students through a fair and transparent admission procedure and on a reasonable fee-structure. On the basis of judgment in Pai Foundation and various previous judgments of the Supreme Court, which have been taken into consideration in that case, the scheme evolved of setting up the two Committees for regulating admissions and determining fee structure by the judgment in Islamic Academy cannot be faulted either on the ground of alleged infringement of Article 19 (1) (g) in case of unaided professional educational institutions of both categories and Article 19 (1) (g) read with Article 30 in case of unaided professional institutions of minorities. There is no impediment to the constitution of the Committees as a stopgap or ad hoc arrangement made in exercise of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 142 of the Constitution until a suitable legislation or regulation framed by the State steps in. Such Committees cannot be equated with Unni Krishnan Committees which were supposed to be permanent in nature. Retired High Court Judges heading the Committees are assisted by experts in accounts and management. They also have the benefit of hearing the contending parties. We expect the Committees, so long as they remain functional, to be more sensitive and to act rationally and reasonably with due regard for realities. They should refrain from generalising fee structures and, where needed, should go into accounts, schemes, plans and budgets of an individual institution for the purpose of finding out what would be an ideal and reasonable fee structure for that institution. In case of any individual institution, if any of the Committees is found to have exceeded its powers by unduly interfering in the administrative and financial matters of the unaided private professional institutions, the decision of the Committee being quasi-judicial in nature, would always be subject to judicial review. (2) Constitution of India--Article 30 (1)--Scope of Article 30 (1)--It is protective measure only and implies certain privilege--It is protection and/or privilege of minority rather than abstract right. (3) Constitution of India--Articles 29 (2) and 30 (1)--Minority educational institution--Admission of students--Whether linguistic students of adjoining State in which they are in majority can be admitted?--Held, "no". What would happen if a minority belonging to a particular State establishes an educational institution in that State and administers it but for the benefit of members belonging to that minority domiciled in the neighbouring State where that community is in majority? The question need not detain the Court for long as it stands answered in no uncertain terms in Pai Foundation. Emphasising the need for preserving its minority character so as to enjoy the privilege of protection under Article 30 (1), it is necessary that the objective of establishing the institution was not defeated. "If so, such an institution is under an obligation to admit the bulk of the students fitting into the description of the minority community. Therefore, the students of that group residing in the State in which the institution is located have to be necessarily admitted in a large measure because they constitute the linguistic minority group as far as that State is concerned. In other words, the predominance of linguistic students hailing from the State in which the minority educational institution is established should be present. The management bodies of such institutions cannot resort to the device of admitting the linguistic students of the adjoining State in which they are in a majority, under the facade of the protection given under Article 30 (1)." The same principle applies to religious minority. If any other view was to be taken, the very objective of conferring the preferential right of admission by harmoniously constructing Articles 30 (1) and 29 (2), may be distorted. It necessarily follows from the law laid down in Pai Foundation that to establish a minority institution, the institution must primarily cater to the requirements of that minority of that State, else its character of minority institution is lost. However, to borrow the words of Chief Justice S. R. Das (in Kerala Education Bill) a 'sprinkling' of that minority from other State on the same footing as a sprinkling of non-minority students, would be permissible and would not deprive the institution of its essential character of being a minority institution determined by reference to that State as a unit. (4) Words and phrases--Education--What cannotes and embraces?--It is occupation and not trade or business. Education is ".....continual growth of personality, steady development of character, and the qualitative improvement of life. A trained mind has the capacity to draw spiritual nourishment from every experience, be it defeat or victory, sorrow or joy. Education is training the mind and not stuffing the brain." Education, accepted as a useful activity, whether for charity or for profit, is an occupation. Nevertheless, it does not cease to be a service to the society. And even though an occupation, it cannot be equated to a trade or a business. In short, education is national wealth essential for the nation's progress and prosperity. (5) Words and phrases--Minority--Not defined in Constitution of India--Minority, whether linguistic or religious, determinable only by reference to demography of a State--And not by taking into consideration population of country as a whole. (6) Minority educational institution--Effect of State aid--Autonomy conferred by Article 30 (1) of Constitution diluted--Regulatory measure permissible--Non-minority students cannot be forced upon it. Merely because Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India has been enacted, minority educational institutions do not become immune from the operation of regulatory measure because the right to administer does not include the right to mal-administer. To what extent the State regulation can go, is the issue. The real purpose sought to be achieved by Article 30 is to give minorities some additional protection. Once aided, the autonomy conferred by the protection of Article 30 (1) on the minority educational institution is diluted as provisions of Article 29 (2) will be attracted. Certain conditions in the nature of regulations can legitimately accompany the State aid. The employment of expressions 'right to establish and administer' and 'educational institution of their choice' in Article 30 (1) of the Constitution of India gives the right a very wide amplitude. Therefore, a minority educational institution has a right to admit students of its own choice, it can, as a matter of its own freewill, admit students of non-minority community. However, non-minority students cannot be forced upon it. The only restriction on the freewill of the minority educational institution admitting students belonging to non-minority community is, as spelt out by Article 30 itself, that the manner and number of such admissions should not be violative of the minority character of the institution. Case Category: ADMISSION/TRANSFER TO ENGINEERING AND MEDICAL COLLEGES P.A. Inamdar and Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. (12.08.2005 - SC) : MANU/SC/0482/2005


TECHNIP SA-v.-SMS HOLDING (PVT.) LTD. AND ORS.

III(2005)BC56(SC) [2005]125CompCas545(SC) (2005)4CompLJ385(SC) [2005]66CLA407(SC) 2005(4)CTC209 JT2005(5)SC506 MANU/SC/0385/2005 [2005]Supp(2)SCR223 [2005]60SCL249(SC) (2005)5SCC465

Case Note: Company - take over - Regulations 2, 3, 10, 11 and 12 of Securities and Exchange Board of India (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeover) Regulations, 1997, Sections 15Z and 356I of Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, Section 7 (1) of Foreign Awards Act, Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1973, Section 45 of Evidence Act, 1972, Section 23A of Income Tax Act, 1922 and Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 - whether Technip acquired control of SEAMEC through Coflexip in April 2000 or in July 2001 - admittedly both Coflexip and Technip incorporated according to and under laws of France thus domiciled in France - issue relating to their internal affairs to be resolved by applying law of their domiciled - no evidence that Technip obtained de facto control of Coflexip in April 2000 - evidence adduced suggested nothing more than strategic alliance - mere fact that in two annual general meetings of Coflexip former was in majority cannot by itself establish its control over Coflexip - Technip never exerted its influence over any policy matters of Coflexip - Technip obtained control of Coflexip in July 2001 and violated Regulations 10 and 12 by acquiring 58.24% of shares/voting rights and control in SEAMEC in July 2001 without making any public offer - Technip rightly directed by SEBI to make public announcement as required under Regulations within 45 days of its order taking 03.07.2001 as specified date for calculation of offered price - Technip also directed to pay interest at rate of 15% per annum to willing minority shareholders of SEAMEC for delayed public announcement. Technip S.A. vs. SMS Holding (Pvt.) Ltd. and Ors. (11.05.2005 - SC) : MANU/SC/0385/2005


MIS. S.B.P. AND CO.-v.-MIS. PATEL ENGINEERING LTD. AND ANR

AIR2006SC450 2006 (1) AWC 538 (SC) 2006(1)ALD10(SC) 2005(3)ArbLR285(SC) 2006(1)BomCR585 [2005]128CompCas465(SC) (2006)2CompLJ7(SC) 2005 (4) CCC 140 2005(5)CTC302 2006GLH(1)105 (2006)3GLR2097 [2006(1)JCR190(SC)] JT2005(9)SC219 2006-1-LW73 2006(1)MPJR(SC)1 (2006)1MLJ1(SC) MANU/SC/1787/2005 2006(1)MPHT1 2006(1)PLJR74 RLW2006(2)SC1386 2005(4)RCR(Civil)747 2005(9)SCALE1 (2005)8SCC618 2006(1)UJ156

Case Note: Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 11--Appointment of Arbitrator by Chief Justice--Whether Chief Justice exercises judicial power or administrative power?--Held, by Majority of 6 : 1 that Chief Justice exercises judicial power--Scope of Section 11 (6) delineated by majority and minority. The Majority, speaking through P. K. Balasubramanyan, J. held : (i) The power exercised by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under Section 11 (6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not an administrative power. It is a judicial power. (ii) The power under Section 11 (6) of the Act, in its entirety, could be delegated, by the Chief Justice of the High Court only to another Judge of that Court and by the Chief Justice of India to another Judge of the Supreme Court. (iii) In case of designation of a Judge of the High Court or of the Supreme Court, the power that is exercised by the designated, Judge would be that of the Chief Justice as conferred by the statute. (iv) The Chief Justice or the designated Judge will have the right to decide the preliminary aspects. These will be, his own jurisdiction, to entertain the request, the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, the existence or otherwise of a live claim, the existence of the condition for the exercise of his power and on the qualifications of the arbitrator or arbitrators. The Chief Justice or the Judge designated would be entitled to seek the opinion of an institution in the matter of nominating an arbitrator qualified in terms of Section 11 (8) of the Act if the need arises but the order appointing the arbitrator could only be that of the Chief Justice or the Judge designate. (v) Designation of a District Judge as the authority under Section 11 (6) of the Act by the Chief Justice of the High Court is not warranted on the scheme of the Act. (vi) Once the matter reaches the arbitral tribunal or the sole arbitrator, the High Court would not interfere with orders passed by the arbitrator or the arbitral Tribunal during the course of the arbitration proceedings and the parties could approach the Court only in terms of Section 37 of the Act or in terms of Section 34 of the Act. (vii) Since an order passed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or by the designated Judge of that Court is a judicial order, an appeal will lie against that order only under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to the Supreme Court. (viii) There can be no appeal against an order of the Chief Justice of India or a Judge of the Supreme Court designated by him while entertaining an application under Section 11 (6) of the Act. (ix) In a case where an arbitral Tribunal has been constituted by the parties without having recourse to Section 11 (6) of the Act, the arbitral Tribunal will have the jurisdiction to decide all matters as contemplated by Section 16 of the Act. (x) Since all were guided by the decision of the Supreme Court in Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. and another v. Rani Construction Pvt. Ltd., (2000) 8 SCC 159 and orders under Section 11 (6) of the Act have been made based on the position adopted in that decision, we clarify that appointments of arbitrators or arbitral Tribunals thus far made, are to be treated as valid, all objections being left to be decided under Section 16 of the Act. As and from this date, the position as adopted in this judgment will govern even pending applications under Section 11 (6) of the Act. (xi) Where District Judges had been designated by the Chief Justice of the High Court under Section 11 (6) of the Act, the appointment orders thus far made by them will be treated as valid ; but applications if any pending before them as on this date will stand transferred, to be dealt with by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court or a Judge of that Court designated by the Chief Justice. Decision in Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. v. Rani Construction (P.) Ltd., 2001 (1) AWC 59 (SC) : (2000) 8 SCC 159, overruled. C. K. Thakker, J., in his minority opinion, held: (i) The function performed by the Chief Justice of the High Court or the Chief Justice of India under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act (i.e. Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996) is administrative, -pure and simple-, and neither judicial nor quasi-judicial. (ii) The function to be performed by the Chief Justice under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act may be performed by him or by 'any person or institution designated by him.' (iii) While performing the function under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act, the Chief Justice should be prima facie satisfied that the conditions laid down in Section 11 are satisfied. (iv) The Arbitral Tribunal has power and jurisdiction to rule 'on its own jurisdiction' under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act. (v) Where the Arbitral Tribunal holds that it has jurisdiction, it shall continue with the arbitral proceedings and make an arbitral award. (vi) A remedy available to the party aggrieved is to challenge the award in accordance with Section 34 or Section 37 of the Act. (vii) Since the order passed by the Chief Justice under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act is administrative, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. A letters patent appeal/Intra-court appeal is competent. A special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution also lies to the Supreme Court. (viii) While exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, however, the High Court will be conscious and mindful of the relevant provisions of the Act, including Sections 5, 16, 34 to 37 as also the object of the legislation and exercise its power with utmost care, caution and circumspection. (ix) The decision of the Constitution Bench in Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. II, to the extent that it held the function of the Chief Justice under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act as administrative is in consonance with settled legal position and lays down correct law on the point. (x) The decision of the Constitution Bench in Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd. II, to the extent that it held Clause 7 of "The Appointment of Arbitrators by the Chief Justice of India Scheme, 1996" providing for issuance of notice to affected parties as "beyond the term of Section 11'' and bad on that ground is not in accordance with law and does not state the legal position correctly. (xi) Since the Chief Justice is performing administrative function in appointing an Arbitral Tribunal, there is no 'duty to act judicially' on his part. The doctrine of 'duty to act fairly', however, applies and the Chief Justice must issue notice to the person or persons likely to be affected by the decision under sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the Act. (xii) All appointments of Arbitral Tribunals so far made without issuing notice to the parties affected are held legal and valid. Henceforth, however, every appointment will be made after issuing notice to such person or persons. In other words, this judgment will have prospective operation and it will not affect past appointments or concluded proceedings. Industry: Capital Goods/ Engineering S.B.P. and Co. vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. and Ors. (26.10.2005 - SC) : MANU/SC/1787/2005


RAMESHW AR PRASAD AND ORS.-v.-UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

AIR2006SC980 2006(3)CTC209 JT2006(1)SC457 (2006)2MLJ67(SC) MANU/SC/0399/2006 2006(1)PLJR249 2006(1)SCALE385 (2006)2SCC1 [2006]1SCR562

Case Note: Constitution - Constitutional validity of - Dissolution of Assembly - Proclamation - The challenge in the present petitions is to the Constitutional validity of Notification dated 23rd May, 2005 ordering dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar - Whether the proclamation dated 23rd May, 2005 dissolving the Assembly of Bihar is illegal and unconstitutional - Held, If political party with support of other political party stakes claim to form government and satisfies the Governor about its majority to form stable government, Governor cannot refuse formation of Government and override the majority claim because of his subjective assessment that majority was cobbled by illegal and unethical means - Grounds of mal-administration by State Government enjoying majority is not available for invoking power under Article 356 - Hence, impugned proclamation was unconstitutional Constitution - Dissolution of Legislative Assembly - Article 174(2)(b) of the Constitution - Is it permissible to dissolve the Legislative Assembly under Article 174(2)(b) of the Constitution without its first meeting taking place - Held, Court relied on holding in Gujarat Assembly Election Matter, where it was held that the constitution of any Assembly can only be under Section 73 of the RP Act, 1951 and the requirement of Article 188 of Constitution suggests that the Assembly comes into existence even before its first sitting commences Constitution - Immunity to Governor - Article 361 of the Constitution of India - What is the scope of Article 361 granting immunity to the Governor - Governor enjoys complete immunity - Governor is not answerable to any Court for the exercise and performance of the powers and duties of his office or for any act done or purporting to be done by him in the exercise and performance of those powers and duties - Immunity granted by Article 361(1) does not, however, take away the power of the Court to examine the validity of the action including on the ground of mala fides Constitution - Status quo ante - Restoration of - If the notification dated 23rd May 2005 is declared as invalid, is it necessary to direct status quo ante as on 7th March, 2005 or 4th March, 2005 - Held, status quo ante cannot be directed - Reasons are the larger public interest, keeping in view the ground realities and taking a pragmatic view - As a result of the impugned Proclamation, the Election Commission of India had announced election which had reached on an advanced stage - Hence, the court permitted the completion of the ongoing election process with the fond hope that the electorate may again not give fractured verdict and may give a clear majority to one or other political party Rameshwar Prasad and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (24.01.2006 - SC) : MANU/SC/0399/2006


I.R.COELHO DEAD BY LRS -VS.- STATE OF TAMILNADU AND ORS.

AIR2007SC861 2007(1)ALLMR(SC)944 2007 (1) AWC 689 (SC) 2007(2)ALT1(SC) 2007GLH(1)501 ILR2007(1)Kerala289 [2007(2)JCR148(SC)] JT2007(2)SC292 2007(1)KLT623(SC) (2007)3MLJ423(SC) MANU/SC/0595/2007 2007(1)SCALE197 (2007)2SCC1 [2007]1SCR706

Case Note: Constitution of India - Article 31B--9th Schedule--Inclusion of a Statute in the 9th Schedule will not save it from being struck down as unconstitutional if it's effect is to abridge or abrogate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of and if such violation will violate the basic structure of the Constitution-- Vires of the Statute included in 9th Schedule is open to Judicial review--Article 368. Gudalur Janmam Estates [Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari] Act, 1969 and Section 2(c) of the West Bengal Land Holding Revenue Act, 1979, were struck down as unconstitutional. Both the Acts were included in the 9th Schedule of the Constitution by amending the Constitution. This was challenged and a 5 member Constitution Bench held that decision in Waman Rao & others v. Union of India & others [(1981) 2 SCC 362] requires reconsideration, in view of the decision in Minerva Mills Case and Maharao Sahib's case and 'it is to be made clear whether an Act or regulation which, or a part of which, is or has been found by the Supreme Court to be violative of one or more of the fundamental rights conferred by Articles 14,19 and 21 can be included in the 9th Schedule or whether it is only a constitutional amendment amending 9th Schedule which damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution which can be struck down'. In the light of the reference order, Nine member Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court framed the larger question 'Whether, on or after the date of Judgment in Keshvananda Bharathi's case, viz., 24-4-1973, it is permissible for the Parliament under Article 31B to immunise legislations from Fundamental rights by inserting them into the 9th Schedule and if so, what is the effect on the power of Judicial review of the Supreme Court'. It was contended by Petitioners that Fundamental rights conferred by part III forms part of the basic structure and laws included in 9th Schedule when tested on the ground of affecting the basic structure shall have to be examined on the test of violation of fundamental rights. On the other hand, it was contended by Respondents that validity of legislations included in the 9th Schedule can only be tested on the touchstone of basic structure doctrine, lack of legislative competence and violation of other Constitutional provisions and there cannot be Judicial review of such legislations on the ground of violation of fundamental rights chapter. After an elaborate precedential survey commencing from A.K. Gopalan's case in 1950 to Nagaraj's case in 2006, relying on the Doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution Bench answered the reference holding that 'if a Statute is held to be unconstitutional and such Statute is included in 9th Schedule after 24-4-1973, such violation can be challenged as violative of the basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Articles 14 and 19 but that actions finalised on the basis of these Statutes shall not be open to challenge'. Held: In conclusion, we hold that: (i) A law that abrogates or abridges rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution may violate the basic structure doctrine or it may not. If former is the consequence of law, whether by amendment of any Article of Part III or by an insertion in the Ninth Schedule, such law will have to be invalidated in exercise of judicial review power of the Court. The validity or invalidity would be tested on the principles laid down in this judgment. (ii) The majority judgment in Kesavananda Bharati's case read with Indira Gandhi's case, requires the validity of each new constitutional amendment to be judged on its own merits. The actual effect and impact of the law on the rights guaranteed under Part III has to be taken into account for determining whether or not it destroys basic structure. The impact test would determine the validity of the challenge. (iii) All amendments to the Constitution made on or after 24th April, 1973 by which the Ninth Schedule is amended by inclusion of various laws therein shall have to be tested on the touchstone of the basic or essential features of the Constitution as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19, and the principles underlying them. To put it differently even though an Act is put in the Ninth Schedule by a constitutional amendment, its provisions would be open to attack on the ground that they destroy or damage the basic structure if the fundamental right or rights taken away or abrogated pertains or pertain to the basic structure. (iv) Justification for conferring protection, not blanket protection, on the laws included in the Ninth Schedule by Constitutional Amendments shall be a matter of Constitutional adjudication by examining the nature and extent of infraction of a Fundamental Right by a Statute, sought to be Constitutionally protected, and on the touchstone of the basic structure doctrine as reflected in Article 21 read with Article 14 and Article 19 by application of the "rights test" and the "essence of the right" test taking the synoptic view of the Articles in Part III as held in Indira Gandhi's case. Applying the above tests to the Ninth Schedule laws, if the infraction affects the basic structure then such a law (s) will not get the protection of the Ninth Schedule. This is our answer to the question referred to us vide Order dated 14th September, 1999 in I.RULE Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu [(1999) 7 SCC 580]. (v) If the validity of any Ninth Schedule law has already been upheld by this Court, it would not be open to challenge such law again on the principles declared by this judgment. However, if a law held to be violative of any rights in Part III is subsequently incorporated in the Ninth Schedule after 24th April, 1973, such a violation/infraction shall be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or damages the basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19 and the principles underlying thereunder. (vi) Action taken and transactions finalised as a result of the impugned Acts shall not be open to challenge. Constitution of India--Article 31B--Judicial review of Statute included in 9th Schedule--If the law infringes the essence of any of the fundamental rights or any other aspect of basic structure, it will be struck down. Held: Cm it be said, after the evolution of the basic structure doctrine, that exclusion of these rights at Parliament's will without any standard, cannot be subjected to judicial scrutiny as a result of the bar created by Article 31B? The obvious answer has to be in the negative. If some of the fundamental rights constitute a basic structure, it would not be open to immunise those legislations from full judicial scrutiny either on the ground that the fundamental rights are not part of the basic structure or on the ground that Part III provisions are not available as a result of immunity granted by Article 31B. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that since the basic structure of the Constitution includes some of the fundamental rights, any law granted Ninth Schedule protection deserves to be tested against these principles. If the law infringes the essence of any of the fundamental rights or any other aspect of basic structure then it will be struck down. The extent of abrogation and limit of abridgment shall have to be examined in each case. Constitution of India--Doctrine of Separation of Powers-- Parliament cannot be the judge of limitation of its power to amend the Constitution--Such function is to be exercised by an independent organ viz., Judiciary. Held: It is permissible for the Legislature to amend the Ninth Schedule and grant a law the protection in terms of Article 31 but subject to right of citizen to assail it on the enlarged judicial review concept. The Legislature cannot grant fictional immunities and exclude the examination of the Ninth Schedule law by the Court after the enunciation of the basic structure doctrine. The constitutional amendments are subject to limitations and if the question of limitation is to be decided by the Parliament itself which enacts the impugned amendments and gives that law a complete immunity, it would disturb the checks and balances in the Constitution. The authority to enact law and decide the legality of the limitations cannot vest in one organ. The validity to the limitation on the rights in Part III can only be examined by another independent organ, namely, the judiciary. Ratio Decidendi: Essentially, it is the consequence of amendment which is relevant than its form to determine constitutional validity of the Ninth schedule laws on the touchstone of basic structure doctrine, to be adjudged by applying the direct impact and effect test, i.e. rights test I.R. Coelho (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (11.01.2007 - SC) : MANU/SC/0595/2007


COMMON CAUSE -VS.- UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

IV(2009)ACC413(SC) 2008(68)AIC132 AIR2008SC2116 2008(3)ALLMR(SC)472 2009(4)ALT15(SC) 2008(3)ALD81(SC) 2008 (2) CCC 199 2008GLH(2)575 (2008)2GLR1453(SC) JT2008(4)SC317 MANU/SC/7480/2008 2008(II)OLR60 2008(II)OLR(SC)60 2008(4)SCALE848 (2008)5SCC511


STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.-v.- THE COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS, WEST BENGAL & ORS.

2010(87)AIC1 AIR2010SC1476 2010 (68) ACC 985 2010(4)ADJ158 2010 6 AWC6073SC (2010)3CALLT6(SC) 2010(2)CTC84 2010(2)GLT1 JT2010(2)SC352 2010(2)KCCR785 2010(1)KLT723(SC) MANU/SC/0121/2010 2010(I)OLR(SC)584 RLW2010(1)SC822 2010(2)RCR(Criminal)141 2010(2)SCALE467 (2010)3SCC571 [2010]3SCR979 2010(2)UJ1047 2010(1)UC444

Case Note: Constitution - Power of High Courts to Issue certain Writs - Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 - FIR lodged by complainant for offences under Sections 148/149/448/436/364/302/201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 25/27 of the Arms Act, 1959 and Section 9(B) of the Explosives Act, 1884 against around 50-60 miscreants - No effective step taken by the state investigating authorities for investigation of the alleged offence - Writ Petition filed in High Court for transfer of investigation from state machinery to Central Bureau of investigation (CBI) for the protection of fundamental Rights of the victims - Whether High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can direct the CBI, established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 ,to investigate a cognizable offence, which is alleged to have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of a State, without the consent of the State Government - Held, Fundamental Rights, are inherent and cannot be extinguished by any constitutional or Statutory provision and any law that abrogates or abridges such rights would be violative of the basic structure doctrine - Also, Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, Apex court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the Fundamental Rights, guaranteed by Constitution - In the present case where the violation of Fundamental Rights of the citizens are in issue, a direction by the High Court to the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence which is violative of Fundamental Right of the citizen and alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be perfectly valid in law - No inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but such extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations as per the facts of the case - Matter referred to bench for disposal accordingly Constitution - Judicial Review - Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 - Validity of - Whether the doctrine of separation of powers curtail the power of judicial review, conferred on the constitutional Courts even in situations where the Fundamental Rights are sought to be abrogated or abridged on the ground that exercise of such power would impinge upon the said doctrine - Held, Courts a the guardians and interpreters of the Constitution and provide remedy under Articles 32 and 226, whenever there is an attempted violation of Fundamental Rights - Violation of Fundamental Rights cannot be immunised from judicial scrutiny on the touchstone of doctrine of separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary - Any direction by the Supreme Court or the High Court in exercise of power under Article 32 or 226 to uphold the Constitution and maintain the rule of law cannot be termed as violating the federal structure or doctrine of separation of power - But such extra-ordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations - Matter referred to bench for disposal accordingly Ratio Decidendi: "The doctrine of separation of powers cannot curtail the power of judicial review conferred on the constitutional Courts specially in situations where the fundamental rights are sought to be abrogated or abridged under the garb of these doctrines." "Violation of Fundamental Rights cannot be immunised from judicial scrutiny under Article 226 or under Article 32 on the touchstone of doctrine of separation of powers between the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary." State of West Bengal and Ors. vs. The Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors. (17.02.2010 - SC) : MANU/SC/0121/2010


SMT. SELVI & ORS.-v.-STATE OF KARNATAKA

AIR2010SC1974 2010(2)ALD(Cri)401 2010(2)Crimes241(SC) II(2010)CCR311(SC) 2010GLH(2)357 JT2010(5)SC11 2010 (2) KHC 412 MANU/SC/0325/2010 RLW2010(2)SC1688 2010(2)RCR(Criminal)896 2010(4)SCALE690 (2010)7SCC263 2010(4)UJ2128

Case Note: Constitution - Right against self-incrimination - Constitutionality of Involuntary administration of Narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) - Article 20(3) of Constitution of India, 1950 - Whether the involuntary administration of the Narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) violates the 'right against self-incrimination' enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution - Held, circumstances that could 'expose a person to criminal charges' amounts to incrimination' for the purpose of Article 20(3) - Article 20(3) aims to prevent the forcible 'conveyance of personal knowledge that is relevant to the facts in issue' - Protective scope of Article 20(3) extends to the investigative stage in criminal cases - Since, the underlying rationale of the 'right against self-incrimination' is to ensure the reliability as well as voluntariness of statements that are admitted as evidence, the compulsory administration of the impugned techniques violates the 'right against self-incrimination - Article 20(3) protects an individual's choice between speaking and remaining silent, irrespective of whether the subsequent testimony proves to be inculpatory or exculpatory - Results obtained from each of the impugned tests bear a 'testimonial' character and they cannot be categorised as material evidence - Hence, test results cannot be admitted in evidence if they have been obtained through the use of compulsion - Appeal Disposed of Constitution - Right against self-incrimination' - Who can avail Right against self-incrimination - Held - 'Right against self-incrimination ' available to persons who have been formally accused as well as those who are examined as suspects in criminal cases - Extends to cover witnesses who apprehend that their answers could expose them to criminal charges in the ongoing investigation or even in cases other than the one being investigated - Appeal Disposed of Constitution - 'Testimonial Compulsion' - Whether the results derived from the impugned techniques amount to 'testimonial compulsion' thereby attracting the bar of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, 1950 - Held, reliance on the contents of compelled testimony comes within the prohibition of Article 20(3) but its use for the purpose of identification or corroboration with facts already known to the investigators not barred - Narcoanalysis technique involves testimonial act as the subject is encouraged to speak in a drug-induced state such - Hence, compulsory administration of the narcoanalysis technique amounts to 'testimonial compulsion' and thereby triggers the protection of Article 20(3) - Appeal Disposed of Constitution - Inter-relation between Right to fair trial and 'personal liberty' - Article 21 of the Constitution of India,1950 - Whether the involuntary administration of the impugned techniques a reasonable restriction on `personal liberty' as understood in the context of Article 21 of the Constitution - Held, inter-relationship between the `right against self- incrimination' and the `right to fair trial' has been recognised under Article 21 - Forcing an individual to undergo any of the impugned techniques violates the standard of `substantive due process' which is required for restraining personal liberty - Compulsory administration of these techniques an unjustified intrusion into the mental privacy of an individual which amount to `cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment' - Invocations of a compelling public interest cannot justify the dilution of constitutional rights such as the `right against self-incrimination - Thus, no individual to be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise - Appeal Disposed of Criminal - Derivative evidence - Admissibility of - Section 27 Evidence Act, 1872 and Article 20(3) of Constitution of India, 1950 - Permissibility of extracting statements which may furnish a link in the chain of evidence and hence create a risk of exposure to criminal charges - Whether such derivative use of information extracted in a custodial environment is compatible with Article 20(3) - Held, Section 27 of Evidence Act, permits the derivative use of custodial statements in the ordinary course of events - Provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are not within the prohibition under Article 20(3) unless compulsion has been used in obtaining the information - Thus, any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results can be admitted, in accordance with Section 27 of the Evidence Act - Appeal Disposed of Ratio Decidendi: "Compulsory involuntary administration of the Narcoanalysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile (BEAP) violates the `right against self-incrimination' enumerated in Article 20(3) of the Constitution as the subject does not exercise conscious control over the responses during the administration of the test." "Article 20(3) not only a trial right but its protection extends to the stage of investigation also." "Provisions of Section 27 of the Evidence Act are not within the prohibition under Article 20(3) unless compulsion has been used in obtaining the information and any information or material that is subsequently discovered with the help of voluntary administered test results to be admitted." JUDGMENT Selvi and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka (05.05.2010 - SC) : MANU/SC/0325/2010


RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE N0.1 OF 2012 A [Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India]

(2012)4CompLJ225(SC) 2012(4)J.L.J.R.230 JT2012(9)SC457 (2012)7MLJ532(SC) MANU/SC/0793/2012 2012(4)PLJR143 2012(4)RCR(Civil)680 2012(9)SCALE310 (2012)10SCC1 [2012]9SCR311

Case Note: Constitution - Reference for opinion - Section 11A of Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) - Whether only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by conduct of auctions - Held, enactment of MMDR Act deals exclusively with natural resources - Section 11A of MMDR Act had been chosen as illustrative provision, to demonstrate how a forthright legitimate legislative policy, may take shape of an illegitimate stratagem - Choice of Section 11A of MMDR Act is on account of fact that it was added to MMDR Act only on 13.2.2012, and as such, there may not have been, as of now, any actual allocation of coal lots based thereon - For grant of a mining lease in respect of an area containing coal, provision leaves no room for any doubt, that selection would be made through auction by competitive bidding - No process other than auction, could therefore be adopted for grant of a coal mining lease - Section 11A of MMDR Act also defines zone of eligibility, for participation in such competitive bidding - To be eligible, contender must be engaged in production of iron and steel, or generation of power, or washing of coal obtained from a mine, or an activity notified by Central Government - Only those satisfying legislatively prescribed zone of eligibility, were permitted to compete for a coal mining lease - Legislative policy limiting zone of consideration could be subject matter of judicial review - In absence of any such challenge, legislative policy would be binding and enforceable - Policy of allocation of natural resources for public good could be defined by legislature - Likewise, policy for allocation of natural resources may also be determined by executive - Parameters for determining legality and constitutionality of two were exactly same - In aforesaid view of matter, there could be no doubt about conclusion recorded in "main opinion" that auction which was just one of several price recovery mechanisms, could not be held to be only constitutionally recognized method for alienation of natural resources - That should not be understood to mean, that it could never be a valid method for disposal of natural resources - Court would therefore conclude by stating that no part of natural resource could be dissipated as a matter of largess, charity, donation or endowment, for private exploitation - Each bit of natural resource expended must bring back a reciprocal consideration - Consideration might be in nature of earning revenue or might be to "best subserve common good" - It may well be amalgam of two - There could not be a dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than their actual worth - One set of citizens could not prosper at cost of another set of citizens, for that would not be fair or reasonable. In Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 2012 (27.09.2012 - SC) : MANU/SC/0793/


REPUBLIC OF ITALY AND ORS.-v.-UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

ILR2013(1)Kerala719 JT2013(2)SC1 2013(1)KLT367(SC) MANU/SC/0059/2013 2013(1)SCALE462 2013(4)SCALE578 (2013)4SCC721 (2014)1WBLR(SC)526

Case Note: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) - Section 188A--Death of two Indian Fishermen due to firing by Italian Marines, sailing on an Italian Merchant Ship, within the Indian Contiguous Zone but outside the Territorial Waters off the coastline of the State of Kerala--The authority of Kerala Police is limited to the Territorial Waters off the Kerala coastline--Extension of the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code to the Exclusive Economic Zone, of which the Contiguous Zone is a part, would entitle only the Union of India to take cognizance of, investigate and prosecute persons who commit any infraction of the domestic laws within the Contiguous Zone--Kerala Police has no authority to investigate such infraction--Union of India directed to set up a Special Court to try the case, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India--Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976 (Central Act 80 of 1976)--Sections 5 and 7. M.V. Enrica Lexie an Italian Merchant Ship while on its voyage to Djibouti came across an Indian Fishing Vessel, St. Antony, which it allegedly mistook to be a pirate vessel, at a distance of about 20.5 Nautical miles from the Indian Sea Coast off the State of Kerala. The Italian Marines deployed in the ship opened fire resulting in the death of two persons in the Indian Fishing Vessel. On receipt of information regarding the incident Crime No. 2 of 2012 was registered at the Coastal Police Station, Neendakara, Kollam, Kerala for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. On receipt of the telephone message from the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre, Mumbai, M.V. Enrica Lexie altered its course and came to Cochin Port on 16-2-2012. Upon docking in Cochin, the Master of the Vessel was informed about the registration of Crime No. 2 of 2012 and the two Italian Marines, who had opened fire resulting in the death of two persons on board the Indian Fishing Vessel, were arrested and on production before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kollam, was remanded to Judicial custody. Writ Petition was filed by the two Italian Marines challenging the jurisdiction of the State of Kerala and the Circle Inspector of Police, Coastal Police Station, Neendakara to register the F.I.R. and conduct investigation into an offence alleged to have been committed outside the Territorial Waters off the Kerala Coast. The Writ Petitioners therefore prayed for cashing the F.I.R. and also for a declaration that their arrest and detention and all proceedings taken against them were without jurisdiction, contrary to law and hence void. The matter was heard at length and judgment reserved by the High Court of Kerala. As the pronouncement of the Judgment was getting delayed the petitioners and the Government of Italy approached the Honourable Supreme Court by filing a Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. During the pendency of the Writ Petition filed before the Honourable Supreme Court, final report was filed by the police against the Italian Marines for the offence under Sections 302, 307, 427 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 of the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against safety of Maritime Navigation and Fixed Platforms on Continental Shelf Act, 2002. Meanwhile the High Court of Kerala dismissed the Writ Petition rejecting the contention of the petitioners regarding lack of jurisdiction. Aggrieved by the judgment the petitioners filed S.L.P. (Civil) No. 20370 of 2012. The Honourable Supreme Court heard the Writ Petition filed under Article 32 and the Special Leave Petition together. On behalf of the petitioners it was mainly contended that the incident having occurred at a place which was 20.5 Nautical miles from the Indian Coast, it was out side the Territorial Waters, though within the Contiguous Zone, only the Central Government could exercise sovereign rights and the police authorities in the State of Kerala had no jurisdiction to register a case and investigate the alleged offences and to arrest the petitioners during the course of such investigation. Reliance was placed on the Maritime Zones Act and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1994. The Honourable Supreme Court, after an exhaustive consideration of the various legal contentions raised by the petitioners, disposed the Writ Petition holding that extension of the application of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code to the Exclusive Economic Zone, of which the Contiguous Zone is a part, would entitle only the Union of India to take cognizance of, investigate and prosecute persons who commit any infraction of the domestic laws within the Contiguous Zone and that the Kerala Police has no authority to investigate such infraction. The Honourable Supreme Court directed the Union of India to set up a Special Court to try the case, in consultation with the Chief Justice of India; Republic of Italy thr. Ambassador and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (18.01.2013 - SC) : MANU/SC/0059/2013


NOVARTIS AG -VS.-UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS

AIR2013SC1311 2013 4 AWC3611SC (2013)6CompLJ131(SC) JT2013(4)SC195 2013-3-LW449 (2013)3MLJ421 MANU/SC/0281/2013 MIPR2013(1)313 2013(54)PTC1(SC) 2013(2)RCR(Civil)685 [2013]119SCL217(SC) 2013(5)SCALE12 (2013)6SCC1

Case Note: Patents Act, 1970 - Sections 2(1), Clauses (j) and (ja) and 3(d)--Patent for beta crystalline form of chemical compound called Imatinib Mesylate which is therapeutic drug for chronic myeloid leukemia and certain kind of tumours--Claim for patent for beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate is attempt to obtain patent for Imatinib Mesylate, which is otherwise not permissible in this country--Patent product beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, fails both test of invention and patentability as provided under Clauses (j), (ja) of Section 2(1) and Section 3(d) respectively. In case the appellant's product satisfies the tests and thus qualifies as "invention" within the meaning of Clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1), can its patentability still be questioned and denied on the ground that Section 3(d) puts it out of the category of "invention"? On the answer to these questions depends whether the appellant is entitled to get the patent for the beta crystalline form of a chemical compound called Imatinib Mesylate which is a therapeutic drug for chronic myeloid leukemia and certain kinds of tumours and is marketed under the names "Glivec" or "Gleevec". These questions were debated at the bar intensely and at great length. The debate took place within a very broad framework. The Court was urged to strike a balance between the need to promote research and development in science and technology and to keep private monopoly (called an 'aberration' under our Constitutional scheme) at the minimum. Arguments were made about India's obligation to faithfully comply with its commitments under international treaties and counter arguments were made to protect India's status as "the pharmacy of the world". The Court was reminded of its duty to uphold the rights granted by the statute, and the Court was also reminded that an error of judgment by it will put life-saving drugs beyond the reach of the multitude of ailing humanity not only in this country but in many developing and underdeveloped countries, dependent on generic drugs from India. In 1997, when the appellant filed its application for patent, the law in India with regard to product patent was in a transitional stage and the appellant's application lay dormant under an arrangement called "the mailbox procedure". Before the application for patent was taken up for consideration, the appellant made an application (Application No. E.M.R./01/2002) on March 27, 2002, for grant of exclusive marketing rights (E.M.R.) for the subject product under Section 24A of the Act, which was at that time on the statute book and which now stands deleted. The Patent Office granted E.M.R. to the appellant by order dated November 10, 2003. The appellant's application for patent was taken out of the "mailbox" for consideration only after amendments were made in the Patents Act, with effect from January 1, 2005. But before it was taken up for consideration, the patent application had attracted five (5) pre-grant oppositions1 in terms of Section 25(1) of the Act. And it was in response to the pre-grant oppositions that the appellant had filed the affidavits on the issue of bioavailability of Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form. The Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs heard all the parties on December 15, 2005, as provided under Rule 55 of the Patent Rules, 2003, and rejected the appellant's application for grant of patent to the subject product by 5 (five) separate, though similar, orders passed on January 25, 2006 on the 5 (five) opposition petitions. The Assistant Controller held that the invention claimed by the appellant was anticipated by prior publication, i.e., the Zimmermann patent; that the invention claimed by the appellant was obvious to a person skilled in the art in view of the disclosure provided in the Zimmermann patent specifications; and further that the patentability of the alleged invention was disallowed by Section 3(d) of the Act; and also that July 18, 1997, the Swiss priority date, was wrongly claimed as the priority date for the application in India and hence, the alleged invention was also anticipated by the specification made in the application submitted in Switzerland. In whichever way Section 3(d) may be viewed, whether as setting up the standards of "patentability" or as an extension of the definition of "invention", it must be held that on the basis of the materials brought before the Supreme Court, the subject product, that is, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, Jails the test of Section 3(a), too, of the Act. The subject product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, does not qualify the test of Section 3(d) of the Act but that is not to say that Section 3(d) bars patent protection for all incremental inventions of chemical and pharmaceutical substances. It will be a grave mistake to read this judgment to mean that Section 3(d) was amended with the intent to undo the fundamental change brought in the patent regime by deletion of Section 5 from the Parent Act. That is not said in this judgment. Section 2(1)(j) defines "invention" to mean, "a new product or...", but the new product in chemicals and especially pharmaceuticals may not necessarily mean something altogether new or completely unfamiliar or strange or not existing before. It may mean something "different from a recent previous" or "one regarded as better than what went before" or "in addition to another or others of the same kind"2. However, in case of chemicals and especially pharmaceuticals if the product for which patent protection is claimed is a new form of a known substance with known efficacy, then the subject product must pass, in addition to Clauses (j) and (ja) of Section 2(1), the test of enhanced efficacy as provided in Section 3(d) read with its explanation. Coming back to the case of the appellant, there is yet another angle to the matter. It is seen above that in the U.S. the drug Gleevec came to the market in 2001. It is beyond doubt that what was marketed then was Imatinib Mesylate and not the subject product, Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystal form. It is also seen above that even while the appellant's application for grant of patent lay in the "mailbox" awaiting amendments in the law of patent in India, the appellant was granted Exclusive Marketing Rights on November 10, 2003, following which Gleevec was marketed in India as well. On its package3, the drug was described as "Imatinib Mesylate Tablets 100 mg." and it was further stated that "each film coated tablet contains: 100 mg. Imatinib (as Mesylate)". On the package there is no reference at all to Imatinib Mesylate in beta crystalline form. What appears, therefore, is that what was sold as Gleevec was Imatinib Mesylate and not the subject product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate. If that be so, then the case of the appellant appears in rather poor light and the claim for patent for beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate would only appear as an attempt to obtain patent for Imatinib Mesylate, which would otherwise not be permissible in this country. In view of the findings that the patent product, the beta crystalline form of Imatinib Mesylate, fails in both the tests of invention and patentability as provided under Clauses (j), (ja) of Section 2(1) and Section 3(d) respectively. 1 The oppositions were made by M/s. Cancer Patients Aid Association (Respondent No. 4). NATCO Pharma Ltd. (Respondent No. 5). CIPLA Ltd. (Respondent No. 6), Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd. (Respondent No. 7), Hetro Drugs Ltd. (Respondent No. 8). 2 The New Oxford Dictionary of English Edition 1998. 3 A copy of the package is enclosed at the end of the judgment as Appendix III. Case Category: MERCANTILE LAWS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS INCLUDING BANKING - TRADE MARKS/COPY RIGHTS/PATENTS/DESIGN ACT Novartis AG vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (01.04.2013 - SC) : MANU/SC/0281/2013


DR. BALRAM PRASAD -v.- DR. KUNAL SAHA & ORS.

IV(2013)ACC378(SC) 2013(4)CDR1041(SC) 2014 1 AWC385SC 2013XI AD (S.C.) 169 2014(1)BomCR397 2013(3)C.P.C.367 IV(2013)CPJ1(SC) 2013 (4) CPR 284 2013 (4) CCC 106 2013(II)CLR(SC)1062 JT2013(14)SC47 2013(6)KarLJ161 (2013)7MLJ781 MANU/SC/1098/2013 2014(1)RLW54(SC) 2013(4)RCR(Civil)946 2013(13)SCALE1 (2014)1SCC384 (2014)4WBLR(SC)39


· LALITA KUMARI -v. GOVT. OF U.P. AND ORS

2014(134)AIC155 AIR2014SC187 2013ALLMR(Cri)4444 2013ALLMR(Cri)4444(SC) 2014 (84) ACC 719 2014 (1) ALT (Crl.) 100 (A.P.) 2014 (1) ALD(Crl.) 159 (SC) 2013XII AD (S.C.) 209 2013BomCR(Cri)680 2013(4)BomCR(Cri)680 2014(2) CHN (SC) 7 2013(4)Crimes243(SC) 2013(4)Crimes488(SC) 2014CriLJ470 IV(2013)CCR369(SC) 2013(6)CTC353 2014(2)GLD355 (SC) 2014(2)GLT(SC)1 2013(4)J.L.J.R.505 2014(1)JCC1 JT2013(14)SC399 2014(2)KCCR1305 2013 (4) KHC 552 2013(4)KLJ686 2013(4)KLT632(SC) 2014-1-LW(Crl)1 2013(4)MLJ(Crl)579 MANU/SC/1166/2013 2013(5)MPHT336(SC) 2014(1)N.C.C.161 2014(I)OLR5 2014(I)OLR(SC)5 2013(4)PLJR504 2013(4)RCR(Criminal)979 2013(13)SCALE559 (2014)2SCC1 2014 (1) SCJ 68 2013(3)UC2017

Case Note: Criminal - Cognizable offence - Receipt of information - Police officer - Foremost duty - Present reference moved seeking to direct Police Officers to register FIR as their foremost duty on receiving complaint about cognizable offence - Whether a police officer is bound to register First Information Report (FIR) upon receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Whether a police officer has power to conduct a "preliminary inquiry" in order to test veracity of such information before registering FIR Facts: The present writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution, has been filed by one Lalita Kumari (minor) through her father, viz., Shri Bhola Kamat for the issuance of a writ of Habeas Corpus or direction(s) of like nature against the Respondents herein for the protection of his minor daughter who has been kidnapped. The grievance in the said writ petition is that on 11.05.2008, a written report was submitted by the Petitioner before the officer in-charge of the police station concerned who did not take any action on the same. Thereafter, when the Superintendent of Police was moved, an FIR was registered. According to the Petitioner, even thereafter, steps were not taken either for apprehending the accused or for the recovery of the minor girl child. Held, while disposing off the reference (1) As such, a significant change that took place by way of the 1898 Code was with respect to the placement of Section 154, i.e., the provision imposing requirement of recording the first information regarding commission of a cognizable offence in the special book prior to Section 156, i.e., the provision empowering the police officer to investigate a cognizable offence. As such, the objective of such placement of provisions was clear which was to ensure that the recording of the first information should be the starting point of any investigation by the police. In the interest of expediency of investigation since there was no safeguard of obtaining permission from the Magistrate to commence an investigation, the said procedure of recording first information in their books along with the signature/seal of the informant, would act as an "extremely valuable safeguard" against the excessive, mala fide and illegal exercise of investigative powers by the police. [31] (2) The use of the word "shall" in Section 154(1) of the Code clearly shows the legislative intent that it is mandatory to register an FIR if the information given to the police discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. [40] (3) The First Information Report is in fact the "information" that is received first in point of time, which is either given in writing or is reduced to writing. It is not the "substance" of it, which is to be entered in the diary prescribed by the State Government. [48] (4) The non qualification of the word "information" in Section 154(1) unlike in Section 41(1)(a) and (g) of the Code is for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record any information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. [64] (5) In terms of the language used in Section 154 of the Code, the police is duty bound to proceed to conduct investigation into a cognizable offence even without receiving information (i.e. FIR) about commission of such an offence, if the officer in charge of the police station otherwise suspects the commission of such an offence. The legislative intent is therefore quite clear, i.e., to ensure that every cognizable offence is promptly investigated in accordance with law. This being the legal position, there is no reason that there should be any discretion or option left with the police to register or not to register an FIR when information is given about the commission of a cognizable offence. Every cognizable offence must be investigated promptly in accordance with law and all information provided under Section154 of the Code about the commission of a cognizable offence must be registered as an FIR so as to initiate an offence. [73] (6) Conducting an investigation into an offence after registration of FIR under Section 154 of the Code is the "procedure established by law" and, thus, is in conformity with Article 21 of the Constitution. Accordingly, the right of the accused under Article 21 of the Constitution is protected if the FIR is registered first and then the investigation is conducted in accordance with the provisions of law. [76] (7) The object sought to be achieved by registering the earliest information as FIR is inter alia two fold: one, that the criminal process is set into motion and is well documented from the very start; and second, that the earliest information received in relation to the commission of a cognizable offence is recorded so that there cannot be any embellishment etc., later. [83] (8) The registration of FIR either on the basis of the information furnished by the informant under Section 154(1) of the Code or otherwise under Section 157(1) of the Code is obligatory. [88] (9) While registration of FIR is mandatory, arrest of the accused immediately on registration of FIR is not at all mandatory. [98] (10) Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. If the information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offence is disclosed or not. [111] (11) As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. [111] Lalita Kumari vs. Govt. of U.P. and Ors. (12.11.2013 - SC) : MANU/SC/1166/2013


NATIONAL LEGAL SERVICES AUTHORITY-v.-UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

AIR2014SC1863 2014(3)ABR586 2014(2) AKR 595 2014 (3) AWC 1 (SC) 2014(4)ALD125(SC) 2014v AD (S.C.) 413 2014(7)BomCR1 209(2014)DLT38(SC) ILR2014(2)Kerala306 2014(2)J.L.J.R.333 JT2014(5)SC182 2014(2)KLT378 (2014)3MLJ595 MANU/SC/0309/2014 2014(2)PLJR301 2014(5)SCALE1 (2014)5SCC438 2014 (4) SCJ 148

Case Note: Constitution of India - Article 14, 15, 16, 19 and 14--Gender identity--Recognition of gender identity--Transgender community--Issue pertaining to constitutional and other legal rights of transgender community and their gender identity and sexual orientation--Transgender community as "third gender" for purpose of safeguarding and enforcing appropriating their rights guaranteed under Constitution--Non-recognition of identity of Transgenders/Hijras in various legislations denies them equal protection of law and they face wide-spread discrimination--By recognition Transgenders as "third gender" they would be able to enjoy their human rights to which they are largely deprived for want of recognition--Directions issued to safeguard constitutional rights of members of Transgender community. By recognizing such T.Gs. as third gender, they would be able to enjoy their human rights, to which they are largely deprived of for want of this recognition. The issue of transgender is not merely a social or medical issue but there is a need to adopt human right approach towards transgenders which may focus on functioning as an interaction between a person and their environment highlighting the role of society and changing the stigma attached to them. T.Gs. face many disadvantages due to various reasons, particularly for gender abnormality which in certain level needs to physical and mental disability. Up till recently they were subjected to cruelty, pity or charity. Fortunately, there is a paradigm shift in thinking from the aforesaid approach to a rights based approach. Though, this may be the thinking of human rights activist, the society has not kept pace with this shift. There appears to be limited public knowledge and understanding of same-sex sexual orientation and people whose gender identity and expression are incongruent with their biological sex. As a result of this approach, such persons are socially excluded from the mainstream of the society and they are denied equal access to those fundamental rights and freedoms that the other people enjoy freely. Gender identification becomes very essential component which is required for enjoying civil rights by this community. It is only with this recognition that many rights attached to the sexual recognition as 'third gender' would be available to this community more meaningfully viz., the right to vote, the right to own property, the right to marry, the right to claim a formal identity through a passport and a ration card, a driver's licence, the right to education, employment, health so on. Further, there seems to be no reason why a transgender must be denied of basic human rights which includes Right to life and liberty with dignity. Right to Privacy and freedom of expression. Right to Education and Empowerment, Right against violence, Right against Exploitation and Right against Discrimination. Constitution has fulfilled its duty of providing rights to transgenders. Now it's time for us to recognize this and to extend and interpret the Constitution in such a manner to ensure a dignified life of transgender people. All this can be achieved if the beginning is made with the recognition that T.G. as third gender. The Supreme Court declares: (1) Hijras, Eunuchs, apart from binary gender, be treated as "third gender" for the purpose of safeguarding their rights under Part III of our Constitution and the laws made by the Parliament and the State Legislature. (2) Transgender persons' right to decide their self-identified gender is also upheld and the Centre and State Governments are directed to grant legal recognition of their gender identity such as male, female or as third gender. (3) The Supreme Court directs the Centre and the State Governments to take steps to treat them as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and extend all kinds of reservation in cases of admission in educational institutions and for public appointments. (4) Centre and State Governments are directed to operate separate H.I.V. Sero-survellance Centres since Hijras/Transgenders face several sexual health issues. (5) Centre and State Governments should seriously address the problems being faced by Hijras/Transgenders such as fear, shame, gender dysphoria, social pressure, depression, suicidal tendencies, social stigma, etc. and any insistence for S.R.S. for declaring one's gender is immoral and illegal (6) Centre and State Governments should take proper measures to provide medical care to T.Gs. in the hospitals and also provide them separate public toilets and other facilities. (7) Centre and State Governments should also take steps for framing various social welfare schemes for their betterment. (8) Centre and State Governments should take steps to create public awareness so that T.Gs. will feel that they are also part and parcel of the social life and be not treated as untouchables. (9) Centre and the State Governments should also take measures to regain their respect and place in the society which once they enjoyed in our cultural and social life. Case Category: LETTER PETITION AND PIL MATTER National Legal Services Authority vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (15.04.2014 - SC) : MANU/SC/0309/2014


PRAMATI EDUCATIONAL & CULTURAL TRUST® & ORS.-v.- UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

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AIR2014SC2114 2014(4)ABR148 2014(3)CDR705(SC) 2014(3)AJR675 2014 (5) AWC 5048 (SC) 2014(3)BomCR496 2014(II)CLR(SC)164 2014(4)ESC678(SC) 2014GLH(2)443 2014(2)J.L.J.R.505 JT2014(7)SC46 2015(2) KarLJ 70 (SC) 2014(2)KLT547 (2014)4MLJ486(SC) MANU/SC/0419/2014 2014(3)PLJR86 2014(3)SCT80(SC) 2014(5)SLR139(SC) 2014(7)SCALE306 (2014)8SCC1 2014 (4) SCJ 626 (2014)3UPLBEC1775

Case Note: Constitution - Validity of Article - Article 15(5) of Constitution (Ninety-third Amendment) Act, 2005 and Article 21A of Constitution (Eighty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2002 - Present petitions filed for challenging validity of Articles 15(5) of Constitution inserted by Act, 2005 and validity of Article 21A of Constitution inserted by Act, 2002 - Whether insertion of specified Articles in Constitution were constitutionally valid - Held, by Act, 2002, new power was made available to State to make law determining manner for providing free and compulsory education to children of specified age - Act provides that aided school receiving aid and grants, whole or part, of its expenses from appropriate Government or local authority has to provide free and compulsory education to specified proportion - Thus, minority aided school was put under legal obligation to provide free and compulsory elementary education to children who need not be children of members of minority community which established school - Evidently, Act was made applicable to minority schools, aided or unaided, right of minorities under Article 30(1) of Constitution would be abrogated - Therefore, Act insofar was made applicable to minority schools was ultra vires to Constitution - Constitution Amendment Act inserting Articles 15(5) and 21A of Constitution did not alter basic structure of Constitution, thus constitutionally valid - Petitions dismissed. [paras 40, 41, 42, 44 and 46] Pramati Educational and Cultural Trust ® and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (06.05.2014 - SC) : MANU/SC/0419/2014


M/S. KAILASH NATH ASSOCIATES -v.- DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY & ANR.

2015(149)AIC43 2015(2)CDR374(SC) 2015 (110) ALR 464 2015 (1) AWC 770 (SC) 2015(2)ALD189(SC) 2015I AD (S.C.) 409 2016(2)CTC570 119(2015)CLT633 216(2015)DLT433 2015(2)J.L.J.R.285 2016-1-LW505 2015(4)MPLJ105 2015(5)MhLJ532(SC) MANU/SC/0019/2015 2015(2)PLJR396 2015(2)RCR(Civil)206 2015(1)SCALE230 (2015)4SCC136 2015 (1) SCJ 401 (2015)3WBLR(SC)412 2015 (2) WLN 88 (SC)


SHREYA SINGHAL -v.-UNION OF INDIA

2015(149)AIC224 AIR2015SC1523 2015 (2) ALT (Crl.) 251 (A.P.) 2015 (2) ALD(Crl.) 971 (SC) 2015X AD (S.C.) 586 2015(2)BomCR(Cri)515 (2015)2CompLJ143(SC) II(2015)CCR47(SC) 218(2015)DLT370(SC) 2015GLH(1)741 2015(2)J.L.J.R.161 2015(2)KLJ292 2015(2)KLT1(SC) (2015)3MLJ162(SC) MANU/SC/0329/2015 2015(3)N.C.C.169 2015(2)PLJR138 2015(2)RCR(Criminal)403 2015(4)SCALE1 (2015)5SCC1 2015 (4) SCJ 283 2015(1)UC594

Case Note: Constitution - Speech and expression - Freedom of - Infringement thereto - Sections 66A, 69 and 79 of Information Technology Act, 2000, Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009 and Section 118(d) of Kerala Police Act, Section 95 and 96 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and Articles 19(1)A and 19(2) of Constitution of India - Present appeal filed to determine validity of Sections 66A, 69A and 79 of Act, Information Technology Rules, 2009 and Section 118(d) of Kerala Police Act - Whether Sections 66A, 69 and 79 of IT Act and Section 118(d) of Act required to be declared unconstitutional for being in violation of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2) - Held, Petitioners were correct in saying that public's right to know was directly affected by Section 66A - Petitioners were right in saying that Section 66A in creating offence against persons who use internet and annoy or cause inconvenience to others very clearly affects freedom of speech and expression of citizenry of India at large - Section 66A arbitrarily, excessively and disproportionately invades right of free speech and upsets balance between such right and reasonable restrictions that may be imposed on such right - Therefore, hold Section 66A was unconstitutional also on ground that it takes within its sweep protected speech and speech that was innocent in nature - Therefore hold that no part of Section 66A was severable and provision as whole must be declared unconstitutional - Section 66A creates offence which was vague and overbroad, and, therefore, unconstitutional under Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2) - Kerala Police Act as whole would necessarily fall under Entry 2 of List II - Section 66A would apply directly to Section 118(d) of Act, as causing annoyance in indecent manner suffers from same type of vagueness and over breadth, that led to the invalidity of Section 66A - Section 118(d) also violates Article 19(1)(a) and not being reasonable restriction on said right and not being saved under any of subject matters contained in Article 19(2) (i) was hereby declared to be unconstitutional - Section 69A unlike Section 66A was narrowly drawn provision with several safeguards - Merely because certain additional safeguards such as those found in Section 95 and 96 Code were not available did not make Rules constitutionally infirm - Unlawful acts beyond what is laid down in Article 19(2) obviously cannot form any part of Section 79 - Thus, Section 66A of Act, 2000 was struck down in its entirety being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved Under Article 19(2) - Section 69A and Information Technology Rules 2009 were constitutionally valid - Section 79 was valid subject to Section 79(3)(b) - Section 118(d) of Kerala Police Act was struck down being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and not saved by Article 19(2) - Petitions disposed of. [paras 20, 41, 44, 90, 98, 100, 105, 106, 109, 111, 117 and 119] Shreya Singhal vs. Union of India (UOI) (24.03.2015 - SC) : MANU/SC/0329/2015


SUPREME COURT ADVOCATES-ON-RECORD ASSOCIATION AND ANOTHER -v.-UNION OF INDIA

2015(5)GLT(SC)12 MANU/SC/1183/2015 2015(11)SCALE1 (2016)5SCC1 (2016)2SCC(LS)253

Case Note: Constitution - Independence of judiciary - Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014; Article 368 of the Constitution - Central Government introduced legislation amending Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution - Substituted Collegium system of appointment of judges in higher judiciary - Introduced National Judicial Appointments Commission - Comprising Chief Justice of India, two Judges of Supreme Court, Minister of Law and Justice and 'eminent persons' - Whether the Acts altered the "basic structure" of the Constitution endangering independence of judiciary from the Executive - Whether the Acts purporting to amend Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution are invalid - Whether the Collegium system for appointment of judges will endure Constitution - Appointment of judges - Articles 124 and 217 Constitution of India - "Consultation" with President of India - S.P. Gupta v. Union of India held that power of appointment of judges lay with Central Government - Chief Justice of India could only tender advice - Overruled in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India - Opinion of Chief Justice of India held primacy in appointments - Affirmed and clarified in Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 - Respondent accepted decisions - Published Memorandum for appointment of judges in accordance with law laid down - Whether the court in the Second and Third Judges cases had construed "consultation" to mean "concurrence" - Whether the decision in First Judges case was correct and subsequent judgments overruling erred in their interpretation - Whether the Court can delve into the correctness of the decisions in the three cases Civil - Recusal - Hearings for validity of National Judicial Appointments Commission referred to five judge Bench - Justice Dave recused himself for being part of the proposed NJAC - Replaced by Justice Khehar - Petitioners submitted Justice Khehar was member of existing Collegium for selection and appointment of judges to Higher judiciary - Whether a Judge hearing a matter should recuse despite the prayer for recusal being unsubstantiated - Whether Justice Khehar should recuse from the matter for the mere possibility of a conflict of interest Facts Two acts, the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 and National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 were enacted by Parliament to set up a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) for selection, appointment and transfer of Judges to the Higher judiciary. The Commission would replace the prevailing procedure under Articles 124(2) and 217(1) of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Collegium. The Commission was purported to introduce transparency in the selection process. Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution were accordingly amended by the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, which received Presidential assent on 31.12.2014. The National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014 was simultaneously assented to. The proposed NJAC would be comprised of the Chief Justice of India, next two senior most judges in the Supreme Court, the Union Minister for Law and Justice and two eminent persons nominated by a separate committee. The committee to nominate the eminent persons would include the Chief Justice of India, the Prime Minister and Leader of the Opposition. Hence, the present petition questioning the constitutional validity of the two acts. Hearings at the Supreme Court of India on the NJAC were initiated before a three-Judge Bench, which referred it to a five-Judge Bench, which included Justice Anil R. Dave. On 13.4.2015 the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, and the National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014, were notified, making Justice Anil R. Dave, J. an ex-officio Member of the National Judicial Appointments Commission, for being the second senior-most Judge after the Chief Justice of India, under Article 124A(1)(b) of the Constitution. The Bench was reconstituted with Justice J.S. Khehar replacing Justice Dave. Submissions were made for Justice Khehar to recuse himself from the matter as he was a member of the Collegium of five Judges of the Supreme Court which recommended judicial appointments to the Higher judiciary, which was directly affected by the creation of the NJAC and the validity of which was under challenge. In their submissions bolstering the validity of the NJAC, Respondents relied on the decision in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (First Judges case), which was overruled by Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (Second Judges case), affirmed in Re: Special Reference No. 1 of 1998 (Third Judges case). Respondents sought to prove correct the interpretation in the First Judges case and challenged the correctness of precedent laid down in Second and Third Judges case. From the opinion in the First Judges case emerged: Chief Justice of India, Chief Justice of the High Court, and other Judges of the High Court and Supreme Court were constitutional functionaries, having a consultative role, and the power of appointments rested solely and exclusively in the decision of the Central Government. This power was not unfettered in that the Central Government could not act arbitrarily, without consulting fully and effectively the constitutional functionaries specified in Articles 124 and 217 of the Constitution. With reference to appointment of Judges of the Supreme Court, it was held, that the Chief Justice of India was required to be consulted, but the Central Government was not bound to act in accordance with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India even though his opinion was to be considered with due importance. Consultation with the Chief Justice of India was a mandatory requirement. but while making an appointment, consultation could extend to other Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts, as deemed necessary by the Central Government. Moreover, Article 222 of the Constitution conferred expressly a power on the President to transfer a judge from one State to another to have 1/3rd of Judges in the High Court from outside the State. The President possessed an implied power to lay down the norms, the principles, the conditions and the circumstances, under which such power was to be exercised. With regards to the "independence of the judiciary", it was observed that while the administration of justice drew its legal sanction from the Constitution, its credibility rested in the faith of the people. Thus, it was held that the ultimate power of appointment rested with the Central Government. The Second Judges case decided: The process of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts was an integrated 'participatory consultative process' for selecting the best and most suitable persons available for appointment. Initiation of the proposal for appointment in the case of the Supreme Court must be by the Chief Justice of India; and in the instance of High Court, by the Chief Justice of the High Court. In the event of conflicting opinions by constitutional functionaries, the opinion of the judiciary, the Chief Justice of India, has primacy. No appointment, to the Supreme Court or a High Court, could be made unless conforming with the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. Only in exceptional cases, stated with strong cogent reasons, should the appointment recommended by the Chief Justice not be made. Provisions of the Constitution, and its scheme, should be construed and implemented in a manner conducive to such an interpretation. Finally, in the Third Judges case it was held: "consultation with the Chief justice of India" in Articles 217(1) of the Constitution of India required consultation with a plurality of Judges in the formation of the opinion of the Chief Justice of India. The sole, individual opinion of the Chief Justice of India did not constitute "consultation". The Chief Justice of India was not entitled to act solely in his individual capacity, without consultation with other Judges of the Supreme Court, in respect of materials and information conveyed by the Government of India for non-appointment of a judge recommended for appointment. "Strong cogent reasons" did not have to be recorded as justification for a departure from the order of seniority in respect of each senior Judge who has been passed over. What has to be recorded is the positive reason for the recommendation. The views of the Judges consulted should be in writing and should be conveyed to the Government of India by the Chief Justice of India along with his views to the extent set out in the body of this opinion. Attention was also drawn to several speeches, debates and deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. Dr. Ambedkar had in the course of the Assembly observed: "there is no doubt that the House in general, has agreed that the independence of the Judiciary from the Executive should be made as clear and definite as we could make it by law. At the same time, there is the fear that in the name of the independence of the Judiciary, we might be creatingWe do not want to create an Imperium in Imperio, and at the same time we want to give the Judiciary ample independence so that it can act without fear or favour of the Executive." In asserting the validity of the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014, Respondents submitted that Parliament's power to amend the Constitution was plenary, subject only to it not altering the "basic structure" of the Constitution. As such, a constitutional amendment must be presumed to be constitutionally valid unless shown otherwise. The Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 only introduced checks and balances, which were inherent components of an effective constitutional arrangement. Further, it was not within the ambit of this Court to suggest an alternative combination of Members for the NJAC or an alternative procedure to regulate its functioning. In conjunction with the issue of "independence of the judiciary", which emanated from the concept of "separation of powers", the Respondents submitted that the scheme of the Constitution envisaged a system of checks and balances. With each organ of governance while being allowed the freedom to discharge the duties assigned to it, was subject to controls in the hands of one or both of the other organs. In the matter of appointment of judges, whereas Articles 124 and 217 provided executive control under the scheme of checks and balances, the Second and Third Judges case had done away with the same. Held, allowing the petition 1.Justice Khehar noted that besides him, three other judges on the instant Bench would over time be a part of the Collegium or would be a part of the NJAC. As such, the averment of conflict of interest should have been raised against them all. Though a Judge may recuse of his own volition from a case entrusted to him by the Chief Justice, such would be a matter of his own choosing. A judge before he assumes his office takes an oath to discharge his duties without fear or favour. He would be in breach of his oath of office if he accepted a prayer for recusal, unless justified. Justice Chelameswar opined the following: (1) if a Judge has a financial interest in the outcome of a case, he is automatically disqualified from hearing the case; (2) in cases where the interest of the Judge in the case is other than financial, then the disqualification is not automatic but an enquiry is required whether the existence of such an interest disqualifies the Judge tested in the light of either on the principle of "real danger" or "reasonable apprehension" of bias; and (3) the Judge is automatically disqualified from hearing a case where the Judge is interested in a cause which is being promoted by one of the parties to the case.[18] and[389] 2.In UOI v. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth the court had held that "consultation" could not be deemed to be "concurrence" with reference to Article 222 of the Constitution. Determining whether the President was to act in its individual capacity, at his own discretion, Court determined that President means the Minister or the Council of Ministers and his opinion, satisfaction or decision is constitutionally secured when Ministers arrive at such opinion satisfaction or decision. The independence of the Judiciary, which is a cardinal principle of the Constitution and has been relied on to justify the deviation, is guarded by the relevant article making consultation with the Chief Justice of India obligatory. Consultation with that highest dignitary of Indian justice will and should be accepted by the government of India and the court will have an opportunity to examine if any other extraneous circumstances have entered into the verdict of the Minister, if he departs from the counsel given by the Chief Justice of India. In practice, the last word in such a sensitive subject must belong to the Chief Justice of India, the rejection of his advice being ordinarily regarded as prompted by oblique considerations vitiating the order. It is immaterial whether the President or the Prime Minister or the Minister for Justice formally decides the issue. [34] 3.The position having been conceded by the Respondents in the Third Judges case, accepting the decision in the Second Judges case, they cannot seek reconsideration of the judicial declaration in the Second and Third Judges cases. Consequent to pronouncement of judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases, a Memorandum of Procedure for Appointment of Judges and Chief Justices to the Higher judiciary was drawn by the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs on 30.6.1999. The Memorandum of Procedure provides for a participatory role, to the judiciary as well as the political-executive. While the judicial contribution is responsible for evaluating the individual's professional ability, the political-executive is tasked with the obligation to provide details about the individual's character and antecedents. [62] and[68] 4.In the Collegium system of appointment, it is open to the Executive to return the file to the Chief Justice of India, for a reconsideration of the proposal, by enclosing material which may have escaped the notice of the Chief Justice of India and his collegium of Judges. There is a complete comity of purpose between the judiciary and the political-executive in the matter of selection and appointment of High Court Judges, and there is clear transparency as views and counter-views are exchanged in writing. [69] and[70] 5.When the Constituent Assembly used the term "consultation" its intent was to limit the participatory role of the political-executive in the matter of appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary. It was the view of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, that the draft article had adopted a middle course, by not making the President-the executive "the supreme and absolute authority in the matter of making appointments" of Judges. The judgments in the Second and Third Judges cases cannot be blamed, for not assigning a dictionary meaning to the term "consultation". If the real purpose sought to be achieved by the term "consultation" was to shield the selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, from executive and political involvement, certainly the term "consultation" was meant to be understood as something more than a mere "consultation". Thus, Article 124 was clearly meant to propound that the matter of "appointments of Judges was an integral part of the "independence of the judiciary". The process contemplated for appointment of Judges would therefore have to be understood to be shielded from political pressure and political considerations. Thus, the court on a harmonious construction of the provisions of the Constitution in the Second and Third Judges cases rightly held that primacy in appointments vested with the judiciary; leading to the inference that the term "consultation" should be understood as giving primacy to the view expressed by the judiciary through the Chief Justice of India. [77],[78],[79] and[89] 6.From Article 74 of the Constitution it cannot be concluded that "aid and advice" can be treated synonymous with a binding "direction", an irrevocable "command" or a conclusive "mandate". The phrase "aid and advice" cannot be individually construed as an imperative diktat, which had to be obeyed under all circumstances. In common parlance, a process of "consultation" is really the process of "aid and advice". The only distinction being, that "consultation" is obtained, whereas "aid and advice" may be tendered. On a plain reading therefore, neither can be understood to convey that they can be of a binding nature. Through the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, Article 74 came to be amended, and with the insertion of the words "shall ... act in accordance with such advice", the President came to be bound, to exercise his functions, in consonance with the "aid and advice" tendered to him, by the Council of Ministers headed by the Prime Minister. The instant seen as clarificatory in character, merely reiterates the manner in which the original provision ought to have been understood. [97] 7.For the nomination of the two "eminent persons", the Selection Committee comprises of one member of the executive, one member of the legislature, and one member of the judiciary. For the two "eminent persons", purported to not be identified with either the executive or legislature, there were no guidelines, for appointment. The sensitivity of selecting Judges is so enormous, and the consequences of making inappropriate appointments so dangerous, that if those involved in the process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary, make wrongful selections, it may lead to chaos. The two "eminent persons" would also have the absolute authority to reject all names unanimously approved by the remaining four Members of the NJAC. That would include the power to reject the unanimous recommendation of the entire judicial component of the NJAC. Vesting of such authority on persons who have no nexus to the system of administration of justice is arbitrary. The inclusion of "eminent persons", would adversely impact primacy of the judiciary, in the matter of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary. Article 124A(1)(d) is liable to be set aside and struck down as being violative of the "basic structure" of the Constitution. [214],[285] and[286] 8.The contention of Respondents that an amendment to the Constitution, passed by following the procedure expressed in the proviso to Article 368(2), constituted the will of the people, and the same was not subject to judicial review was rejected. Article 368 postulates only a "procedure" for amendment of the Constitution, and that, the same could not be treated as a "power" vested in the Parliament to amend the Constitution, so as to alter, the "core" of the Constitution, which has also been described as, the "basic features/basic structure" of the Constitution. [246] 9.Since the executive has a major stake, in a majority of cases, which arise for consideration before the higher judiciary, the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC, would be questionable. One of the rules of natural justice is that the adjudicator should not be biased. In the NJAC, the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice would be a party to all final selections and appointments of Judges to the higher judiciary. It may be difficult for Judges approved by the NJAC, to resist a plea of conflict of interest where the political-executive is a party to the lis. It would have the inevitable effect of undermining the "independence of the judiciary". Therefore, the role assigned to the political-executive, can at best be limited to a collaborative participation, excluding any role in the final determination. Merely the participation of the Union Minister in charge of Law and Justice, in the final process of selection, as an ex officio Member of the NJAC, would render the amended provision of Article 124A(1)(c) as ultra vires the Constitution, as it impinges on the principles of "independence of the judiciary" and "separation of powers". [268] and[269] 10.It is evident from the conclusions returned in the State of Maharashtra v. Central Provinces Manganese Ore Co. Ltd., that in the facts and circumstances of the instant the construction suggested by Respondents would result in the creation of a void if neither the original nor amended constitutional provision of the Constitution would survive. The clear intent of the Parliament while enacting the Constitution (Ninety-ninth Amendment) Act, 2014 was to provide for a new process of selection and appointment of Judges to the higher judiciary by amending the existing provisions. Therefore, when the amended provision postulating a different procedure is set aside, the original process of selection and appointment under the unamended provisions would revive. The above position also emerges from the legal position declared in Koteswar Vittal Kamath v. K. Rangappa Baliga and Co. Plea for reference to a larger Bench, and for reconsideration of the Second and Third Judges cases is rejected.[352] and[359] 11.This Court can reconsider an earlier decision rendered by it. The broad principles that can be culled out from the various decisions suggest that: (1) If the decision concerns an interpretation of the Constitution, perhaps the bar for reconsideration might be lowered a bit; where a constitutional issue is involved, the necessity of reconsideration should be shown beyond all reasonable doubt, the remedy of amending the Constitution always being available to Parliament. (2) If the decision concerns the imposition of a tax, then too the bar might be lowered since the tax burden would affect a large section of the public. (3) If the decision concerns the fundamental rights of the people. (4) In other cases, the Court must be convinced that the earlier decision is plainly erroneous and has a baneful effect on the public; that it is vague or inconsistent or manifestly wrong. (5) If the decision only concerns two contending private parties or individuals, then perhaps it might not be advisable to reconsider it. (6) The power to reconsider is not unrestricted or unlimited, but is confined within narrow limits and must be exercised sparingly and under exceptional circumstances for clear and compelling reasons. Therefore, merely because a view different from or contrary to what has been expressed earlier is preferable is no reason to reconsider an earlier decision. [806] 12.There are two crucial factors to be carefully considered before a person is appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court. These are: (1) The professional skills, judicial potential, suitability and temperament of a person to be a good judge, and (2) The personal strengths, weaknesses, habits and traits of that person. As far as the professional skills, judicial potential, suitability and temperament of a person being a good judge is concerned, the most appropriate person to make that assessment would be the Chief Justice of India (in consultation with the other judges) and not somebody from outside the legal fraternity. On the other hand, as far as the personal strengths, weaknesses, habits and traits of a person are concerned, appropriate inputs can come only from the executive, since the Chief Justice of India and other judges may not be aware of them. Since these two facets of the personality of a would-be judge are undoubtedly distinct, there cannot be a difference of opinion between the judiciary and the executive in this regard since they both express an opinion on different facets of a person's life. The Chief Justice of India cannot comment upon the 'expert opinion' of the executive nor can the executive comment upon the 'expert opinion' of the Chief Justice of India. [1056] 13.The 'collegium system' postulated by the Second Judges case and the Third Judges case gets revived. A 'consequence hearing' is required to assist in the matter for steps to be taken in the future to streamline the process and procedure of appointment of judges, to make it more responsive to the needs of the people, to make it more transparent and in tune with societal needs. [1097] 14.The word amendment literally means betterment or improvement and sponsor of amendment may always claim improvement. Such claim has to be tested by applying the 'identity test' and the 'impact test'. The amendment should not affect the identity of an essential feature of the Constitution. The impact of the amendment on the working of the scheme of the Constitution has to be taken into account. The criticism against perceived short comings in the working of the collegium also does not justify the impugned provisions. [1150] and[1153] 15. Justice Chelameswar dissented. "(Judicial independence) connotes not merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions, but a status or relationship to others, particularly to the executive branch of government, that rests on objective conditions or guaranteesIt is generally agreed that judicial independence involves both individual and institutional relationships: the individual independence of a judge, as reflected in such matters as security of tenure, and the institutional independence of the court or tribunal over which he or she presides, as reflected in its institutional or administrative relationships to the executive and legislative branches of Government.[415] 16. Further, in M. Nagaraj and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. it was held: "The point which is important to be noted is that principles of federalism, secularism, reasonableness and socialism, etc. are beyond the words of a particular provision. They are systematic and structural principles underlying and connecting various provisions of the Constitution. They give coherence to the Constitution. They make the Constitution an organic whole. They are part of constitutional law even if they are not expressly stated in the form of rules." [476] 17. In Minerva Mills Ltd. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. it was held the amendment of a single article may result in the destruction of the basic structure of the Constitution depending upon the nature of the basic feature and the context of the abrogation of that article if the purpose sought to be achieved by the Article constitutes the quintessential to the basic structure of the Constitution. The case, and similar, do not help determine the instant case as they do not lay down any general principle by which it can be determined as to when can a constitutional amendment be said to destroy the basic structure of the Constitution. In the present case the identity of the basic feature is not in dispute, rather the question is whether the amendment is abrogative of the independence of judiciary (the basic feature) resulting in the destruction of the basic structure of the Constitution. This basic feature with does not confer any fundamental or constitutional right in favour of individuals. It is only a means for securing to the people of India, justice, liberty and equality. It creates a collective right in favour of the polity to have a judiciary which is free from the control of the Executive or the Legislature in its essential function of decision making. [482],[483] and[484] 18. By Articles 124, 217 and 124-A and 124-B of the Constitution it leads to the position that the Executive Branch of Government cannot push through an 'undeserving candidate' so long as at least two members representing the Judicial Branch are united in their view as to unsuitability of that candidate. Even one eminent person and a single judicial member of NJAC could effectively stall entry of an unworthy appointment. Similarly, the judicial members also cannot push through persons of their choice unless at least one other member belonging to the non-judicial block supports the candidate proposed by them. An identical inference is that in difficult times when political branches cannot be counted upon, neither can the Judiciary: the judiciary is not the only constitutional organ which protects liberties of the people. Accordingly, primacy to the opinion of the judiciary in the matter of judicial appointments is not the only mode of securing independence of judiciary for protection of liberties. Consequently, the assumption that primacy of the Judicial Branch in the appointments process is an essential element and thus a basic feature is empirically flawed without any basis either in the constitutional history of the Nation or any other and normatively fallacious apart from being contrary to political theory.[496] and[499] 19. To wholly eliminate the Executive from the process of selection would be inconsistent with the foundational premise that government in a democracy is by chosen representatives of the people. To hold that it should be totally excluded from the process of appointing judges would be wholly illogical and inconsistent with the foundations of the theory of democracy and a doctrinal heresy. Such exclusion has no parallel in any other democracy whose models were examined by the Constituent Assembly and none other were brought to our notice either. Established principles of constitutional government, practices in other democratic constitutional arrangements and the fact that the Constituent Assembly provided a role for the Executive clearly prohibit the inference that Executive participation in the selection process abrogates a basic feature. Submissions that exclusion of the Executive Branch is destructive of the basic feature of checks and balances-a fundamental principle in constitutional theory- are correct. [500] 20. In I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu it was opined, "Further, mere possibility of abuse is not a relevant test to determine the validity of a provision. The people, through the Constitution, have vested the power to make laws in their representatives through Parliament in the same manner in which they have entrusted the responsibility to adjudge, interpret and construe law and the Constitution including its limitation in the judiciary. We, therefore, cannot make any assumption about the alleged abuse of the power." Such a test is relevant only for bodies created by statutes and subordinate legislation. The functioning of any constitutional body is only disciplined by appropriate legislation. Constitution does not lay down any guidelines for the functioning of the President and Prime Minister nor the Governors or the Chief Ministers. Performance of constitutional duties entrusted to them is structured by legislation and constitutional culture. To contend that the amendment is destructive of the basic structure since it does not lay down any guidelines is tantamount to holding that the design of the Constitution as originally enacted is defective. For the abovementioned reasons, amendment should be upheld. [503],[509] and[516] Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record-Association and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) (16.10.2015 - SC) : MANU/SC/1183/2015


UNION OF INDIA-v.-V. SRI HARAN@ MURUGAN & ORS.

2014(139)AIC186 2014 (86) ACC 658 2014(2)Crimes265(SC) JT2014(6)SC377 MANU/SC/0363/2014 2014(2)RCR(Criminal)678 2014(5)SCALE600 (2014)11SCC1 2014 (5) SCJ 196


GUJARAT URJA VIKAS NIGAM LIMITED-V.-EMCO LIMITED & OTHERS

AIR2016SC698 2016(1)CDR278(SC) 2016(1)AJR719 2016 2 AWC1305SC 2016(5) CHN (SC) 146 2016ELR(SC)129 (2016)4GLR3097 MANU/SC/0109/2016 2016(2)SCALE75 (2016)11SCC182 2016 (5) SCJ 161

ase Note: What was the point of time at which power producer could exercise such right to seek determination of a separate tariff? Held, Income Tax Act gave an option to producers of power either to avail 'benefit of accelerated depreciation' or not. It also specified point of time at which such an option could be exercised. Right to exercise such option at a point of time specified in the 2nd proviso to Rule 5(1A) of income Tax Rules, 1962 was limited only for purpose of availing benefits flowing from Income Tax Act. PPA did not make any reference to "benefits of accelerated depreciation". It simply specified price to be paid by Appellant for power purchased by it from first Respondent. Appellant determined said price after taking into consideration various factors. One of them happened to be that, Power Producers were entitled to certain 'benefits' under Income Tax Act. Availability of such 'benefit' was dependent upon option of power producers. Though 1st Tariff Order employed expression 'benefit' in context of AD Scheme under Section 32 of IT Act, applicability of provision to a power producer depended upon choice of power producer. It was for power producer to make an assessment whether availing of AD was beneficial or not would take a decision, if scheme under Section 32 IT Act should be availed or not. But availability of such an option to power producer for purpose of assessment of income under IT Act did not relieve power producer of contractual obligations incurred under PPA. No doubt that, first Respondent as a power producer had freedom of contract either to accept price offered by Appellant or not before PPA was entered into. But such freedom was extinguished after PPA was entered into. First Respondent knowing fully well entered into PPA in question which expressly stipulated under Article 5.2 that tariff was determined by Hon'ble Commission vide Tariff Order for solar based power project dated 29th January, 2010. Stipulation in PPA clearly envisaged a situation where notwithstanding contract between parties (the PPA), there was a possibility of first Respondent not being able to commence generation of electricity within "control period" stipulated in 1st Tariff Order. It also visualised that, for subsequent control period, tariffs payable to a PROJECTS/power producers (similarly situated as the first Respondent) could be different. In recognition of said two factors, PPA clearly stipulated that in such a situation, first Respondent would be entitled only for lower of two tariffs. Unfortunately, said stipulation was overlooked by second Respondent and Appellate Tribunal. There was no whisper about said stipulation in either of orders. On assumption that, petition filed by first Respondent (1270/2012) was to be treated as an application for determination of separate tariff which would be identical with tariff fixed under 2nd Tariff Order, whether first Respondent would be entitled for such a relief depended, if at all he was entitled to seek such a determination, on a consideration of "all relevant facts" but not by virtue of operation of 2nd Tariff Order. impugned order was set aside. Appeal allowed Industry: Power and Energy Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs. EMCO Limited and Ors. (02.02.2016 - SC) : MANU/SC/0109/2016


MUKESH & ANR.-v.-STATE FOR NCT OF DELHI & ORS

AIR2017SC2161 2017ALLMR(Cri)2448 2017(2)BomCR(Cri)665 2017(2)Crimes154(SC) 2017CriLJ4365 II(2017)CCR253(SC) 2017(3)J.L.J.R.273 2017(2)MLJ(Crl)480 MANU/SC/0575/2017 2017(3)N.C.C.77 2017(3)PLJR248 2017(5)SCALE506 (2017)6SCC1 2017 (4) SCJ 465 2017(II)ILR-CUT1

Case Note: Criminal - Capital punishment - Gang rape - Rarest of rare category - Sections 120B, 201, 302, 307, 365, 366, 376(2)(g), 377, 395, 397 and 412 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 235 and 354 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Deceased prosecutrix and informant boarded bus - Accused persons started to abuse informant and assaulted him with iron rods - Robbed their articles - Prosecutrix was raped by them, one after other - Prosecutrix was also subjected to unnatural sex - Her private parts and her internal organs were seriously injured - Accused were exhorting that both victims be not left alive - Threw them out of moving bus - Victims were taken to Hospital - First Information Report was registered - 1st Accused was arrested - Personal search was conducted and his disclosure statement - Investigating Officer seized bus - Arrest of 1st Accused, led to arrest of 4th and 5th Accused - Later on, 2nd Accused was apprehended - Mobile belonging to informant was recovered - In Test Identification Parade, informant identified 2nd Accused - Further recoveries were made - Dying declaration of prosecutrix was recorded - Prosecutrix gave her statement through gestures and writings - Later on, in foreign hospital, prosecutrix died - Charge-sheet came to be filed under provisions of Code, 1860 - Supplementary chargesheet was filed later on - During course of trial, 1st Accused committed suicide - Sessions Judge convicted all Accused persons under Sections 120B, 365, 366, 307, 376(2)(g), 377, 302, 395, 397, 201 and 412 - All Accused were sentenced to death for offence - Punishment of imprisonment was also awarded - Fine was also imposed - High Court affirmed conviction and confirmed death penalty - Hence, present appeals by all Accused/Appellants - Whether Accused persons were guilty of their culpability or there was public pressure, as alleged, to falsely implicate them - Whether Courts below did not follow fundamental norms of sentencing and were not guided by paramount beacons of legislative policy discernible from Sections 354(3) and 235(2) of Code, 1973 - Whether there was violation of mandate of Section 235(2) of Code, 1973 - Whether present case could be one of rarest of rare cases warranting death penalty Facts: On 16.12.2012, the prosecution case, as projected, was that the deceased prosecutrix had gone with her friend/the informant/P.W. 1 to watch a movie. After the show was over, they took an auto and reached bus stand wherefrom they boarded a white coloured chartered bus which was bound to Dwarka/Palam Road, as a boy in the bus was calling for commuters for the said destination. As per the version of the informant, the friend of the prosecutrix, the bus had yellow and green lines/stripes and the word "Yadav" was written on it. After both of them had entered the bus, they noticed that six persons were already inside the bus, four in the cabin of the driver and two behind the driver's cabin. The deceased and the informant sat on the left side in the row of two-seaters and paid the fare. The Accused persons did not allow anyone else to board and the bus moved and the lights inside the bus were put off. The lights were put off. A few minutes later, three Accused persons, including a juvenile in conflict with law, came out of the driver's cabin and started to abuse the informant, who raised opposition to the abuse that led to an altercation which invited the other two who were sitting outside the driver's cabin to join. He was assaulted by the Accused persons with the iron rods that caused injuries to his head, both the legs and other parts of the body and the consequence was that he fell on the floor of the bus. The two Accused persons pinned the informant down and robbed the victims of their mobiles besides robbing the informant of his purse, clothes and other articles. As per the version of the prosecution, the informant was carrying two mobiles and the prosecutrix was carrying only one, and the Accused snatched away all the three mobiles. The Accused persons took the prosecutrix to the rear side of the bus and she was raped by them, one after the other. The prosecutrix was also subjected to unnatural sex. Her private parts and her internal organs were seriously injured. The prosecutrix was carrying a grey colour purse. The Accused persons robbed her of her belongings and stripped her. They also took away the clothes of the informant while beating him with iron rods. The Accused were exhorting that both the victims be not left alive. The Accused then tried to throw both the informant and the prosecutrix out of the moving bus from its rear door but could not open it and so, they brought them to the front door and threw them out of the moving bus at National Highway No. 8, Hotel Delhi 37, Mahipalpur flyover by the side of the road. The prosecutrix and the informant were noticed by P.W. 72, who heard the voice of the prosecutrix. P.W. 72 saw the informant and the prosecutrix sitting naked having blood all around. Immediately thereafter, P.W. 72 informed P.W. 70, who was in the Control Room, requesting him to call PCR. P.W. 70 dialed 100 No. and even asked his other patrolling staff to reach the spot. P.W. 73/H.C., who was in charge of PCR van Zebra 54, received information about the incident and the lying of victims in a naked condition. P.W. 73 reached the spot and found the victims. He got the crowd dispersed and brought a bottle of water and a bedsheet from the nearby hotel and tore the same into two parts and gave it to both the victims to cover themselves. P.W. 73 took the victims to Safdarjung Hospital. On the way to the hospital, the victims gave their names to him and informed about the incident. While leaving the informant in the casualty where he was examined by P.W. 51 and his MLC/P.W. 51/A, was drawn up, P.W. 73 took the prosecutrix to the Gynae ward and got her admitted there. The MLC of the prosecutrix, P.W. 49/B, was prepared by P.W. 49, who recorded the history of the incident as told to her by the prosecutrix and noted the same in Exhibit P.W. 49/A. After the victims were rescued, the informant gave his first statement to the police at 3:45 a.m. on 17.12.2012 which culminated into the recording of the FIR at 5:40 a.m. being FIR No. 413/2012 Under Section 120B of Indian Penal Code and Sections 365/366/376(2)(g)/377/307/302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and/or Sections 396/395 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with Sections 397/201/412 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. It was thereafter handed over to P.W. 80 for investigation. On the same night, i.e., 16/17.12.2012, the prosecutrix underwent first surgery. The prosecutrix was operated by P.W. 50. The second and third surgeries were performed on 19.12.2012 and 23.12.2012 respectively. On 17.12.2012, supplementary statements of the informant were recorded by P.W. 80. Based on the description of the bus given by the informant, the offending bus was found parked in Ravi Das Jhuggi Camp, R.K. Puram, New Delhi. P.W. 80 along with P.W. 74/SI and P.W. 65/Ct., went to the spot and found 1st Accused sitting in the bus. On seeing the police, 1st Accused got down from the bus and started running. The police intercepted 1st Accused and he was arrested and interrogated. Personal search was conducted on 1st Accused and his disclosure statement, Ex. P-74/F, was recorded by P.W. 74 and his team. Based on his disclosure statement, P.W. 74 Investigating Officer seized the bus, Ex. P1, vide Seizure Memo Ex. P.W. 74/K. P.W. 74 seized the seat cover of the bus of red colour and its curtains of yellow colour. On the bus, 'Yadav' was found written on its body with green and yellow stripes on it. The Investigating Officer also seized the key of the bus, Ex. P-74/2, vide Seizure Memo Ex. P.W. 74/J. The documents of the bus were also seized. The disclosure statement of 1st Accused, Ex. P.W. 74/F, led to the recovery of his bloodstained clothes, iron rods and debit card of the mother of the prosecutrix. P.W. 74, Investigating Officer, also recovered ashes and the partly unburnt clothes lying near the bus which was seized vide Memo Exhibit No. P.W. 74/M and Unix Mobile Phone with MTNL Sim, Ex. P-74/5, vide Memo Ex. P/74E. The Investigating Officer prepared the site plan of the place where the bus was parked and from where the ashes were found. The arrest of 1st Accused also led to the arrest of 4th Accused and 5th Accused. On 18.12.2012, 2nd Accused was apprehended by P.W. 58/SI and was produced before P.W. 80. At the instance of 2nd Accused, a Samsung Galaxy Trend DUOS Blue Black mobile belonging to the informant was recovered. On 23.12.2012, at his instance, P.W. 80 prepared the route chart of the route where 2nd Accused drove the bus at the time of the incident, Ex. P.W. 80/H. Besides that, he got recovered his bloodstained clothes from the garage of his brother. He opted to undergo Test Identification Parade (TIP). In the Test Identification Parade conducted by P.W. 17/Metropolitan Magistrate, the informant identified 2nd Accused. 5th Accused was apprehended and arrested about 1:15 p.m. on 18.12.2012 vide memo Ex. P.W. 60/A; his disclosure, Ex. P.W. 60/G, was recorded and his personal search was conducted vide memo Ex. P.W. 60/C. In his disclosure statement, 5th Accused pointed out Munirka bus stand where the prosecutrix and the informant boarded the bus and memo Ex. P.W. 68/I was prepared. He also pointed at the spot where the informant and the prosecutrix were thrown out of the bus and memo Ex. P.W. 68/J was prepared in this regard. 4th Accused got recovered his bloodstained clothes, the informant's leather shoes and the prosecutrix's mobile phone, Nokia Model 3110 of black grey colour. Further recoveries were made pursuant to his supplementary disclosure. Similarly, 5th Accused got recovered his bloodstained clothes, shoes and also a wrist watch make Sonata and Rs. 1000/- robbed from the informant. 3rd Accused was also arrested from a village of Bihar. His disclosure statement was recorded. He led to his brother's house and got recovered his bloodstained clothes. A ring belonging to the informant, two metro cards and a Nokia phone with SIM of Vodafone Company was also recovered from 3rd Accused. 3rd Accused also opted to undergo TIP and was positively identified by the informant. The mobile phones of the Accused persons were seized and call details records with requisite certificates Under Section 65-B of Indian Evidence Act were obtained by the police. After getting arrested, all the Accused were medically examined. The MLCs of all the Accused persons showed various injuries on their person; viz., in the MLC, Ex. P.W. 2/A, of 1st Accused, P.W. 2 opined that the injuries could possibly be struggle marks. Similar opinions were received in respect of other Accused persons. The prosecutrix was re-operated on 23.12.2012 for peritoneal lavage and placement of drain under general anaesthesia and the notes are exhibited as Ex. P.W. 50/E. As the condition of the prosecutrix did not improve much, the prosecution thought it appropriate to record the statements of the prosecutrix. The said statements were conferred the status of dying declaration. P.W. 49 also deposed that certain exhibits were collected for examination such as outer clothes. On 21.12.2012, on being declared fit, the second dying declaration was recorded by P.W. 27/Sub-Divisional Magistrate. This dying declaration was an elaborate one where the prosecutrix described the incident in detail. She also stated that the accused were addressing each other with names. On 25th December, 2012, P.W. 30/Metropolitan Magistrate, went to the hospital to record the dying declaration of the prosecutrix. The attending doctors opined that the prosecutrix was not in a position to speak but she was otherwise conscious and responded by way of gestures. Accordingly, P.W. 30 put questions in such a manner as to enable her to narrate the incident by way of gestures or writing. Her statement, Ex. P.W. 30/D, was recorded by P.W. 30 in the form of dying declaration by putting her questions in the nature of multiple choice questions. The prosecutrix gave her statement/dying declaration through gestures and writings, Exhibit P.W. 30/D. Since the condition of the prosecutrix was critical, it was decided that she be shifted abroad for further treatment and fostering oasis of hope on 27th December, 2012, she was shifted to a Hospital of Singapore, for her further treatment. The hope and expiration became a visible mirage as the prosecutrix died on 29th December, 2012. P.W. 34/Forensic Pathologist deposed that her exact time of death was 4:45 a.m. on 29th December, 2012. The cause of her death was sepsis with multiple organ failure following multiple injuries. The original post mortem report was Ex. P.W. 34/A and its scanned copy is Ex. P.W. 34/B; the Toxicology Report dated 4th January, 2013 was Exhibit P.W. 34/C. In the post-mortem report, Ex. P.W. 34/A, besides other serious injuries, various bite marks were observed. The investigating agency went around to collect the electronic evidence. A CCTV footage produced by P.W. 25 in a CD, Ex. P.W. 25/C-1 and P.W. 25/C-2, and the photographs, Ex. P.W. 25/B-1 to Ex. P.W. 25/B-7, were collected to ascertain the presence of the informant and the prosecutrix at the Mall. The certificate Under Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 with respect to the said footage was proved by P.W. 26 vide Ex. P.W. 26/A. Another important evidence was the CCTV footage of Hotel Delhi 37 situated near the dumping spot. The said footage showed a bus matching the description given by the informant and said bus had the word "Yadav" written on one side. Thereafter, the report of the CFSL was received. The report, after analysing the DNA profiles generated from the known samples of the prosecutrix, the informant, and each of the Accused, concluded that the samples were authentic and established the identities of the persons beyond reasonable doubt. P.W. 46/Senior Scientific Officer (Finger Prints) submitted his report Ex. P.W. 46/D. In the report, the chance prints of 4th Accused were found to have matched with those on the bus in question. Bite mark analysis was also undertaken by the investigative team to establish the identity and involvement of the Accused persons. P.W. 66 had taken 10 photographs of different parts of the body of the prosecutrix which were marked as Ex. P.W. 66/B (Colly.) and Ex. P.W. 66/C (Colly.). P.W. 66 also proved in Court the certificate provided by him in terms of Section 65-B of the Evidence Act in respect of the photographs, Ex. P.W. 66/A. Thereafter, P.W. 18 collected the photographs and the dental models from Safdarjung Hospital and duly deposited the same in the malkhana after he, P.W. 18, had handed them over to the S.H.O/P.W. 78. The same were later entrusted to S.I./P.W. 18. P.W. 71 submitted the final report in this regard which is exhibited as Ex. P.W. 71/C. In the said report, he concluded that at least three bite marks were caused by 1st Accused whereas one bite mark was identified to have been most likely caused by 3rd Accused. The chargesheet came to be filed Under Section 365/376(2)(g)/377/307/395/397/302/396/412/201/120/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and supplementary chargesheet was filed later on. During the course of trial, 1st Accused committed suicide and the proceedings qua him stood abated. Sessions Judge convicted all the Accused persons Under Section 120B Indian Penal Code for the offence of criminal conspiracy; Under Section 365/366 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code for abducting the victims with an intention to force the prosecutrix to illicit intercourse; Under Section 307 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code for attempting to kill the informant; Under Section 376(2)(g) Indian Penal Code for committing gang rape with the prosecutrix in pursuance of their conspiracy; Under Section 377 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code for committing unnatural offence with the prosecutrix; Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code for committing murder of the helpless prosecutrix; Under Section 395 Indian Penal Code for conjointly committing dacoity in pursuance of the aforesaid conspiracy; Under Section 397 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code for the use of iron rods and for attempting to kill the informant at the time of committing robbery; Under Section 201 Indian Penal Code read with Section 120B Indian Penal Code for destroying of evidence and Under Section 412 Indian Penal Code for the offence of being individually found in possession of the stolen property which they all knew was a stolen booty of dacoity committed by them. All the Accused were sentenced to death for offence punishable Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code and for other offences, punishment of imprisonment of different duration was awarded. Fine was also imposed and in default of payment of fine such convict shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. The sentences Under Sections 120B/365/366/376(2)(g)/377/201/395/397/412 Indian Penal Code were directed to run concurrently and that the benefit Under Section 428 Code of Criminal Procedure would be given wherever applicable. The High Court affirmed the conviction and confirmed the death penalty imposed upon the Accused by expressing the opinion that under the facts and circumstances of the case, imposition of death penalty awarded by the Trial Court deserved to be confirmed in respect of all the four Accused. As the death penalty was confirmed, the appeals preferred by the Accused were dismissed. Held, while dismissing the appeals: Dipak Misra, J.: (i) There was no delay in the registration of FIR. The sequence of events were natural. After the occurrence, the victim was seriously injured and was in a critical condition and it had to be treated as a natural conduct that giving medical treatment to her was of prime importance. The admission of the informant and the victim in the hospital and the completion of procedure must have taken some time. The informant himself was injured and was admitted to the hospital. No delay could be said to have been caused in examining the informant. It is not expected from a victim to give details of the incident either in the FIR or in the brief history given to the doctors. If any overt act is attributed to a particular accused among the assailants, it must be given greater assurance. The involvement of the Accused persons could not be determined solely on the basis of what was mentioned in the FIR. The informant stated about the presence of four persons sitting in the cabin of the bus and two boys sitting behind the cabin and clearly stated about the overt act. He broadly made reference to the Accused persons and also to the overt acts. There were no indications of fabrication in the statement of the informant. It could not be said that merely because the names of the Accused persons were not mentioned in the FIR, it raised serious doubts about the prosecution case. [51],[55],[61] and[62] (ii) The contentions assailing the evidence of the informant did not merit acceptance, for at the time when he was first examined his friend/the prosecutrix was critically injured and he was in a shocked mental condition. The evidence of a witness is not to be disbelieved simply because he is a partisan witness or related to the prosecution. It is to be weighed whether he was present or not and whether he is telling the truth or not. The informant clearly spoken about the occurrence and also corroborated his complaint. The injuries found on the person of the informant and the fact that the informant was injured in the same occurrence lent assurance to his testimony that he was present at the time of the occurrence along with the prosecutrix. The evidence of an injured witness is entitled to a greater weight and the testimony of such a witness is considered to be beyond reproach and reliable. Firm, cogent and convincing ground is required to discard the evidence of an injured witness. It is to be kept in mind that the evidentiary value of an injured witness carries great weight. Apart from the injuries sustained, the presence of the informant was further confirmed by the DNA analysis. [77],[78],[79] and[81] (iii) The evidence of the informant was not to be disbelieved simply because there were certain omissions. The Accused persons were in a group and were also armed with iron rods. The informant was held by them. It would not have been possible for the informant to resist the number of Accused persons and save the prosecutrix. The evidence of the informant could not be doubted on the ground that he had not interfered with the occurrence. The improvements made in the supplementary statement need not necessarily render the informant's evidence untrustworthy more so when the informant had no reason to falsely implicate the Accused. [90] and[92] (iv) Once it is proved before the Court through the testimony of the experts that the photographs and the CCTV footage are not tampered with, there is no reason or justification to perceive the same with the lens of doubt. It was perceptible that the High Court, in order to satisfy itself, had got the CCTV footage played during the hearing and found the same to be creditworthy and acceptable. There was dearth of space inside the police stations and the use of Stadium, where the bus was taken to, as parking lot by the Police in the present case did not necessarily mean that there was any mala fide intention on the part of the investigating agency without any specific assertion to advance the said bald allegation. [100] and[104] (v) The contention of the Accused that the testimony of P.W. 81/the owner of the bus deserved to be totally discarded, was unacceptable. The principal contention was that P.W. 81 was in judicial custody and, therefore, his version in the Court was under tremendous pressure as he was desirous of getting a bail order to enjoy his liberty. However, it was limpid from the deposition of P.W. 81 that he was in judicial custody for a separate offence and, therefore, it was difficult to accede to the argument advanced by the Accused that he was under pressure to support the version of the prosecution. It stood proved that the bus in question was routinely driven by 1st Accused. [106],[108] and[110] (vi) All the Accused persons were closely associated with each other. It was not permissible to advance an argument that Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 was constantly abused by the prosecution or that it used the said provision as a lethal weapon against anyone it likes. The recoveries made when the Accused persons were in custody were established with certainty. The witnesses who deposed with regard to the recoveries remained absolutely unshaken and, in fact, nothing was elicited from them to disprove their creditworthiness. The recoveries of articles belonging to the informant and the victim from the custody of the Accused persons could not be discarded. No explanation was by the Accused persons explaining as to how they had got into possession of the said articles. [124],[126],[135] and[136] (vii) 4th Accused and 5th Accused refused to participate in the TIP proceedings without giving any reason whatsoever. The informant identified 2nd Accused and 3rd Accused. Test Identification Proceedings corroborated and lent assurance to the dock identification of 2nd Accused and 3rd Accused by the informant. The informant, apart from identifying the Accused who had made themselves available in the TIP, also identified all of them in Court. The TIP was not dented. [139] and[145] (viii) A dying declaration is an important piece of evidence which, if found veracious and voluntary by the court, could be the sole basis for conviction. If a dying declaration is found to be voluntary and made in fit mental condition, it can be relied upon even without any corroboration. However, the Court, while admitting a dying declaration, must be vigilant towards the need for 'Compos Mentis Certificate' from a doctor as well as the absence of any kind of tutoring. A mere omission on the part of the prosecutrix to state the entire factual details of the incident in her very first statement did not make her subsequent statements unworthy, especially when her statements were duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses including the medical evidence. The contention that the third dying declaration made through gestures lacked credibility and that the same ought to have been videographed, was totally sans substance. The dying declaration recorded on the basis of nods and gestures is not only admissible but also possesses evidentiary value, the extent of which shall depend upon who recorded the statement. All the three dying declarations were consistent with each other and well corroborated with other evidence and the Trial Court as well as the High Court correctly placed reliance upon the dying declarations of the prosecutrix to record the conviction. [173],[180] and[185] (ix) The dying declaration of the prosecutrix, which is highly reliable, clearly established the horrendous use of iron rods by the Accused persons. The factum of insertion of iron rods in the private parts of the prosecutrix was also fortified by the scientific evidence. Merely because the injuries sustained by the informant were opined to be of simple nature, the use of iron rods could not be doubted. The informant's omission to state the factum of use of iron rods in his complaint or MLC was not fatal to the case of the prosecution. Merely because no injuries to the uterus of the victim were noticed, that did not lead to the conclusion that iron rod was not used. [195],[196] and[198] (x) In order to establish a clear link between the accused persons and the incident at hand, the prosecution also adduced scientific evidence in the form of DNA, fingerprint and bite mark analysis. If the quality control is maintained, it is treated to be quite accurate and as the same was established. [225] and[230] (xi) Forensic Odontology has established itself as an important and indispensable science in medico-legal matters and expert evidence through various reports which have been utilized by courts in the administration of justice. In the case at hand, the report was wholly credible because of matching of bite marks with the tooth structure of the Accused persons and there was no reason to view the same with any suspicion. [242] (xii) There existed contradictions in the statements of the defence witnesses produced on behalf of 5th Accused. It is settled in law that while raising a plea of 'alibi', the burden squarely lies upon the accused person to establish the plea convincingly by adducing cogent evidence. The plea of 'alibi' that 4th Accused and 5th Accused had attended the alleged musical programme in the evening of 16.12.2012 was rightly rejected by the Trial Court which was given the stamp of approval by the High Court. [251] and[266] (xiii) Conspiracy and its objective can be inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused. Moreover, conspiracy being a continuing offence continues to subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by the choice of necessity. The presence of P.W. 82 in the bus prior to the boarding of the bus by the informant and the victim and the presence of all the Accused in the bus was established by the prosecution. [283] and[294] (xiv) The prosecution established that the Accused were associated with each other. The criminal acts done in furtherance of conspiracy was established by the sequence of events and the conduct of the Accused. The chain of events described by the prosecutrix in her dying declarations coupled with the testimonies of the other witnesses established that as soon as the informant and the prosecutrix boarded the bus, the Accused persons formed an agreement to commit heinous offences against the victim. Forcefully having sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix, one after the other, inserting iron rod in her private parts, dragging her by her hair and then throwing her out of the bus all established the common intent of the Accused to rape and murder the prosecutrix. The Trial Court rightly recorded that the prosecutrix's alimentary canal from the level of duodenum upto 5 cm of anal sphincter was completely damaged. It was beyond repair. Causing of damage to the jejunum was indicative of the fact that the rod was inserted through the vagina and/or anus upto the level of jejunum. Further, septicemia was the direct result of multiple internal injuries. Moreover, the prosecutrix also maintained in her dying declaration that the Accused persons were exhorting that the prosecutrix had died and she be thrown out of the bus. Ultimately, both the prosecutrix as well as the informant were thrown out of the moving bus through the front door by the Accused after having failed to throw them through the rear door. The conduct of the Accused in committing heinous offences with the prosecutrix in concert with each other and thereafter throwing her out of the bus in an unconscious state alongwith the informant unequivocally brought home the charge Under Section 120B in case of each of them. The criminal acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy was evident from the acts and also the words uttered during the commission of the offence. Therefore, the Trial court and the High Court correctly considered the entire case on the touchstone of well-recognised principles for arriving at the conclusion of criminal conspiracy. The relevant evidence on record led to a singular conclusion that the Accused persons were liable for criminal conspiracy and their confessions to counter the same deserved to be repelled. [300] and[303] (xv) The present Court concluded that the evidence of the informant was unimpeachable and it deserved to be relied upon. The Accused persons alongwith the juvenile in conflict with law were present in the bus when the prosecutrix and her friend got into the bus. There was no reason to disregard the CCTV footage, establishing the description and movement of the bus. The arrest of the Accused persons from various places at different times was proved by the prosecution. The personal search, recoveries and the disclosure leading to recovery were in consonance with law and the assail of the same on the counts of custodial confession made under torture and other pleas were highly specious pleas and they did not remotely create a dent in the said aspects. The contention raised by the Accused persons that the recoveries on the basis of disclosure were a gross manipulation by the investigating agency and deserved to be thrown overboard did not merit acceptance. The relationship between the parties having been clearly established, their arrest gains more credibility and the involvement of each accused gains credence. The dying declarations, three in number, do withstand close scrutiny and they were consistent with each other. The stand that the deceased could not have given any dying declaration because of her health condition has to be repelled because the witnesses who stated about the dying declarations stood embedded to their version and nothing was brought on record to discredit the same. That apart, the dying declaration by gestures was proved beyond reasonable doubt. There was no justification to think that the informant and the deceased would falsely implicate the Accused and leave the real culprits. The dying declarations made by the deceased received corroboration from the oral and documentary evidence and also enormously from the medical evidence. The DNA profiling, which was done after taking due care for quality, proved to the hilt the presence of the Accused in the bus and their involvement in the crime. The submission that certain samples were later on taken from the Accused and planted on the deceased to prove the DNA aspect was noted only to be rejected because it had no legs to stand upon. The argument that the transfusion of blood had the potentiality to give rise to two categories of DNA or two DNAs was farthest from truth and there was no evidence on that score. On the contrary, the evidence in exclusivity points to the matching of the DNA of the deceased with that of the Accused on many aspects. The evidence brought on record with regard to finger prints was absolutely impeccable and the Trial court and the High Court correctly placed reliance on the same and that there was no reason to disbelieve the same. The scientific evidence relating to odontology showed how far the Accused proceeded and where the bites were found and it was extremely impossible to accept the submission that it had been a manipulation by the investigating agency to rope in the Accused persons. The evidence brought on record as regards criminal conspiracy stands established. The brutal, barbaric and diabolic nature of the crime was evincible from the acts committed by the Accused persons. The aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances now brought on record. Therefore, the High Court correctly confirmed the death penalty. [304],[356] and[357] R. Banumathi, J. - concurring view: (xvi) Persisting notion that the testimony of victim has to be corroborated by other evidence must be removed. To equate a rape victim to an accomplice is to add insult to womanhood. Ours is a conservative society and not a permissive society. Ordinarily a woman, more so, a young woman will not stake her reputation by levelling a false charge, concerning her chastity. It is well-settled that conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix if it is implicitly reliable and there is a ring of truth in it. Corroboration as a condition for judicial reliance on the testimony of a prosecutrix is not requirement of law but a guidance of prudence under given circumstances. [375] and[377] (xvii) In cases where there are more than one dying declarations, the Court should consider whether they are consistent with each other. If there are inconsistencies, the nature of the inconsistencies must be examined as to whether they are material or not. In cases where there are more than one dying declaration, it is the duty of the Court to consider each one of them and satisfy itself as to the voluntariness and reliability of the declarations. Mere fact of recording multiple dying declarations does not take away the importance of each individual declaration. Court has to examine the contents of dying declaration in the light of various surrounding facts and circumstances. [390] (xviii) When a dying declaration is recorded voluntarily, pursuant to a fitness report of a certified doctor, nothing much remains to be questioned unless, it is proved that the dying declaration was tainted with animosity and a result of tutoring. Though there was time gap between the declarations, all the three dying declarations were consistent with each other and there were no material contradictions. All the three dying declarations depicted truthful version of the incident, particularly the detailed narration of the incident concerning the rape committed on the victim, insertion of iron rod and the injuries caused to her vagina and rectum, unnatural sex committed on the victim and throwing the victim and the informant out of the moving bus. All the three dying declarations being voluntary, consistent and trustworthy, satisfied the test of reliability. The dying declarations were well-corroborated by medical and scientific evidence adduced by the prosecution. Moreover, the same was amply corroborated by the testimony of eye witness-the informant. The dying declaration is amply corroborated by medical evidence. The dying declarations well corroborated by medical and scientific evidence strengthened the case of the prosecution by conclusively connecting the Accused with the crime. [397],[398],[402],[403] and[409] (xix) The computer generated electronic record in evidence, admissible at a trial is proved in the manner specified in Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 65 of the Evidence Act makes electronic records admissible as a document, paper print out of electronic records stored in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer, subject to the fulfillment of the conditions specified in Sub-section (2) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act. When those conditions are satisfied, the electronic record becomes admissible in any proceeding without further proof or production of the original, as evidence of any of the contents of the original or any fact stated therein of which direct evidence is admissible. Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led Under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. [415] (xx) Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act speaks of a confession made to a police officer, which shall not be proved as against a person accused of an offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act also speaks that no confession made by the person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act put a complete bar on the admissibility of a confessional statement made to a police officer or a confession made in absentia of a Magistrate, while in custody. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is by way of a proviso to Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and a statement even by way of confession made in police custody which distinctly relates to the fact discovered is admissible in evidence against the Accused. [433] (xxi) DNA evidence is now a predominant forensic technique for identifying criminals when biological tissues are left at the scene of crime or for identifying the source of blood found on any articles or clothes etc. recovered from the accused or from witnesses. DNA testing on samples such as saliva, skin, blood, hair or semen not only helps to convict the accused but also serves to exonerate. Meeting of minds for committing an illegal act is sine qua non of the offence of conspiracy. It is also obvious that meeting of minds, thereby resulting in formation of a consensus between the parties, can be a sudden act, spanning in a fraction of a minute. It is neither necessary that each of the conspirators take active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial act, nor it is necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every details of the conspiracy. [446] and[453] (xxii) The most important aspect of the offence of conspiracy is that apart from being a distinct statutory offence, all the parties to the conspiracy are liable for the acts of each other and as an exception to the general law in the case of conspiracy intent i.e. mens rea alone constitutes a crime. There was ample evidence proving the acts, statements and circumstances, establishing firm ground to hold that the Accused who were present in the bus were in prior concert to commit the offence of rape. The prosecution established that the Accused were associated with each other. The criminal acts done in furtherance of conspiracy, was established by the sequence of events and the conduct of the Accused. Existence of conspiracy and its objects could be inferred from the chain of events. The chain of events described by the victim in her dying declarations coupled with the testimony of the informant established that as soon as the informant and the victim boarded the bus, the Accused switched off the lights of the bus. Few Accused pinned down the informant and others committed rape on the victim in the back side of the bus one after the other. The Accused inserted iron rods in the private parts of the prosecutrix, dragging her holding her hair and then threw her outside the bus. The victim also maintained in her dying declaration that the Accused persons were exhorting that the victim died and she be thrown out of the bus. Ultimately, both the victim and the informant were thrown out of the moving bus through the front door, having failed to throw them through the rear door. The chain of action and the act of finally throwing the victim and the informant out of the bus showed that there was unity of object among the accused to commit rape and destroy the evidence thereon. [455] and[459] (xxiii) Under Section 235(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 where the Accused is convicted, save in cases of admonition or release on good conduct, the Judge shall hear the Accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence in accordance with law. Section 235(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 imposes duty on the court to hear the Accused on the question of sentence and then pass sentence on him in accordance with law. The only exception to the said rule is created in case of applicability of Section 360 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 i.e. when the court finds the Accused eligible to be released on probation of good conduct or after admonition. Section 354 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 specifies the language and contents of judgment, while delivering the judgment in a criminal case. Section 354(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 deals with judgments where conviction is for an offence punishable with death penalty or in the alternative with imprisonment for life. Section 354(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 mandates that when the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and in the case of sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. [467] and[468] (xxiv) Where a crime is committed with extreme brutality and the collective conscience of the society is shocked, courts must award death penalty, irrespective of their personal opinion as regards desirability of death penalty. By not imposing a death sentence in such cases, the Courts may do injustice to the society at large. Diabolic nature of the crime and the manner of committing crime, as reflected in committing gang-rape with the victim; forcing her to perform oral sex, injuries on the body of the deceased by way of bite marks; insertion of iron rod in her private parts and causing fatal injuries to her private parts and other internal injuries; pulling out her internal organs which caused sepsis and ultimately led to her death; throwing the victim and the informant naked in the cold wintery night and trying to run the bus over them. The brazenness and coldness with which the acts were committed in the evening hours by picking up the deceased and the victim from a public space, reflected the threat to which the society would be posed to, in case the Accused are not appropriately punished. There was no scope of reform. The horrific acts reflecting the in-human extent to which the Accused could go to satisfy their lust, being completely oblivious, not only to the norms of the society, but also to the norms of humanity. The acts committed so shook the conscience of the society. The circumstances stated by the Accused were too slender to be treated as mitigating circumstances. Offences against women are not a women's issue alone but, human rights issue. [498],[500] and[507] Mukesh and Ors. vs. State for NCT of Delhi and Ors. (05.05.2017 - SC) : MANU/SC/0575/2017


EXCEL CROP CARE LIMITED-v.- COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

AIR2017SC2734 2017CompLR355(Supreme Court) II(2017)CPJ20(SC) [2017]138CLA95(SC) (2017)5MLJ187 MANU/SC/0588/2017 2017(4)RCR(Civil)1027 [2017]141SCL480(SC) 2017(6)SCALE241 (2017)8SCC47 2017 (10) SCJ 443

Case Note: Anti-competitive agreement - Violation of provisions - Scope of power - Section 3 of Competition Act, 2002 - Whether dispute regarding violation of Section 3 of Act by Appellants could be gone into in respect of tender of March, 2009, as Section 3 was operationalised only by Notification dated 20th May, 2009? Held, anti-competitive conduct of Appellants was not limited to 2009 tender alone. It had considered tender dated 3rd November, 2009 floated by U.P. State Warehousing Corporation, tender dated 13th July, 2010 of Central Warehousing Corporation, tender dated 15th July, 2010 of M.P. State Warehousing Corporation, and tender dated 14th February, 2011 of Punjab State Co-operative SS and Marketing Federation and found that, even against these tenders, Appellants had quoted identical prices. Keeping in view said pattern of quotation, COMPAT opined that, notwithstanding any objection of Appellants premised on retrospective application of Section 3, anti-competitive conduct of APT manufacturers, i.e. Appellants, continued right up to year 2011, much after Section 3 of Act had come into force. Therefore, even if, 2009 tender was to be completely ignored, provisions of Act would nevertheless be attracted in instant case. Merely because purported agreement between Appellants was entered into and bids submitted before 20th May, 2009 are no yardstick to put an end to matter. No doubt, after agreement, first sting was inflicted on 8th May, 2009 when bids were submitted and there was no provision like Section 3 on that date. However, effect of arrangement continued even after 20th May, 2009, with more stings, as a result of which Appellants bagged contracts and fruits thereof reaped by Appellants, when Section 3 had come into force which frowns upon such kinds of agreements. Thus, enquiry into tender of March, 2009 by CCI is covered by Section 3 of Act as tender process, though initiated prior to date when Section 3 became operation, continued much beyond 20th May, 2009, the date on which the provisions of Section 3 of the Act were enforced. Bidding process did not come to an end on 8th May, 2009 as argued by Appellants. It continued even thereafter, when Appellants appeared before committee for negotiations, much beyond 20th May, 2009 date on which provisions of Section 3 of Act were enforced. Principle of retroactivity would definitely apply. No doubt, Clause (d) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of Act, uses both expressions 'bid rigging' and 'collusive bidding', but Explanation thereto refers to 'bid rigging' only. However, it cannot be said that, intention was to exclude 'collusive bidding'. Even if Explanation does contain expression 'collusive bidding' specifically, while interpreting Clause (d), it can be inferred that, 'collusive bidding' relates to process of bidding as well. Two expressions are to be interpreted using principle of noscitur a sociis, i.e. when two or more words which are susceptible to analogous meanings are coupled together, words can take colour from each other. CCI was well within its jurisdiction to hold an enquiry under Section 3 of Act in respect of tender of March, 2009. Anti-competitive Agreement - Investigation - Whether CCI was barred from investigating the matter pertaining to the tender floated by FCI in March, 2011 because of reason that FCI in its complaint dated 4th February, 2011 given to CCI had not complained about this tender? Held, CCI had entrusted task to DG after it received representation/complaint from FCI vide its communication dated 4th February, 2011. Section 26(1) is wide enough to cover the investigation by DG. Entire purpose of an investigation is to cover all necessary facts and evidence in order to see as to whether there are any anti-competitive practices adopted by persons complained against. For this purpose, no doubt, starting point of inquiry would be allegations contained in complaint. However, while carrying out this investigation, if other facts also get revealed and are brought to light, revealing that, 'persons' or 'enterprises' had entered into an agreement that is prohibited by Section 3 which had appreciable adverse effect on competition, the DG would be well within his powers to include those as well in his report. Even when CCI forms prima facie opinion on receipt of a complaint which is recorded in order passed under Section 26(1) of Act and directs DG to conduct investigation, at said initial stage, it cannot foresee and predict whether any violation of Act would be found upon investigation and what would be nature of violation revealed through investigation. If investigation process is to be restricted in manner projected by Appellants, it would defeat very purpose of Act, which is to prevent practices having appreciable adverse effect on competition. Anti-competitive agreement - Violation of provisions - Whether, on facts of case, conclusion of CCI that, Appellants had entered into an agreement/arrangement and pursuant thereto indulged in collusive bidding by forming a cartel, resulting into contravention of Section 3(3)(a), 3(3)(b) and 3(3)(d) read with Section 3(1) of the Act, is justified? Held, it is not in dispute that in respect of 2009 tender of FCI, all three Appellants had quoted same price, i.e. ` 388 per kg. for the APT. Appellants have attempted to give their explanations and have contended that, it cannot be presumed that, it was result of any prior agreement or arrangement between them. Appellants had been quoting such identical rates much prior to and even after 20th May, 2009. Entire history of quoting identical price before coming into operation of Section 3 and which continued much after Section 3 of the Act was enforced has been highlighted. There cannot be coincidence to such an extent that almost on all occasions price quoted by three Appellants is identical, not even few paisa more or less from each other. That too, when cost structure, i.e. cost of production of this product, of three Appellants sharply varies with each other. Ingredients of Section 3 stand satisfied and CCI rightly held that, provisions of Section 3(3)(a), 3(3)(b) and 3(3)(d) have been contravened by Appellants. In 2009 tender, a specific quantity of 600 MT was prescribed. At that time, all three Appellants participated and did not object to the same. As against this in 2011 tender, tentative annual requirement of APT was stated to be 400 MT and not 75 MT per month. Condition referred to by Appellants was not for supply of 75 MT per month. It only stated that, in a given month, tenderer should have capacity to supply 75 MT. It was nowhere stated that, 75 MT will have to be supplied by successful tenderer every month. In any case, from conduct of three Appellants, it becomes manifest that, reason to boycott May, 2011 tender was not the purported onerous conditions, but it was a concerted action. Otherwise, if Appellants were genuinely interested in participating in the said tender and were aggrieved by aforesaid conditions, they could have taken up the matter with the FCI well in time. They, therefore, could request FCI to drop the same (in fact FCI dropped these conditions afterwards when matter was brought to their notice). However, no such effort was made. M/s. Excel Crop Care wrote letter only a day before, just to create the record which cannot be termed as a bona fide move on its part. UPL did not even make any such representation in writing. Likewise, M/s. Sandhya Organics Chemicals (P) Ltd. would not have liked itself to be rendered disqualified and silently swallowed this situation. After all, it would have liked to remain a supplier of APT to FCI having regard to the fact that the said product is consumed by handful of Government sector undertakings. Therefore, not making any sincere effort in this behalf by any of the Appellants clearly shows that they were in hand in glove in taking a decision not to bid against this tender. This conclusion gets strengthened by fact that, these are only four suppliers (including three Appellants) in market for this product. Reaction of not participating in said tender by four suppliers could have been perceived otherwise, had there been a number of manufacturers in market and four out of them abstaining. Abstention by hundred per cent (who are only four) makes things quite obvious. Events get quite apparent, when examined along with past history of quoting identical prices. Since collusion stands proved by conduct of Appellants in abstaining from bidding in respect of May, 2011 tender, requirement of Section 3(3)(d) of Act read with 'explanation' thereto stands satisfied, viz. concerted action based on an agreement/arrangement between Appellants, resulted in restricting or manipulating competition or process of bidding, since said act was collusive in nature. Anti-competitive agreement - Penalty - Whether penalty under Section 27(b) of the Act has to be on total/entire turnover of offending company? Held, under Section 27(b) of Act, penalty of 10 per cent of turnover is prescribed as maximum penalty with no provision for minimum penalty. CCI had chosen to impose 9 per cent of average turnover keeping in view serious nature of breach on part of these Appellants. COMPAT has maintained rate of penalty i.e. 9 per cent of three years average turnover. However, it has not agreed with CCI that 'turnover' mentioned in Section 27 would be 'total turnover' of offending company. In its opinion, it has to be 'relevant turnover' i.e. turnover of product in question. Penalty cannot be disproportionate and it should not lead to shocking results. That is the implication of doctrine of proportionality which is based on equity and rationality. It is, in fact, a constitutionally protected right which can be traced to Article 14 as well as Article 21 of Constitution. Doctrine of proportionality is aimed at bringing out 'proportional result or proportionality stricto sensu'. It is a result oriented test as it examines result of law, in fact the proportionality achieves balancing between two competing interests: harm caused to society by infringer which gives justification for penalising infringer on one hand and right of infringer in not suffering punishment which may be disproportionate to seriousness of Act. Purpose and objective behind Act is to discourage and stop anti-competitive practice. Penal provision contained in Section 27 of Act serves this purpose as it is aimed at achieving objective of punishing offender and acts as deterrent to others. Such apurpose can adequately be served by taking into consideration relevant turnover. It is in public interest as well as in interest of national economy that, industries thrive in this country leading to maximum production. Therefore, it cannot be said that, purpose of Act is to 'finish' those industries altogether by imposing those kinds of penalties which are beyond their means. It is also purpose of Act not to punish violator even in respect of which, there are no anti-competitive practices and provisions of Act are not attracted. There was no error in approach of order of COMPAT interpreting Section 27(b) of Act. Prior History / High Court Status: From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2013 of the Competition Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 79 of 2012 (MANU/TA/0028/2013) Disposition: Appeal Dismissed Excel Crop. Care Limited vs. Competition Commission of India and Ors. (08.05.2017 - SC) : MANU/SC/0588/2017


COMMON CAUSE-v.- UNION OF INDIA AND ORS

(2017)13 scr 361

Mines and Minerals – Illegal mining of enormous proportions in districts of Odisha – Writ petition partly based on reports given by Justice M.B. Shah Commissions of Inquiry sought directions, inter alia, to Union of India and Government of Odisha to immediately stop forthwith all illegal mining in the State of Odisha and for CBI investigation into such illegal mining – Plea of mining lease holders that reports given by Commission were vitiated as they were not given notice u/ss.8B, 8C of the 1952 Act, and thus, the very foundation of the writ petition goes away – Held: First report given by Commission was a general, overall perspective on the subject – No irregularity or illegality has been committed so as to vitiate the first report – Second report went into specific details of several mining lease holders, but herein one is not concerned with those specifics – Therefore, whether notices were issued or not to the lease holders who were the subject matter of discussion in the second report is of no consequence –However, the reports of the Commission are not being relied upon for the purpose of present judgment and order – Further, for now, no direction is being given with regard to any investigation by CBI – Expert Committee be set up under the guidance of a retired judge of Supreme Court to identify the lapses occurred over the years enabling rampant illegal or unlawful mining in Odisha and measures to prevent this from happening in other parts of the country – Further, directions issued – Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 – ss.8B, 8C.


SHAYARA BANO -v.-UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

2017(179)AIC104 AIR2017SC4609 2017 5 AWC4353SC 2017(5)BomCR481 2017(4) CHN (SC) 60 121(3)CWN1 2017 (3) CCC 82 III(2017)DMC1SC ILR2017(3)Kerala907 (2017)6MLJ378 MANU/SC/1031/2017 2017(9)SCALE178 (2017)9SCC1 2017 (7) SCJ 477

Case Note: Family - Divorce - Triple talaq - Validity thereof - Section 2 of Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 and Articles 13, 14, 15, 21, 25 and 142 of Constitution of India - Petitioner/Wife had approached present Court, for assailing divorce pronounced by her Husband in presence of witnesses saying that I gave 'talak, talak, talak' - Petitioner had sought declaration, that talaq-e-biddat pronounced by her husband be declared as void ab initio - Whether triple talaq, could be interfered with on judicial side by present Court. Facts: The Petitioner/Wife had approached present Court, for assailing the divorce pronounced by her Husband in the presence of witnesses saying that I gave 'talak, talak, talak'. The Petitioner had sought a declaration, that the talaq-e-biddat pronounced by her husband be declared as void ab initio. Held, while allowing the petition: J.S. Khehar, C.J.I. and S. Abdul Nazeer, J.:Dissenting view (i) Practice of 'talaq-e-biddat', has had the sanction and approval of the religious denomination which practiced it, and as such, there could be no doubt that the practice, was a part of their personal law. [145] (ii) After examined Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, the limited purpose of the aforesaid provision was to negate the overriding effect of usages and customs over the Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat'. The debates reveal that customs and usages by tribals were being given overriding effect by courts while determining issues between Muslims. The Shariat Act, neither lays down nor declares the Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat'. Not even, on the questions/subjects covered by the legislation. There was no room for any doubt, that there was substantial divergence of norms regulating Shias and Sunnis. There was further divergence of norms, in their respective schools. The Shariat Act did not crystallise the norms as were to be applicable to Shias and Sunnis, or their respective schools. What was sought to be done through the Shariat Act, was to preserve Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat', as it existed from time immemorial. The Shariat Act recognizes the Muslim 'personal law' as the 'rule of decision' in the same manner as Article 25 recognises the supremacy and enforceability of 'personal law' of all religions. Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat' as body of law, was perpetuated by the Shariat Act, and what had become ambiguous (due to inundations through customs and usages), was clarified and crystalised. Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat' could not be considered as a State enactment. [156] (iii) The fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 14, 15 and 21 are as against State actions. A challenge under these provisions Articles 14, 15 and 21 could be invoked only against the State. It was essential to keep in mind, that Article 14 forbids the State from acting arbitrarily. Article 14 requires the State to ensure equality before the law and equal protection of the laws, within the territory of Country. Likewise, Article 15 prohibits the State from taking discriminatory action on the grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, or any of them. The mandate of Article 15 requires, the State to treat everyone equally. Even Article 21 is a protection from State action, inasmuch as, it prohibits the State from depriving anyone of the rights ensuring to them, as a matter of life and liberty (-except, by procedure established by law). Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat', could not be tested on the touchstone of being a State action. Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat', is a matter of 'personal law' of Muslims, to be traced from four sources, namely, the Quran, the 'hadith', the 'ijma' and the 'qiyas'. None of these could be attributed to any State action. Talaq-e-biddat is a practice amongst Sunni Muslims of the Hanafi school. A practice which was a component of the faith of those belonging to that school. Personal law, being a matter of religious faith, and not being State action, there was no question of its being violative of the provisions of the Constitution, more particularly, the provisions relied upon by the Petitioners, to assail the practice of talaq-e-biddat, namely, Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution. [165] (iv) This was a case which presents a situation where present Court should exercise its discretion to issue appropriate directions under Article 142 of the Constitution. Direction granted to Union of India to consider appropriate legislation, particularly with reference to 'talaq-e-biddat'. The contemplated legislation would also take into consideration advances in Muslim 'personal law'-'Shariat', as have been corrected by legislation the world over, even by theocratic Islamic States. [199] (v) Till such time as legislation in the matter is considered, Muslim husbands are injuncted from pronouncing 'talaq-e-biddat' as a means for severing their matrimonial relationship. The instant injunction, shall in the first instance, be operative for a period of six months. If the legislative process commences before the expiry of the period of six months, and a positive decision emerges towards redefining 'talaq-e-biddat' (three pronouncements of 'talaq', at one and the same time)-as one, or alternatively, if it was decided that the practice of 'talaq-e-biddat' be done away with altogether, the injunction would continue, till legislation is finally enacted. Failing which, the injunction shall cease to operate. [200] Kurian Joseph, J.: Concurring view (vi) To freely profess, practice and propagate religion of one's choice is a Fundamental Right guaranteed under the Constitution. Under Article 25 (2) of the Constitution, the State is also granted power to make law in two contingencies notwithstanding the freedom granted under Article 25(1). Article 25 (2) states that "nothing in this Article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law-(a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice; (b) providing for social welfare and reform or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and Sections of Hindus. Except to the above extent, the freedom of religion under the Constitution is absolute. On the statement that triple talaq was an integral part of the religious practice, could not be agreed. Merely because a practice had continued for long, that by itself could not make it valid if it had been expressly declared to be impermissible. The whole purpose of the 1937 Act was to declare Shariat as the Rule of decision and to discontinue anti-Shariat practices with respect to subjects enumerated in Section 2 which include talaq. Therefore, in any case, after the introduction of the 1937 Act, no practice against the tenets of Quran was permissible. Hence, there could not be any Constitutional protection to such a practice and thus, disagreement with the Chief Justice for the constitutional protection given to triple talaq. [224] Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. and and U.U. Lalit J.: Concurring view (vii) Marriage in Islam is a contract, and like other contracts, may under certain circumstances, be terminated. There was something astonishingly modern about this-no public declaration was a condition precedent to the validity of a Muslim marriage nor was any religious ceremony deemed absolutely essential, though they were usually carried out. Apparently, before the time of Prophet, the pagan Arab was absolutely free to repudiate his wife on a mere whim, but after the advent of Islam, divorce was permitted to a man if his wife by her indocility or bad character renders marital life impossible. In the absence of good reason, no man could justify a divorce for he then draws upon himself the curse of God. Indeed, Prophet had declared divorce to be the most disliked of lawful things in the sight of God. The reason for this was not far to seek. Divorce breaks the marital tie which is fundamental to family life in Islam. Not only does it disrupt the marital tie between man and woman, but it has severe psychological and other repercussions on the children from such marriage. [234] (viii) Given the fact that Triple Talaq is instant and irrevocable, it was obvious that any attempt at reconciliation between the husband and wife by two arbiters from their families, which was essential to save the marital tie, could not ever take place. Also, as understood by the Privy Council in Rashid Ahmad, such Triple Talaq was valid even if it was not for any reasonable cause, which view of the law no longer holds good after Shamim Ara. This being the case, it was clear that this form of Talaq was manifestly arbitrary in the sense that the marital tie could be broken capriciously and whimsically by a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form of Talaq must, therefore, be held to be violative of the fundamental right contained Under Article 14 of the Constitution. The 1937 Act, insofar as it seeks to recognize and enforce Triple Talaq, was within the meaning of the expression laws in force in Article 13(1) and must be struck down as being void to the extent that it recognizes and enforces Triple Talaq. The practice of talaq-e-biddat-triple talaq was set aside. [283] Shayara Bano and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (22.08.2017 - SC) : MANU/SC/1031/2017


JUSTICE K S PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) AND ANR.-v.- UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

2017(178)AIC1 AIR2017SC4161 2017(5)ALLMR686 2017 (124) ALR 877 2017(6)BomCR78 121(2)CWN1 (2018)1CompLJ369(SC) 2017(4)KLT1 (2017)6MLJ267 MANU/SC/1044/2017 2017(10)SCALE1 (2017)10SCC1 2017 (8) SCJ 33

Case Note: Constitution - Right to privacy - Entitlement thereto - Articles 19 and 20 of Constitution - Bench of three judges of present Court, while considering constitutional challenge to aadhar card scheme of Union Government noted in its earlier order that norms for and compilation of demographic biometric data by government was questioned on ground that it violates right to privacy - Bench of three judges of present Court took note of several decisions of present Court in which right to privacy has been held to be constitutionally protected fundamental right - These subsequent decisions which affirmed existence of constitutionally protected right of privacy, were rendered by Benches of strength smaller than those in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh cases - Faced with this predicament and having due regard to far-reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of Constitution, it was felt that institutional integrity and judicial discipline would require reference to larger Bench - Hence Bench of three judges observed in its order that to determine whether there was any fundamental right of privacy under Constitution - Determination of this question would essentially entail whether decision recorded by present Court in M.P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Ors by eight-Judge Constitution Bench, and also, in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P. and Ors. by six-Judge Constitution Bench, that there was no such fundamental right, was correct expression of constitutional position - Issue deserves to be placed before nine-Judge Constitution Bench - Hence, present reference - Whether there is constitutionally protected right to privacy. Facts: A Bench of three judges of present Court, while considering the constitutional challenge to the aadhar card scheme of the Union Government noted in its earlier order that the norms for and compilation of demographic biometric data by government was questioned on the ground that it violates the right to privacy. The Bench of three judges of present Court took note of several decisions of present Court in which the right to privacy has been held to be a constitutionally protected fundamental right. These subsequent decisions which affirmed the existence of a constitutionally protected right of privacy, were rendered by Benches of a strength smaller than those in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh cases. Faced with this predicament and having due regard to the far-reaching questions of importance involving interpretation of the Constitution, it was felt that institutional integrity and judicial discipline would require a reference to a larger Bench. Hence the Bench of three judges observed in its order that to determine whether there was any fundamental right of privacy under the Indian Constitution. The determination of this question would essentially entail whether the decision recorded by present Court in M.P. Sharma and Ors. v. Satish Chandra, District Magistrate, Delhi and Ors by an eight-Judge Constitution Bench, and also, in Kharak Singh v. The State of U.P. and Ors. by a six-Judge Constitution Bench, that there was no such fundamental right, was the correct expression of the constitutional position. Issue deserves to be placed before the nine-Judge Constitution Bench. Held, while disposing off the reference: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.: (i) To live is to live with dignity. The draftsmen of the Constitution defined their vision of the society in which constitutional values would be attained by emphasising, among other freedoms, liberty and dignity. So fundamental was dignity that it permeates the core of the rights guaranteed to the individual by Part III. Dignity was the core which unites the fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to achieve for each individual the dignity of existence. Privacy with its attendant values assures dignity to the individual and it was only when life can be enjoyed with dignity can liberty be of true substance. Privacy ensures the fulfilment of dignity and was a core value which the protection of life and liberty was intended to achieve. [107] (ii) The judgment in M.P. Sharma holds essentially that in the absence of a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right to privacy could not be read into the provisions of Article 20 (3) of the Indian Constitution. The judgment did not specifically adjudicate on whether a right to privacy would arise from any of the other provisions of the rights guaranteed by Part III including Article 21 and Article 19. The observation that privacy is not a right guaranteed by the Indian Constitution is not reflective of the correct position. M.P. Sharma was overruled to the extent to which it indicates to the contrary. [186] (iii) Kharak Singh has correctly held that the content of the expression 'life' under Article 21 means not merely the right to a person's "animal existence" and that the expression 'personal liberty' is a guarantee against invasion into the sanctity of a person's home or an intrusion into personal security. Kharak Singh also correctly laid down that the dignity of the individual must lend content to the meaning of 'personal liberty'. The first part of the decision in Kharak Singh which invalidated domiciliary visits at night on the ground that they violated ordered liberty was an implicit recognition of the right to privacy. The second part of the decision, however, which holds that the right to privacy was not a guaranteed right under our Constitution, was not reflective of the correct position. Similarly, Kharak Singh's reliance upon the decision of the majority in Gopalan was not reflective of the correct position in view of the decisions in Cooper and in Maneka. Kharak Singh to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy was not protected under the Indian Constitution was overruled. [187] (iv) Life and personal liberty are inalienable rights. These are rights which are inseparable from a dignified human existence. The dignity of the individual, equality between human beings and the quest for liberty are the foundational pillars of the Indian Constitution. Life and personal liberty were not creations of the Constitution. These rights were recognised by the Constitution as inhering in each individual as an intrinsic and inseparable part of the human element which dwells within. Privacy is a constitutionally protected right which emerges primarily from the guarantee of life and personal liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Elements of privacy also arise in varying contexts from the other facets of freedom and dignity recognised and guaranteed by the fundamental rights contained in Part III. Judicial recognition of the existence of a constitutional right of privacy was not an exercise in the nature of amending the Constitution nor was the Court embarking on a constitutional function of that nature which was entrusted to Parliament. Privacy is the constitutional core of human dignity. Privacy has both a normative and descriptive function. At a normative level privacy sub-serves those eternal values upon which the guarantees of life, liberty and freedom are founded. At a descriptive level, privacy postulates a bundle of entitlements and interests which lie at the foundation of ordered liberty. Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the public arenas, it was important to underscore that privacy was not lost or surrendered merely because the individual was in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it was an essential facet of the dignity of the human being. Present Court has not embarked upon an exhaustive enumeration or a catalogue of entitlements or interests comprised in the right to privacy. The Constitution must evolve with the felt necessities of time to meet the challenges thrown up in a democratic order governed by the Rule of law. The meaning of the Constitution could not be frozen on the perspectives present when it was adopted. Technological change has given rise to concerns which were not present seven decades ago and the rapid growth of technology may render obsolescent many notions of the present. Hence the interpretation of the Constitution must be resilient and flexible to allow future generations to adapt its content bearing in mind its basic or essential features. Like other rights which form part of the fundamental freedoms protected by Part III, including the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, privacy is not an absolute right. A law which encroaches upon privacy would have to withstand the touchstone of permissible restrictions on fundamental rights. In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure which was fair, just and reasonable. The law must also be valid with reference to the encroachment on life and personal liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty must meet the three-fold requirement of (i) legality, which postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of a legitimate state aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted to achieve them; and privacy has both positive and negative content. The negative content restrains the state from committing an intrusion upon the life and personal liberty of a citizen. Its positive content imposes an obligation on the state to take all necessary measures to protect the privacy of the individual. [188] (v) Informational privacy was a facet of the right to privacy. The dangers to privacy in an age of information can originate not only from the state but from non-state actors as well. Present Court commend to the Union Government the need to examine and put into place a robust regime for data protection. The creation of such a regime requires a careful and sensitive balance between individual interests and legitimate concerns of the state. The legitimate aims of the state would include for instance protecting national security, preventing and investigating crime, encouraging innovation and the spread of knowledge, and preventing the dissipation of social welfare benefits. These were matters of policy to be considered by the Union government while designing a carefully structured regime for the protection of the data. Since the Union government has informed the Court that it has constituted a Committee, for that purpose, the matter should be dealt with appropriately by the Union government having due regard to what has been set out in this judgment. [190] Jasti Chelameswar, J.: (vi) It goes without saying that no legal right can be absolute. Every right has limitations. This aspect of the matter was conceded at the bar. Therefore, even a fundamental right to privacy has limitations. The limitations were to be identified on case to case basis depending upon the nature of the privacy interest claimed. There were different standards of review to test infractions of fundamental rights. While the concept of reasonableness overarches Part III, it operates differently across Articles (even if only slightly differently across some of them). Having emphatically interpreted the Constitution's liberty guarantee to contain a fundamental right of privacy, it was necessary to outline the manner in which such a right to privacy could be limited. [233] (vii) The just, fair and reasonable standard of review under Article 21 needs no elaboration. It has also most commonly been used in cases dealing with a privacy claim hitherto. Gobind resorted to the compelling state interest standard in addition to the Article 21 reasonableness enquiry. From the United States where the terminology of 'compelling state interest' originated, a strict standard of scrutiny comprises two things-a 'compelling state interest' and a requirement of 'narrow tailoring' (narrow tailoring means that the law must be narrowly framed to achieve the objective). As a term, compelling state interest does not have definite contours in the US. Hence, it was critical that this standard be adopted with some clarity as to when and in what types of privacy claims it was to be used. Only in privacy claims which deserve the strictest scrutiny was the standard of compelling State interest to be used. As for others, the just, fair and reasonable standard under Article 21 would apply. When the compelling State interest standard was to be employed must depend upon the context of concrete cases. [236] S.A. Bobde, J.,: (viii) There is no doubt that privacy is integral to the several fundamental rights recognized by Part III of the Constitution and must be regarded as a fundamental right itself. The relationship between the right of privacy and the particular fundamental right (or rights) involved would depend on the action interdicted by a particular law. At a minimum, since privacy is always integrated with personal liberty, the constitutionality of the law which was alleged to have invaded into a rights bearer's privacy must be tested by the same standards by which a law which invades personal liberty under Article 21 was liable to be tested. Under Article 21, the standard test at present was the rationality review expressed in Maneka Gandhi's case. This requires that any procedure by which the state interferes with an Article 21 right to be "fair, just and reasonable, not fanciful, oppressive or arbitrary. [281] (ix) The ineluctable conclusion must be that an inalienable constitutional right to privacy inheres in Part III of the Constitution. M.P. Sharma and the majority opinion in Kharak Singh must stand overruled to the extent that they indicate to the contrary. The right to privacy is inextricably bound up with all exercises of human liberty - both as it is specifically enumerated across Part III, and as it is guaranteed in the residue under Article 21. It is distributed across the various articles in Part III and, mutatis mutandis, takes the form of whichever of their enjoyment its violation curtails. [283] Rohinton Fali Nariman, J: (x) This right is subject to reasonable Regulations made by the State to protect legitimate State interests or public interest. However, when it comes to restrictions on this right, the drill of various Articles to which the right relates must be scrupulously followed. For example, if the restraint on privacy was over fundamental personal choices that an individual was to make, State action could be restrained under Article 21 read with Article 14 if it was arbitrary and unreasonable; and under Article 21 read with Article 19(1) (a) only if it relates to the subjects mentioned in Article 19(2) and the tests laid down by present Court for such legislation or subordinate legislation to pass muster under the said Article. Each of the tests evolved by this Court, qua legislation or executive action, under Article 21 read with Article 14; or Article 21 read with Article 19(1)(a) in the aforesaid examples must be met in order that State action pass muster. In the ultimate analysis, the balancing act that iss to be carried out between individual, societal and State interests must be left to the training and expertise of the judicial mind. [369] (xi) The inalienable fundamental right to privacy resides in Article 21 and other fundamental freedoms contained in Part III of the Constitution of India. M.P. Sharma and the majority in Kharak Singh, to the extent that they indicate to the contrary, stand overruled. The later judgments of present Court recognizing privacy as a fundamental right do not need to be revisited. These cases were, therefore, sent back for adjudication on merits to the original Bench of three Judges of present Court. [377] Abhay Manohar Sapre, J.: (xii) It was not possible for the framers of the Constitution to incorporate each and every right be that a natural or common law right of an individual in Part III of the Constitution. Whenever occasion arose in the last fifty years to decide as to whether any particular right alleged by the citizen is a fundamental right or not, present Court with the process of judicial interpretation recognized with remarkable clarity several existing natural and common law rights of an individual as fundamental rights falling in Part III though not defined in the Constitution. It was done keeping in view the fact that the Constitution is a sacred living document and, hence, susceptible to appropriate interpretation of its provisions based on changing needs of "We, the People" and other well defined parameters. [392] (xiii) The "right to privacy" emanating from the two expressions of the preamble namely, "liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship" and "Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual" and also emanating from Article 19(1)(a) which gives to every citizen "a freedom of speech and expression" and further emanating from Article 19(1)(d) which gives to every citizen "a right to move freely throughout the territory of India" and lastly, emanating from the expression "personal liberty" under Article 21. Indeed, the right to privacy is inbuilt in these expressions and flows from each of them and in juxtaposition. [411] (xiv) ''Right to privacy" is a part of fundamental right of a citizen guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. However, it is not an absolute right but is subject to certain reasonable restrictions, which the State is entitled to impose on the basis of social, moral and compelling public interest in accordance with law. [412] Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.: (xv) The right of privacy is a fundamental right. It is a right which protects the inner sphere of the individual from interference from both State, and non-State actors and allows the individuals to make autonomous life choices. [496] (xvi) If the individual permits someone to enter the house it does not mean that others could enter the house. The only check and balance is that it should not harm the other individual or affect his or her rights. This applies both to the physical form and to technology. In an era where there are wide, varied, social and cultural norms and more so in a country like ours which prides itself on its diversity, privacy is one of the most important rights to be protected both against State and non-State actors and be recognized as a fundamental right. How it thereafter works out in its inter-play with other fundamental rights and when such restrictions would become necessary would depend on the factual matrix of each case. That it may give rise to more litigation could hardly be the reason not to recognize this important, natural, primordial right as a fundamental right. [498] (xvii) Let the right of privacy, an inherent right, be unequivocally a fundamental right embedded in part-III of the Constitution of India, but subject to the restrictions specified, relatable to that part. [502] (xviii) The decision in M.P. Sharma which holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands over-ruled, the decision in Kharak Singh to the extent that it holds that the right to privacy is not protected by the Constitution stands over-ruled, the right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution and decisions subsequent to Kharak Singh which have enunciated the position above lay down the correct position in law. [504] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (24.08.2017 - SC) : MANU/SC/1044/2017


COMMON CAUSE (A REGD. SOCIETY) -v.- UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER

2014(137)AIC73 2014(2)CDR513(SC) 2014 (104) ALR 509 2014 (4) AWC 3819 (SC) 2014III AD (S.C.) 213 (SCSuppl)2014(4)CHN41 MANU/SC/0140/2014 2014(2)RCR(Civil)48 2014(2)RCR(Criminal)11 2014(3)SCALE1 (2014)5SCC338 2014 (3) SCJ 21

Case Note: Constitution of India - Articles 32 and 21--Euthanasia--Validity--Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648, observed that "right to live with dignity" includes "right to die with dignity"--On basis of this observation petitioner-society seeks for remedy under Article 32--Although Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur case had upheld that "right to live with dignity" under Article 21 will be inclusive of "right to die with dignity"--Decision does not arrive at conclusion for validity of euthanasia be it active or passive--Only judgment that holds field in regard to euthanasia in India is Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug v. Union of India, (2011) 4 SCC 454, which upholds validity of passive euthanasia and lays down elaborate procedure for executing same on wrong premise that Constitution Bench in Gian Kaur case had upheld the same--In view of inconsistent opinion rendered in Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug case and also in view of important question of law involved which needs to be reflected in light of social, legal, medical and' constitutional perspective--It becomes extremely important to have clear enunciation of law--Question of law involved requires careful consideration by Constitution Bench of Supreme Court for benefit of humanity as whole--Constitution Bench to go into all aspects of matter and lay down exhaustive guidelines in this regard--Accordingly, matter referred to Constitution Bench of Supreme Court for authoritative opinion. In the instant case, the writ petition, under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, has been filed by Common Cause-a Society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 engaged in taking up various common problems of the people for securing redressal, praying for declaring 'right to die with dignity' as a fundamental right within the fold of 'right to live with dignity' guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and to issue direction to the respondent to adopt suitable procedures, in consultation with the State Governments wherever necessary, to ensure that the persons with deteriorated health or terminally ill should be able to execute a document, viz., 'my living will and Attorney authorization' which can be presented to hospital for appropriate action in the event of the executant being admitted to the hospital with serious illness which may threaten termination of life of the executant or in the alternative, issue appropriate guidelines to this effect and to appoint an Expert Committee consisting of doctors, social scientists and lawyers to study into the aspect of issuing guidelines regarding execution of 'Living Wills'. The petitioner had emphasized the need for a law to be passed which would authorize the execution of the 'Living Will and Attorney Authorization'. According to the petitioner-Society, the citizens who are suffering from chronic diseases and/or are at the end of their natural life span and are likely to go into a state of terminal illness or permanent vegetative state are deprived of their rights to refuse cruel and unwanted medical treatment like feeding through hydration tubes, being kept on ventilator and other life supporting machines, in order to artificially prolong their natural life span. Thus, the denial of this right leads to extension of pain and agony both physical as well as mental which the Indipendent Society seeks to end by making an informed choice by way of clearly expressing their wishes in advance called "a Living Will" in the event of their going into a state when it will not be possible for them to express their wishes. In view of the inconsistent opinions rendered in Aruna Shanbaug, (2011) 4 SCC 454 and also considering the important question of law involved which needs to be reflected in the light of social legal, medical and constitutional perspective, it becomes extremely important to have a clear enunciation of law. The question of law involved requires careful consideration by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court for the benefit of humanity as a whole. Constitution Bench to go into all the aspects of the matter and lay down exhaustive guidelines in this regard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court referred this matter to a Constitution Bench for an authoritative opinion. Common Cause (A Regd. Society) vs. Union of India (UOI) (25.02.2014 - SC) : MANU/SC/0140/2014


MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, UJJAIN & ANR.- v.-BVG INDIA LIMITED AND ORS.

2018(2)J.L.J.R.457 MANU/SC/0293/2018 2018(2)PLJR486 2018(5)SCALE128 (2018)5SCC462 2018 (5) SCJ 11

Commercial - Tender - Validity thereof - Appellant had issued notice inviting tender for appointment of agency to carry out work related to solid waste management - Present appeal filed against order whereby First Respondent was awarded contract despite issuance of show cause notices by technical expert against him - Whether under scope of judicial review, High Court could ordinarily question judgment of expert consultant on issue of technical qualifications of bidder - Whether High Court was justified in independently evaluating technical bids and financial bids of parties, as appellate authority, for coming to conclusion Facts: Appellant had issued notice inviting tender for appointment of agency to carry out "Municipal Solid Waste Door to Door Collection and Transportation". Tender was to be awarded based on final score arrived at by taking total of weighted scores of technical and financial evaluations. First Respondent scored low on technical evaluation whereas Third Respondent got more score than First Respondent. On final analysis based on technical and financial weighted scores Third Respondent was awarded contract. Such award of contract was questioned by First Respondent before High Court which was allowed. During pendency Court granted interim order staying operation of impugned order of High Court, consequent upon which successful bidder was awarded contract. Hence, present appeal filed by Appellants. Held, while allowing the appeals: (i) First Respondent had submitted its bid as individual bidder and not as consortium and hence certificate of third party could not be considered for benefit of meeting technical qualification of First Respondent. First Respondent had suppressed 73 show cause notices issued against it in respect of work relating to solid waste management. Despite suppression by First Respondent, technical expert from its own sources gathered information and found that 73 show cause notices were issued against First Respondent which reveal that First Respondent had not shown due diligence in work of door to door collection of solid waste. Hence, conclusion reached by High Court that it was not open for technical committee to suo motu take into consideration show cause notices while evaluating technical bid was not correct. The due diligence and experience of the expert consultant ought to have been appreciated by High Court keeping in mind the object to which bids were invited. First Respondent did not have good track record and therefore such notices were necessarily taken into consideration by technical expert. In all fairness, First Respondent ought to have disclosed these factors in its bid. [44] (ii) If bidder had faced number of show-cause notices from various municipal corporations in matter of non-performance of door to door collection of garbage, Court could not compel authority to choose such undeserving company to carry out work. Public interest must be safeguarded. Since public was directly interested and would be affected if work entrusted was not carried out appropriately, and as technical expert had found that First Respondent would not be suitable company to be entrusted work inasmuch as it had faced show-cause notices from different Municipal Corporations, High Court could not have interfered with decision taken by authority. Impugned order of High Court was set aside. [48] Disposition: Appeal Allowed Municipal Corporation, Ujjain and Ors. vs. BVG India Limited and Ors. (27.03.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/0293/2018


SHAKTI VAHINI-v.- UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

2019(1)HLR267 AIR2018SC1601 2018(3)ALLMR915 2018(4)ALD1 2018 (2) ALD(Crl.) 144 (SC) 2018(2)Crimes205(SC) 2018(2)CWC329 2018(2)JLJ1 MANU/SC/0291/2018 2018(5)SCALE51 (2018)7SCC192 2018 (4) SCJ 706 2018 (3) WLN 105 (SC)

Case Note: Criminal - Honor Killing - Present petition filed seeking directions to Respondents to take preventive steps combating honor crimes - Directions to constitute special cells approached by couples for their safety - Whether steps be taken to curb honor crimes Facts: Present petition filed seeking directions to the Respondents to take preventive steps in order to combat honor crimes and to constitute special cells approached by couples for their safety. Held, while disposing off petition: (i) To meet the challenges of the agonizing effect of honor crime, the present Court was of the view that there has to be preventive, remedial and punitive measures and accordingly issued following directions: A. Preventive Steps: The State Governments should forthwith identify Districts, Sub-Divisions and/or Villages where instances of honor killing or assembly of Khap Panchayats have been reported in the recent past, in the last five years. The Secretary, Home Department of the concerned States should issue directives/advisories to the Superintendent of Police of the concerned Districts for ensuring that the Officer In charge of the Police Stations of the identified areas are extra cautious if any instance of inter-caste or inter-religious marriage within their jurisdiction comes to their notice. If information about any proposed gathering of a Khap Panchayat comes to the knowledge of any police officer or any officer of the District Administration, he shall forthwith inform his immediate superior officer and also simultaneously intimate the jurisdictional Deputy Superintendent of Police and Superintendent of Police. On receiving such information, the Deputy Superintendent of Police (or such senior police officer as identified by the State Governments with respect to the area/district) shall immediately interact with the members of the Khap Panchayat and impress upon them that convening of such meeting/gathering is not permissible in law and to eschew from going ahead with such a meeting. Additionally, he should issue appropriate directions to the Officer In charge of the jurisdictional Police Station to be vigilant and, if necessary, to deploy adequate police force for prevention of assembly of the proposed gathering. Despite taking such measures, if the meeting is conducted, the Deputy Superintendent of Police shall personally remain present during the meeting and impress upon the assembly that no decision can be taken to cause any harm to the couple or the family members of the couple, failing which each one participating in the meeting besides the organizers would be personally liable for criminal prosecution. He shall also ensure that video recording of the discussion and participation of the members of the assembly is done on the basis of which the law enforcing machinery can resort to suitable action. [53] B. Remedial Measures: Despite the preventive measures taken by the State Police, if it comes to the notice of the local police that the Khap Panchayat has taken place and it has passed any diktat to take action against a couple/family of an inter-caste or inter-religious marriage (or any other marriage which does not meet their acceptance), the jurisdictional police official shall cause to immediately lodge an F.I.R. under the appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code. Upon registration of F.I.R., intimation should be simultaneously given to the Superintendent of Police/Deputy Superintendent of Police who, in turn, shall ensure that effective investigation of the crime is done and taken to its logical end with promptitude and necessary steps should be taken accordingly to provide security to the couple/family and, if necessary, to remove them to a safe house within the same district or elsewhere keeping in mind their safety and threat perception. The State Government may consider of establishing a safe house at each District Headquarter for that purpose. [53] C. Punitive Measures: Any failure by either the police or district officer/officials to comply with the aforesaid directions shall be considered as an act of deliberate negligence and/or misconduct for which departmental action must be taken under the service rules. The departmental action shall be initiated and taken to its logical end, preferably not exceeding six months, by the authority of the first instance. [53] Disposition: Disposed of Shakti Vahini vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (27.03.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/0291/2018


NAVTEJ SINGH JOHAR & ORS.-v.- UNION OF INDIA THR. SECRETARY MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE

2018(190)AIC1 AIR2018SC4321 2018 (105) ACC 258 2018(3)ACR3234 2018(4)BomCR(Cri)289 122(2)CWN1 2018(3)Crimes233(SC) 2018CriLJ4754 IV(2018)CCR1(SC) 2018(4)KLT1 2018(4)MLJ(Crl)306 MANU/SC/0947/2018 2018(10)SCALE386 (2018)10SCC1 2018 (9) SCJ 3

Case Note: Constitution - Validity of provision - Section 377 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of Constitution of India, 1950 - Writ Petition was filed for declaring "right to sexuality", "right to sexual autonomy" and "right to choice of a sexual partner" to be part of the right to life guaranteed Under Article 21 of Constitution of India and further to declare Section 377 of IPC to be unconstitutional - Whether Section 377 of IPC as it criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who were competent to consent) in private, was violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of Constitution. Facts Writ Petition was filed for declaring "right to sexuality", "right to sexual autonomy" and "right to choice of a sexual partner" to be part of the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and further to declare Section 377 of IPC to be unconstitutional. It is urged by the learned Counsel for the Petitioners that individuals belonging to the LGBT group suffer discrimination and abuse throughout their lives due to the existence of Section 377 of IPC which is nothing but a manifestation of a mindset of societal values prevalent during the Victorian era where sexual activities were considered mainly for procreation. The said community remains in a constant state of fear which is not conducive for their growth. It is contended that they suffer at the hands of law and are also deprived of the citizenry rights which are protected under the Constitution. Petitioners face a violation of their fundamental rights to an extent which is manifestly clear and it is a violation which strikes at the very root or substratum of their existence. The discrimination suffered at the hands of the majority, the onslaught to their dignity and invasion on the right to privacy is demonstrably visible and permeates every nook and corner of the society. It is the argument of the Petitioners that Section 377, if retained in its present form, would involve the violation of, not one but, several fundamental rights of the LGBTs, namely, right to privacy, right to dignity, equality, liberty and right to freedom of expression. The Petitioners contend that sexual orientation which is a natural corollary of gender identity is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution and any discrimination meted out to the LGBT community on the basis of sexual orientation would run counter to the mandate provided under the Constitution and the said view has also gained approval of this Court in the NALSA case. Held, while allowing the petitions 1. Sexual orientation is integral to the identity of the members of the LGBT communities. It is intrinsic to their dignity, inseparable from their autonomy and at the heart of their privacy. Section 377 is founded on moral notions which are an anathema to a constitutional order in which liberty must trump over stereotypes and prevail over the mainstreaming of culture. [500] 2. The impact of Section 377 has travelled far beyond criminalising certain acts. The presence of the provision on the statute book has reinforced stereotypes about sexual orientation. It has lent the authority of the state to the suppression of identities. The fear of persecution has led to the closeting of same sex relationships. A penal provision has reinforced societal disdain. [501] 3. Sexual and gender based minorities cannot live in fear, if the Constitution has to have meaning for them on even terms. In its quest for equality and the equal protection of the law, the Constitution guarantees to them an equal citizenship. In de-criminalising such conduct, the values of the Constitution assure to the LGBT community the ability to lead a life of freedom from fear and to find fulfilment in intimate choices. [502] 4. The choice of a partner, the desire for personal intimacy and the yearning to find love and fulfilment in human relationships have a universal appeal, straddling age and time. In protecting consensual intimacies, the Constitution adopts a simple principle: the state has no business to intrude into these personal matters. Nor can societal notions of heteronormativity regulate constitutional liberties based on sexual orientation. [503] 5. Present case has had great deal to say on the dialogue about the transformative power of the Constitution. In addressing LGBT rights, the Constitution speaks-as well-to the rest of society. In recognising the rights of the LGBT community, the Constitution asserts itself as a text for governance which promotes true equality. It does so by questioning prevailing notions about the dominance of sexes and genders. [505] 6. A hundred and fifty eight years is too long a period for the LGBT community to suffer the indignities of denial. That it has taken sixty eight years even after the advent of the Constitution is a sobering reminder of the unfinished task which lies ahead. It is also a time to invoke the transformative power of the Constitution. [506] 7. The ability of a society to acknowledge the injustices which it has perpetuated is a mark of its evolution. In the process of remedying wrongs under a regime of constitutional remedies, recrimination gives way to restitution, diatribes pave the way for dialogue and healing replaces the hate of a community. For those who have been oppressed, justice under a regime committed to human freedom, has the power to transform lives. In addressing the causes of oppression and injustice, society transforms itself. The Constitution has within it the ability to produce a social catharsis. The importance of this case lies in telling us that reverberations of how we address social conflict in our times will travel far beyond the narrow alleys in which they are explored. [507] 8. Article 21 provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. Such procedure established by law must be fair, just and reasonable. The right to life and liberty affords protection to every citizen or non-citizen, irrespective of their identity or orientation, without discrimination. The right to privacy has now been recognised to be an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty Under Article 21. Sexual orientation is an innate part of the identity of LGBT persons. Sexual orientation of a person is an essential attribute of privacy. Its protection lies at the core of Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 15, and 21. The right to privacy is broad-based and pervasive under our Constitutional scheme, and encompasses decisional autonomy, to cover intimate/personal decisions and preserves the sanctity of the private sphere of an individual.314 The right to privacy is not simply the "right to be let alone", and has travelled far beyond that initial concept. It now incorporates the ideas of spatial privacy, and decisional privacy or privacy of choice.315 It extends to the right to make fundamental personal choices, including those relating to intimate sexual conduct, without unwarranted State interference. Section 377 affects the private sphere of the lives of LGBT persons. It takes away the decisional autonomy of LGBT persons to make choices consistent with their sexual orientation, which would further a dignified existence and a meaningful life as a full person. Section 377 prohibits LGBT persons from expressing their sexual orientation and engaging in sexual conduct in private, a decision which inheres in the most intimate spaces of one's existence. [524] 9. The right to health, and access to healthcare are also crucial facets of the right to life guaranteed Under Article 21 of the Constitution.317 LGBT persons being a sexual minority have been subjected to societal prejudice, discrimination and violence on account of their sexual orientation. Since Section 377 criminalises "carnal intercourse against the order of nature" it compels LGBT persons to lead closeted lives. As a consequence, LGBT persons are seriously disadvantaged and prejudiced when it comes to access to health-care facilities. This results in serious health issues, including depression and suicidal tendencies amongst members of this community.318 LGBT persons, and more specifically the MSM, and transgender persons are at a higher risk of contracting HIV as they lack safe spaces to engage in safe-sex practices. They are inhibited from seeking medical help for testing, treatment and supportive care on account of the threat of being 'exposed' and the resultant prosecution. Higher rates of prevalence of HIV-AIDS in MSM, who are in turn married to other people of the opposite sex, coupled with the difficulty in detection and treatment, makes them highly susceptible to contraction and further transmission of the virus. [524.3] 10. Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of expression to all citizens. However, reasonable restrictions can be imposed on the exercise of this right on the grounds specified in Article 19(2). LGBT persons express their sexual orientation in myriad ways. One such way is engagement in intimate sexual acts like those proscribed Under Section 377. Owing to the fear of harassment from law enforcement agencies and prosecution, LGBT persons tend to stay 'in the closet'. They are forced not to disclose a central aspect of their personal identity i.e. their sexual orientation, both in their personal and professional spheres to avoid persecution in society and the opprobrium attached to homosexuality. Unlike heterosexual persons, they are inhibited from openly forming and nurturing fulfilling relationships, thereby restricting rights of full personhood and a dignified existence. It also has an impact on their mental well-being. [525.1] 11. History owes an apology to the members of this community and their families, for the delay in providing redressal for the ignominy and ostracism that they have suffered through the centuries. The members of this community were compelled to live a life full of fear of reprisal and persecution. This was on account of the ignorance of the majority to recognise that homosexuality is a completely natural condition, part of a range of human sexuality. The mis-application of this provision denied them the Fundamental Right to equality guaranteed by Article 14. It infringed the Fundamental Right to non-discrimination Under Article 15, and the Fundamental Right to live a life of dignity and privacy guaranteed by Article 21. The LGBT persons deserve to live a life unshackled from the shadow of being 'unapprehended felons'. [528] 12. It is declared that insofar as Section 377 criminalises consensual sexual acts of adults (i.e. persons above the age of 18 years who are competent to consent) in private, is violative of Articles 14, 15, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. It is, however, clarified that, such consent must be free consent, which is completely voluntary in nature, and devoid of any duress or coercion. The declaration of the aforesaid reading down of Section 377 shall not, however, lead to the reopening of any concluded prosecutions, but can certainly be relied upon in all pending matters whether they are at the trial, appellate, or revisional stages. The provisions of Section 377 will continue to govern non-consensual sexual acts against adults, all acts of carnal intercourse against minors, and acts of beastiality. The judgment in Suresh K. Koushal and Anr. v. Naz Foundation and Ors. is hereby overruled. The Reference is answered accordingly. Writ Petitions are allowed. [529] Disposition: In Favour of Accused Navtej Singh Johar and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (06.09.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/0947/2018


JUSTICE K. S. PUTTASWAMY (RETD.) & ANR.-v.-UNION OF INDIA & ORS

122(3)CWN1 255(2018)DLT1 (2018)8MLJ115 MANU/SC/1054/2018 2018(12)SCALE1 (2019)1SCC1 2018 (9) SCJ 224

Case Note: Constitution - Aadhaar scheme - Right to privacy - Articles 14,19,21,110 and 110(1) of Constitution of India and Sections 7,28(5),29,29(1),29(2),33,47,57,59 of The Aadhaar Act, 2016 - Present petitions filed challenging constitutional validity of Aadhaar Act, 2016 and executive's Scheme notified by Government, by which Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was constituted to implement UIDAI Scheme - In writ petitions scheme had primarily been challenged on ground that it violates fundamental rights of innumerable citizens of India, namely, right to privacy falling under Article 21 of Constitution of India - Whether provisions of Aadhaar Act, 2016 was liable to be struck down as violative of constitution. Facts: The present petition filed to challenge The Aadhaar Act, 2016 and executive's Scheme notified by the Government, by which the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) was constituted to implement the UIDAI Scheme. It was the submission of the Petitioners that the Constitution balances rights of individuals against State interest. The Aadhaar completely upsets this balance and skews the relationship between the citizen and the State enabling the State to totally dominate the individual. Held, while disposing off the petitions. A.K. Sikri, J. (For Chief Justice, himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.) (a) The architecture and structure of the Aadhaar Act reveals that the UIDAI was established as a statutory body which is given the task of developing the policy, procedure and system for issuing Aadhaar numbers to individuals and also to perform authentication thereof as per the provisions of the Act. For the purpose of enrolment and assigning Aadhaar numbers, enrolling agencies are recruited by the Authority. All the residents in India were eligible to obtain an Aadhaar number. To enable a resident to get Aadhaar number, he was required to submit demographic as well as biometric information i.e., apart from giving information relating to name, date of birth and address, biometric information in the form of photograph, fingerprint, iris scan was also to be provided. Aadhaar number given to a particular person was treated as unique number as it could not be reassigned to any other individual. (b) Insofar as subsidies, benefits or services to be given by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, was concerned, these Governments could mandate that receipt of these subsidies, benefits and services would be given only on furnishing proof of possession of Aadhaar number (or proof of making an application for enrolment, where Aadhaar number was not assigned). An added requirement was that such individual would undergo authentication at the time of receiving such benefits etc. A particular institution/body from which the aforesaid subsidy, benefit or service is to be claimed by such an individual, the intended recipient would submit his Aadhaar number and is also required to give her biometric information to that agency. On receiving this information and for the purpose of its authentication, the said agency, known as Requesting Entity (RE), would send the request to the Authority which shall perform the job of authentication of Aadhaar number. On confirming the identity of a person, the individual is entitled to receive subsidy, benefit or service. Aadhaar number was permitted to be used by the holder for other purposes as well. (c) In this whole process, any resident seeking to obtain an Aadhaar number is, in the first instance, required to submit her demographic information and biometric information at the time of enrolment. She, thus, parts with her photograph, fingerprint and iris scan at that stage by giving the same to the enrolling agency, which may be a private body/person. Likewise, every time when such Aadhaar holder intends to receive a subsidy, benefit or service and goes to specified/designated agency or person for that purpose, she would be giving her biometric information to that RE, which, in turn, shall get the same authenticated from the Authority before providing a subsidy, benefit or service. (d) Attack of the Petitioners to the Aadhaar programme and its formation/structure under the Aadhaar Act was founded on the arguments that it is a grave risk to the rights and liberties of the citizens of this country which are secured by the Constitution of India. It militates against the constitutional abiding values and its foundational morality and has the potential to enable an intrusive state to become a surveillance state on the basis of information that is collected in respect of each individual by creation of a joint electronic mesh. In this manner, the Act strikes at the very privacy of each individual thereby offending the right to privacy which is elevated and given the status of fundamental right by tracing it to Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India by a nine Judge Bench judgment of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy. (e) The Respondents, had attempted to shake the very foundation of the aforesaid structure of the Petitioners' case. They argue that in the first instance, minimal biometric information of the applicant, who intends to have Aadhaar number, is obtained which is also stored in CIDR for the purpose of authentication. Secondly, no other information is stored. It was emphasised that there was no data collection in respect of religion, caste, tribe, language records of entitlement, income or medical history of the applicant at the time of Aadhaar enrolment. Thirdly, the Authority also claimed that the entire Aadhaar enrolment eco-system is foolproof inasmuch as within few seconds of the biometrics having been collected by the enrolling agency, the said information gets transmitted the Authorities/CIDR, that too in an encrypted form, and goes out of the reach of the enrolling agency. Same was the situation at the time of authentication as biometric information does not remain with the requesting agency. Fourthly, while undertaking the authentication process, the Authority simply matches the biometrics and no other information is received or stored in respect of purpose, location or nature or transaction etc. Therefore, the question of profiling does not arise at all. (f) In the said scenario, it was necessary, in the first instance, to find out the extent of core information, biometric as well as demographic, that is collected and stored by the Authority at the time of enrolment as well as at the time of authentication. This exercise becomes necessary in order to consider the argument of the Petitioners about the profiling of the Aadhaar holders. On going through this aspect, on the basis of the powerpoint presentation given by CEO of UIDAI, and the arguments of both the sides, including the questions which were put by the Petitioners to CEO of UIDAI and the answers thereupon, the Court has come to the conclusion that minimal possible data, demographic and biometric, is obtained from the Aadhaar holders. (g) The Court also noticed that the whole architecture of Aadhaar was devised to give unique identity to the citizens of this country. No doubt, a person could have various documents on the basis of which that individual can establish her identify. It may be in the form of a passport, PAN card, ration card and so on. For the purpose of enrolment itself number of documents were prescribed which an individual can produce on the basis of which Aadhaar card could be issued. Thus, such documents, in a way, were also proof of identity. However, there was a fundamental difference between the Aadhaar card as a mean of identity and other documents through which identity could be established. Enrolment for Aadhaar card also requires giving of demographic information as well as biometric information which is in the form of iris and fingerprints. This process eliminates any chance of duplication. It was emphasised that an individual could manipulate the system by having more than one or even number of PAN cards, passports, ration cards etc. When it comes to obtaining Aadhaar card, there was no possibility of obtaining duplicate card. Once the biometric information is stored and on that basis Aadhaar card was issued, it remains in the system with the Authority. Wherever there would be a second attempt for enrolling for Aadhaar and for this purpose same person gives his biometric information, it would be immediately get matched with the same biometric information already in the system and the second request would stand rejected. It was for this reason the Aadhaar card was known as Unique Identification (UID). Such an identity was unparalleled. (h) There was, then, another purpose for having such a system of issuing unique identification cards in the form of Aadhaar card. A glimpse thereof is captured under the heading Introduction above, while mentioning how and under what circumstances the whole project was conceptualised. To put it tersely, in addition to enabling any resident to obtain such unique identification proof, it is also to empower marginalised Section of the society, particularly those who are illiterate and living in abject poverty or without any shelter etc. It gives identity to such persons also. Moreover, with the aid of Aadhaar card, they could claim various privileges and benefits etc. which were actually meant for these people. (i) Identity of a person had a significance for every individual in his/her life. In a civilised society every individual, on taking birth, is given a name. Her place of birth and parentage also becomes important as she is known in the society and these demographic particulars also become important attribute of her personality. Throughout their lives, individuals were supposed to provide such information, be it admission in a school or college or at the time of taking job or engaging in any profession or business activity, etc. When all this information was available in one place, in the form of Aadhaar card, it not only becomes unique, it would also qualify as a document of empowerment. Added with this feature, when an individual knows that no other person can clone her, it assumes greater significance. (j) Thus, the scheme by itself could be treated as laudable when it comes to enabling an individual to seek Aadhaar number, more so, when it is voluntary in nature. Howsoever benevolent the scheme may be, it had to pass the muster of constitutionality. According to the Petitioners, the very architecture of Aadhaar was unconstitutional on various grounds. (k) The Court has taken note of the heads of challenge of the Act, Scheme and certain Rules etc. and clarified that the matter was examined with objective examination of the issues on the touchstone of the constitutional provisions, keeping in mind the ethos of constitutional democracy, Rule of law, human rights and other basic features of the Constitution. Discussing the scope of judicial review, the Court had accepted that apart from two grounds noticed in Binoy Viswam, on which legislative Act can be invalidated [(a) the Legislature does not have competence to make the law and b) law made is in violation of fundamental rights or any other constitutional provision], another ground, namely, manifest arbitrariness, could also be the basis on which an Act could be invalidated. The issues are examined having regard to the aforesaid scope of judicial review. (l) From the arguments raised by the Petitioners and the grounds of challenge, it becomes clear that the main plank of challenge is that the Aadhaar project and the Aadhaar Act infringes right to privacy. Inbuilt in this right to privacy is the right to live with dignity, which was a postulate of right to privacy. In the process, discussion leads to the issue of proportionality, viz. whether measures taken under the Aadhaar Act satisfy the doctrine of proportionality. (m) The Court discussed the contours of right to privacy, as laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy, principle of human dignity and doctrine of proportionality. After taking note of the discussion contained in different opinions of Judges, it stands established, without any pale of doubt, that privacy had now been treated as part of fundamental right. The Court had held that, in no uncertain terms, that privacy had always been a natural right which given an individual freedom to exercise control over his or her personality. The judgment further affirms three aspects of the fundamental right to privacy, namel intrusion with an individual's physical body, informational privacy and privacy of choice. (n) As succinctly put by Nariman, J., first aspect involves the person himself/herself and guards a person's rights relatable to his physical body thereby controlling the uncalled invasion by the State. Insofar as second aspect, namely, informational privacy is concerned, it does not deal with a person's body but deals with a person's mind. In this manner, it protects a person by giving her control over the dissemination of material that is personal to her and disallowing unauthorised use of such information by the State. Third aspect of privacy relates to individual's autonomy by protecting her fundamental personal choices. These aspects have functional connection and relationship with dignity. In this sense, privacy was a postulate of human dignity itself. Human dignity had a constitutional value and its significance was acknowledged by the Preamble. Further, by catena of judgments, human dignity was treated as fundamental right as a facet not only of Article 21, but that of right to equality (Article 14) and also part of bouquet of freedoms stipulated in Article 19. Therefore, privacy as a right was intrinsic of freedom, liberty and dignity. Viewed in this manner, one could trace positive and negative contents of privacy. The negative content restricts the State from committing an intrusion upon the life and personal liberty of a citizen. Its positive content imposes an obligation on the State to take all necessary measures to protect the privacy of the individual. (o) In developing the said concepts, the Court had been receptive to the principles in international law and international instruments. It was a recognition of the fact that certain human rights could not be confined within the bounds of geographical location of a nation but have universal application. In the process, the Court accepts the concept of universalisation of human rights, including the right to privacy as a human right and the good practices in developing and understanding such rights in other countries had been welcomed. In this hue, it could also be remarked that comparative law had played a very significant role in shaping the aforesaid judgment on privacy in Indian context, notwithstanding the fact that such comparative law has only persuasive value. The whole process of reasoning contained in different opinions of the Judges would, thus, reflect that the argument that it was difficult to precisely define the common denominator of privacy, was rejected. While doing so, the Court referred to various approaches to formulating privacy. (p) This court also remarked the taxonomy of privacy, namely, on the basis of harms, interest and aggregation of rights. This court also discussed the scope of right to privacy with reference to the cases at hand and the circumstances in which such a right can be limited. In the process, we have also taken note of the passage from the judgment rendered by Nariman, J. in K.S. Puttaswamy stating the manner in which law had to be tested when it was challenged on the ground that it violates the fundamental right to privacy. (q) One important comment which needs to be made at this stage relates to the standard of judicial review while examining the validity of a particular law that allegedly infringes right to privacy. The question was as to whether the Court was to apply strict scrutiny standard or the just, fair and reasonableness standard. In the privacy judgment, different observations were made by the different Judges and the aforesaid aspect was not determined authoritatively, may be for the reason that the Bench was deciding the reference on the issue as to whether right to privacy was a fundamental right or not and, in the process, it was called upon to decide the specific questions referred to it. This Court preferred to adopt a just, fair and reasonableness standard which was in tune with the view expressed by majority of Judges in their opinion. Even otherwise, this is in consonance with the judicial approach adopted by this Court while construing reasonable restrictions that the State could impose in public interest, as provided in Article 19 of the Constitution. Insofar as principles of human dignity were concerned, the Court, after taking note of various judgments where this principle was adopted and elaborated, summed up the essential ingredients of dignity jurisprudence by noticing that the basic principle of dignity and freedom of the individual was an attribute of natural law which becomes the right of all individuals in a constitutional democracy. Dignity had a central normative role as well as constitutional value. (r) As per Dworkin, there are two principles about the concept of human dignity, First principle regards an intrinsic value of every person, namely, every person has a special objective value which value was not only important to that person alone but success or failure of the lives of every person was important to all of us. It could also be described as self respect which represents the free will of the person, her capacity to think for herself and to control her own life. The second principle was that of personal responsibility, which means every person had the responsibility for success in her own life and, therefore, she must use her discretion regarding the way of life that would be successful from her point of view. (s) Sum total of this exposition could be defined by explaining that as per the aforesaid view dignity was to be treated as empowerment which makes a triple demand in the name of respect for human dignity, namely respect for one's capacity as an agent to make one's own free choices, respect for the choices so made and respect for one's need to have a context and conditions in which one could operate as a source of free and informed choice. (t) In the entire formulation of dignity right, respect for an individual is the fulcrum, which was based on the principle of freedom and capacity to make choices and a good or just social order was one which respects dignity via assuring contexts and conditions as the source of free and informed choice. The said discourse on the concept of human dignity is from an individual point of view. That was the emphasis of the Petitioners as well. That would be one side of the coin. A very important feature which the present case had brought into focus was another dimension of human dignity, namely, in the form of common good or public good. Thus, endeavour here was to give richer and more nuanced understanding to the concept of human dignity. (u) Therefore, this court have to keep in mind humanistic concept of Human Dignity which was to be accorded to a particular segment of the society and, in fact, a large segment. Their human dignity was based on the socio-economic rights that were read in to the Fundamental Rights. When read socio-economic rights into human dignity, the community approach also assumes importance along with individualistic approach to human dignity. It had now been well recognise that at its core, human dignity contains three elements, namely, Intrinsic Value, Autonomy and Community Value. These were known as core values of human dignity. These three elements could assist in structuring legal reasoning and justifying judicial choices in hard cases. (v) When it comes to dignity as a community value, it emphasises the role of the community in establishing collective goals and restrictions on individual freedoms and rights on behalf of a certain idea of good life. The relevant question was in what circumstances and to what degree should these actions be regarded as legitimate in a constitutional democracy. The liberal predicament that the state must be neutral with regard to different conceptions of the good in a plural society was not incompatible, of course, with limitation resulting from the necessary coexistence of different views and potentially conflicting rights. Such interferences, however, must be justified on grounds of a legitimate idea of justice, an overlapping consensus that could be shared by most individuals and groups. Whenever such tension arises, the task of balancing was to be achieved by the Courts. (w) In this way, the concept of human dignity had been widened to deal with the issues at hand. As far as doctrine of proportionality was concerned, after discussing the approaches that are adopted by the German Supreme Court and the Canadian Supreme Court, which were somewhat different from each other, this Court has applied the tests as laid down in Modern Dental College & Research Centre, which were approved in K.S. Puttaswamy as well. However, at the same time, a modification was done by focusing on the parameters set down of Bilchitz which were aimed at achieving a more ideal approach. [446] Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (1) In order to deal with the challenge that the Aadhaar Act should not have been passed as a Money Bill, this Court was required to adjudicate whether the decision of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to certify a Bill as a Money Bill, could be subject to judicial review. The judgment had analyzed the scope of the finality attributed to the Speaker's decision, by looking at the history of Article 110(3) of the Constitution, by comparing it with the comparative constitutional practices which accord finality to the Speaker's decision, by analyzing other constitutional provisions which use the phrase shall be final, and by examining the protection granted to parliamentary proceedings under Article 122. This judgment holds that the phrase shall be final used under Article 110(3) aims at avoiding any controversy on the issue as to whether a Bill was a Money Bill, with respect to the Rajya Sabha and before the President. The language used in Article 110(3) did not exclude judicial review of the Speaker's decision. This also applies to Article 199(3). The immunity from judicial review provided to parliamentary proceedings under Article 122 was limited to instances involving irregularity of procedure. The decisions of this Court in Special Reference, Ramdas Athawale and Raja Ram Pal hold that the validity of proceedings in Parliament or a State Legislature can be subject to judicial review when there is a substantive illegality or a constitutional violation. These judgments make it clear that the decision of the Speaker is subject to judicial review, if it suffers from illegality or from a violation of constitutional provisions. Article 255 had no relation with the decision of the Speaker on whether a Bill is a Money Bill. The three Judge Bench decision in Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui erroneously interpreted the judgment in Mangalore Beedi to apply Articles 212 (or Article 122) and 255 to refrain from questioning the conduct of the Speaker (under Article 199 or 110). The two judge Bench decision in Yogendra Kumar followed Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui. The correct position of law is that the decision of the Speaker under Articles 110(3) and 199(3) is not immune from judicial review. The decisions in Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui and Yogendra Kumar were accordingly overruled. The existence of and the role of the Rajya Sabha, as an institution of federal bicameralism in the Indian Parliament, constitutes a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The decision of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to certify a Bill as a Money Bill had a direct impact on the role of the Rajya Sabha, since the latter had a limited role in the passing of a Money Bill. A decision of the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to declare an ordinary Bill to be a Money Bill limits the role of the Rajya Sabha. The power of the Speaker could not be exercised arbitrarily in violation of constitutional norms and values, as it damages the essence of federal bicameralism, which is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Judicial review of the Speaker's decision, on whether a Bill was a Money Bill, was therefore necessary to protect the basic structure of the Constitution. (2) To be certified a Money Bill, a Bill must contain only provisions dealing with every or any one of the matters set out in Sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 110(1). A Bill, which had both provisions which fall within Sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 110(1) and provisions which fall outside their scope, will not qualify to be a Money Bill. Thus, when a Bill which had been passed as a Money Bill had certain provisions which fall beyond the scope of Sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 110(1), these provisions could not be severed. If the bill was not a Money Bill, the role of the Rajya Sabha in its legislative passage could not have been denuded. The debasement of a constitutional institution cannot be countenanced by the Court. Democracy survives when constitutional institutions were vibrant. (3) The Aadhaar Act creates a statutory framework for obtaining a unique identity number, which was capable of being used for any purpose, among which availing benefits, subsidies and services, for which expenses were incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India, was just one purpose provided under Section 7. Clause (e) of Article 110(1) requires that a Money Bill must deal with the declaring of any expenditure to be expenditure charged on the Consolidated Fund of India (or increasing the amount of the expenditure). Section 7 fails to fulfil this requirement. Section 7 does not declare the expenditure incurred to be a charge on the Consolidated Fund. It only provides that in the case of such services, benefits or subsidies, Aadhaar could be made mandatory to avail of them. Moreover, provisions other than Section 7 of the Act deal with several aspects relating to the Aadhaar numbers enrolment on the basis of demographic and biometric information, generation of Aadhaar numbers, obtaining the consent of individuals before collecting their individual information, creation of a statutory authority to implement and supervise the process, protection of information collected during the process, disclosure of information in certain circumstances, creation of offences and penalties for disclosure or loss of information, and the use of the Aadhaar number for any purpose. All these provisions of the Aadhaar Act did not lie within the scope of Sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Article 110(1). Hence, in the alternate, even if it was held that Section 7 bears a nexus to the expenditure incurred from the Consolidated Fund of India, the other provisions of the Act fail to fall within the domain of Article 110(1). Thus, the Aadhaar Act was declared unconstitutional for failing to meet the necessary requirements to have been certified as a Money Bill under Article 110(1). (4) The argument that the Aadhaar Act was in pith and substance a Money Bill, with its main objective being the delivery of subsidies, benefits and services flowing out of the Consolidated Fund of India and that the other provisions were ancillary to the main purpose of the Act also holds no ground, since the doctrine of pith and substance was used to examine whether the legislature had the competence to enact a law with regard to any of the three Lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The doctrine could not be invoked to declare whether a Bill satisfies the requirements set out in Article 110 of the Constitution to be certified a Money Bill. The argument of the Union of India misses the point that a Bill could be certified as a Money Bill only if it deals with all or any of the matters contained in Clauses (a) to (g) of Article 110(1). (5) Having held that the Aadhaar Act was unconstitutional for having been passed as a Money Bill this judgment has also analysed the merits of the other constitutional challenges to the legislation as well as to the framework of the project before the law was enacted. (6) The architecture of the Aadhaar Act seeks to create a unique identity for residents on the basis of their demographic and biometric information. The Act sets up a process of identification by which the unique identity assigned to each individual was verified with the demographic and biometric information pertaining to that individual which was stored in a centralised repository of data. Identification of beneficiaries was integral and essential to the fulfilment of social welfare schemes and programmes, which were a part of the State's attempts to ensure that its citizens have access to basic human facilities. This judgment accepts the contention of the Union of India that there was a legitimate state aim in maintaining a system of identification to ensure that the welfare benefits provided by the State reach the beneficiaries who are entitled, without diversion. (7) The Aadhaar programme involves application of biometric technology, which uses an individual's biometric data as the basis of authentication or identification and is therefore intimately connected to the individual. While citizens had privacy interests in personal or private information collected about them, the unique nature of biometric data distinguishes it from other personal data, compounding concerns regarding privacy protections safeguarding biometric information. Once a biometric system is compromised, it is compromised forever. Therefore, it ws imperative that concerns about protecting privacy must be addressed while developing a biometric system. Adequate norms must be laid down for each step from the collection to retention of biometric data. At the time of collection, individuals must be informed about the collection procedure, the intended purpose of the collection, the reason why the particular data set is requested and who would have access to their data. Additionally, the retention period must be justified and individuals must be given the right to access, correct and delete their data at any point in time, a procedure familiar to an opt-out option. (8) Prior to the enactment of the Aadhaar Act, no mandatory obligation was imposed upon the Registrars or the enrolling agencies, to obtain informed consent from residents before recording their biometric data, to inform them how the biometric data would be stored and used and about the existence of adequate safeguards to secure the data. Moreover, prior to the enactment of the Act, while UIDAI had itself contemplated that an identity theft could occur at the time of enrollment for Aadhaar cards, it had no solution to the possible harms which could result after the identity theft of a person. (9) The Regulations framed subsequently under the Aadhaar Act also did not provide a robust mechanism on how informed consent was to be obtained from residents before collecting their biometric data. The Aadhaar Act and Regulations were bereft of the procedure through which an individual can access information related to his or her authentication record. The Aadhaar Act clearly had no defined options that should be made available to the Aadhaar number holders in case they did not wish to submit identity information during authentication, nor do the Regulations specify the procedure to be followed in case the Aadhaar number holder did not provide consent for authentication. (10) Sections 29(1) and (2) of the Act create a distinction between two classes of information (core biometric information and identity information), which were integral to individual identity and require equal protection. Section 29(4) of Act suffers from overbreadth as it gives wide discretionary power to UIDAI to publish, display or post core biometric information of an individual for purposes specified by the Regulations. (11) Sections 2(g), (j), (k) and (t) suffer from overbreadth, as these could lead to an invasive collection of biological attributes. These provisions give discretionary power to UIDAI to define the scope of biometric and demographic information and empower it to expand on the nature of information already collected at the time of enrollment, to the extent of also collecting any "such other biological attributes" that it may deem fit. (12) There is no clarity on how an individual is supposed to update his/her biometric information, in case the biometric information mismatches with the data stored in CIDR. The proviso to Section 28(5) of the Aadhaar Act, which disallows an individual access to the biometric information that forms the core of his or her unique ID, was violative of a fundamental principle that ownership of an individual's data must at all times vest with the individual. UIDAI is also provided wide powers in relation to removing the biometric locking of residents. With this analysis of the measures taken by the Government of India prior to the enactment of the Aadhaar Act as well as a detailed analysis of the provisions under the Aadhaar Act, 2016 and supporting Regulations made under it, this judgment concludes that the Aadhaar programme violates essential norms pertaining to informational privacy, self-determination and data protection. (13) The State was under a constitutional obligation to safeguard the dignity of its citizens. Biometric technology which is the core of the Aadhaar programme was probabilistic in nature, leading to authentication failures. These authentication failures have led to the denial of rights and legal entitlements. The Aadhaar project had failed to account for and remedy the flaws in its framework and design which has led to serious instances of exclusion of eligible beneficiaries as demonstrated by the official figures from Government records including the Economic Survey of India and research studies. Dignity and the rights of individuals could not be made to depend on algorithms or probabilities. Constitutional guarantees cannot be subject to the vicissitudes of technology. Denial of benefits arising out of any social security scheme which promotes socio-economic rights of citizens was violative of human dignity and impermissible under our constitutional scheme. (14) The violations of fundamental rights resulting from the Aadhaar scheme were tested on the touchstone of proportionality. The measures adopted by the Respondents fail to satisfy the test of necessity and proportionality for the following reasons: (a) Under the Aadhaar project, requesting entities can hold the identity information of individuals, for a temporary period. It was admitted by UIDAI that AUAs may store additional information according to their requirement to secure their system. ASAs had also been permitted to store logs of authentication transactions for a specific time period. It had been admitted by UIDAI that it gets the AUA code, ASA code, unique device code and the registered device code used for authentication, and that UIDAI would know from which device the authentication took place and through which AUA/ASA. Under the Regulations, UIDAI further stores the authentication transaction data. This was in violation of widely recognized data minimisation principles which mandate that data collectors and processors delete personal data records when the purpose for which it had been collected is fulfilled. Moreover, using the meta-data related to the transaction, the location of the authentication could easily be traced using the IP address, which impacts upon the privacy of the individual. (b) From the verification log, it was possible to locate the places of transactions by an individual in the past five years. It was also possible through the Aadhaar database to track the current location of an individual, even without the verification log. The architecture of Aadhaar poses a risk of potential surveillance activities through the Aadhaar database. Any leakage in the verification log poses an additional risk of an individual's biometric data being vulnerable to unauthorised exploitation by third parties. (c) The biometric database in the CIDR is accessible to third-party vendors providing biometric search and de-duplication algorithms, since neither the Central Government nor UIDAI have the source code for the de-duplication technology which is at the heart of the programme. The source code belongs to a foreign corporation. UIDAI was merely a licensee. Prior to the enactment of the Aadhaar Act, without the consent of individual citizens, UIDAI contracted with L-1 Identity Solutions (the foreign entity which provided the source code for biometric storage) to provide to it any personal information related to any resident of India. This is contrary to the basic requirement that an individual has the right to protect herself by maintaining control over personal information. The protection of the data of citizens was a question of national security and could not be subjected to the mere terms and conditions of a normal contract. (d) Before the enactment of the Aadhaar Act, MOUs signed between UIDAI and Registrars were not contracts within the purview of Article 299 of the Constitution, and therefore, did not cover the acts done by the private entities engaged by the Registrars for enrolment. Since there was no privity of contract between UIDAI and the Enrolling agencies, the activities of the private parties engaged in the process of enrolment before the enactment of the Aadhaar Act had no statutory or legal backing. (e) Under the Aadhaar architecture, UIDAI was the sole authority which carries out all administrative, adjudicatory, investigative, and monitoring functions of the project. While the Act confers these functions on UIDAI, it did not place any institutional accountability upon UIDAI to protect the database of citizens' personal information. UIDAI also takes no institutional responsibility for verifying whether the data entered and stored in the CIDR was correct and authentic. The task has been delegated to the enrolment agency or the Registrar. Verification of data being entered in the CIDR was a highly sensitive task for which the UIDAI ought to have taken responsibility. The Aadhaar Act was also silent on the liability of UIDAI and its personnel in case of their non-compliance of the provisions of the Act or the Regulations. (f) Section 47 of the Act violates citizens' right to seek remedies. Under Section 47(1) of Act, a court can take cognizance of an offence punishable under the Act only on a complaint made by UIDAI or any officer or person authorised by it. Section 47 was arbitrary as it fails to provide a mechanism to individuals to seek efficacious remedies for violation of their right to privacy. Further, Section 23(2)(s) of the Act requires UIDAI to establish a grievance redressal mechanism. Making the authority which was administering a project, also responsible for providing a grievance redressal mechanism for grievances arising from the project severely compromises the independence of the grievance redressal body. (g) While the Act creates a regime of criminal offences and penalties, the absence of an independent regulatory framework renders the Act largely ineffective in dealing with data violations. The architecture of Aadhaar ought to have, but had failed to embody within the law the establishment of an independent monitoring authority (with a hierarchy of regulators), along with the broad principles for data protection. This compromise in the independence of the grievance redressal body impacts upon the possibility and quality of justice being delivered to citizens. In the absence of an independent regulatory and monitoring framework which provides robust safeguards for data protection, the Aadhaar Act could not pass muster against a challenge on the ground of reasonableness under Article 14. (h) No substantive provisions, such as those providing data minimization, had been laid down as guiding principles for the oversight mechanism provided under Section 33(2) of Act, which permits disclosure of identity information and authentication records in the interest of national security. (i) Allowing private entities to use Aadhaar numbers, under Section 57 of Act would lead to commercial exploitation of the personal data of individuals without consent and could also lead to individual profiling. Profiling could be used to predict the emergence of future choices and preferences of individuals. These preferences could also be used to influence the decision making of the electorate in choosing candidates for electoral offices. This was contrary to privacy protection norms. Data cannot be used for any purpose other than those that have been approved. While developing an identification system of the magnitude of Aadhaar, security concerns relating to the data of billion citizens ought to be addressed. These issues had not been dealt with by the Aadhaar Act. By failing to protect the constitutional rights of citizens, Section 57 violates Articles 14 and 21. (j) Section 57 of Act was susceptible to be applied to permit commercial exploitation of the data of individuals or to affect their behavioural patterns. Section 57 could not pass constitutional muster. Since it is manifestly arbitrary, it suffers from overbreadth and violates Article 14. (k) Section 7 suffers from overbreadth since the broad definitions of the expressions services and benefits enable the government to regulate almost every facet of its engagement with citizens under the Aadhaar platform. If the requirement of Aadhaar was made mandatory for every benefit or service which the government provides, it was impossible to live in contemporary India without Aadhaar. The inclusion of services and benefits in Section 7 was a pre-cursor to the kind of function creep which is inconsistent with the right to informational self-determination. Section 7 of Act was therefore arbitrary and violative of Article 14 in relation to the inclusion of services and benefits as defined. (l) The legitimate aim of the State could be fulfilled by adopting less intrusive measures as opposed to the mandatory enforcement of the Aadhaar scheme as the sole repository of identification. The State had failed to demonstrate that a less intrusive measure other than biometric authentication would not subserve its purposes. That the state has been able to insist on an adherence to the Aadhaar scheme without exception was a result of the overbreadth of Section 7 of Act. (m) When Aadhaar was seeded into every database, it becomes a bridge across discreet data silos, which allows anyone with access to this information to re-construct a profile of an individual's life. This was contrary to the right to privacy and poses severe threats due to potential surveillance. (n) One right could not be taken away at the behest of the other. The State had failed to satisfy this Court that the targeted delivery of subsidies which animate the right to life entails a necessary sacrifice of the right to individual autonomy, data protection and dignity when both these rights are protected by the Constitution. (15) Section 59 of the Aadhaar Act seeks to retrospectively validate the actions of the Central Government done prior to the Aadhaar Act pursuant to Notifications. Section 59 did not validate actions of the state governments or of private entities. Moreover, the notification of 2009 did not authorise the collection of biometric data. Consequently, the validation of actions taken under the notification by Section 59 did not save the collection of biometric data prior to the enforcement of the Act. While Parliament possesses the competence to enact a validating law, it must cure the cause of infirmity or invalidity. Section 59 fails to cure the cause of invalidity prior to the enactment of the Aadhaar Act. The absence of a legislative framework for the Aadhaar project left the biometric data of millions of Indian citizens bereft of the kind of protection which must be provided to comprehensively protect and enforce the right to privacy. Section 59 therefore fails to meet the test of a validating law since the complete absence of a regulatory framework and safeguards could not be cured merely by validating what was done under the notifications. (16) The decision in Puttaswamy recognised that revenue constitutes a legitimate state aim in the three-pronged test of proportionality. However, the existence of a legitimate aim was insufficient to uphold the validity of the law, which must also meet the other parameters of proportionality spelt out in Puttaswamy. (17) The seeding of Aadhaar with PAN cards depends on the constitutional validity of the Aadhaar legislation itself. Section 139AA of the Income Tax Act 1962 was based on the premise that the Aadhaar Act itself was a valid legislation. Since the Aadhaar Act itself was now held to be unconstitutional for having been enacted as a Money Bill and on the touchstone of proportionality, the seeding of Aadhaar to PAN Under Article 139AA did not stand independently. (18) The 2017 amendments to the PMLA Rules fail to satisfy the test of proportionality. The imposition of a uniform requirement of linking Aadhaar numbers with all account based relationships proceeds on the presumption that all existing account holders as well as every individual who seeks to open an account in future was a potential money-launderer. No distinction had been made in the degree of imposition based on the client, the nature of the business relationship, the nature and value of the transactions or the actual possibility of terrorism and money-laundering. The Rules also fail to make a distinction between opening an account and operating an account. Moreover, the consequences of the failure to submit an Aadhaar number are draconian. In their present form, the Rules were clearly disproportionate and excessive. This holding would not preclude the Union Government in the exercise of its Rule making power and the Reserve Bank of India as the regulator to re-design the requirements in a manner that would ensure due fulfillment of the object of preventing money-laundering, subject to compliance with the principles of proportionality as outlined in this judgment. (19) Mobile phones had become a ubiquitous feature of the lives of people and the linking of Aadhaar numbers with SIM cards and the requirement of e-KYC authentication of mobile subscribers must necessarily be viewed in this light. Applying the proportionality test, the legitimate aim of subscriber verification, had to be balanced against the countervailing requirements of preserving the integrity of biometric data and the privacy of mobile phone subscribers. Mobile phones were a storehouse of personal data and reflect upon individual preferences, lifestyle and choices. The conflation of biometric information with SIM cards poses grave threats to individual privacy, liberty and autonomy. Having due regard to the test of proportionality which had been propounded in Puttaswamy and as elaborated in this judgment, the decision to link Aadhaar numbers with mobile SIM cards was neither valid nor constitutional. The mere existence of a legitimate state aim would not justify the disproportionate means which had been adopted in the present case. The biometric information and Aadhaar details collected by Telecom Service Providers shall be deleted forthwith and no use of the said information or details shall be made by TSPs or any agency or person or their behalf. (20) Defiance of judicial orders (both interim and final) be it by the government or by citizens negates the basis of the Rule of law. Both propriety and constitutional duty required the Union government to move this Court after the enactment of the Aadhaar Act for variation of this Court's interim orders. Institutions of governance were bound by a sense of constitutional morality which requires them to abide by judicial orders. (21) Identity was necessarily a plural concept. The Constitution also recognizes a multitude of identities through the plethora of rights that it safeguards. The technology deployed in the Aadhaar scheme reduces different constitutional identities into a single identity of a twelve-digit number and infringes the right of an individual to identify herself/himself through a chosen means. Aadhaar was about identification and was an instrument which facilitates a proof of identity. It must not be allowed to obliterate constitutional identity. (22) The entire Aadhaar programme, since 2009, suffers from constitutional infirmities and violations of fundamental rights. The enactment of the Aadhaar Act did not save the Aadhaar project. The Aadhaar Act, the Rules and Regulations framed under it, and the framework prior to the enactment of the Act were unconstitutional. (23) To enable the government to initiate steps for ensuring conformity with this judgment, it is directed under Article 142 that the existing data which has been collected shall not be destroyed for a period of one year. During this period, the data shall not be used for any purpose whatsoever. At the end of one year, if no fresh legislation had been enacted by the Union government in conformity with the principles which had been enunciated in this judgment, the data shall be destroyed. Creating strong privacy protection laws and instilling safeguards may address or at the very least assuage some of the concerns associated with the Aadhaar scheme which severely impairs informational self-determination, individual privacy, dignity and autonomy. In order to uphold the democratic values of the Constitution, the government needs to address the concerns highlighted in this judgment which would provide a strong foundation for digital initiatives, which are imminent in today's digital age. However, in its current form, the Aadhaar framework does not sufficiently assuage the concerns that have arisen from the operation of the project which had been discussed in this judgment. [787] Ashok Bhushan, J. (1) The requirement under Aadhaar Act to give one's demographic and biometric information does not violate fundamental right of privacy. (2) The provisions of Aadhaar Act requiring demographic and biometric information from a resident for Aadhaar Number pass three-fold test as laid down in Puttaswamy (supra) case, hence could not be said to be unconstitutional. (3) Collection of data, its storage and use did n`ot violate fundamental Right of Privacy. (4) Aadhaar Act did not create an architecture for pervasive surveillance. (5) Aadhaar Act and Regulations provides protection and safety of the data received from individuals. (6) Section 7 of the Aadhaar was constitutional. The provision did not deserve to be struck down on account of denial in some cases of right to claim on account of failure of authentication. (7) The State while enlivening right to food, right to shelter etc. envisaged under Article 21 could not encroach upon the right of privacy of beneficiaries nor former could be given precedence over the latter. (8) Provisions of Section 29 of Act was constitutional and did not deserves to be struck down. (9) Section 33 of Act could not be said to be unconstitutional as it provides for the use of Aadhaar data base for police investigation nor it can be said to violate protection granted under Article 20(3). (10) Section 47 of the Aadhaar Act could not be held to be unconstitutional on the ground that it did not allow an individual who finds that there was a violation of Aadhaar Act to initiate any criminal process. (11) Section 57 of Act, to the extent, which permits use of Aadhaar by the State or any body corporate or person, in pursuant to any contract to this effect was unconstitutional and void. Thus, the last phrase in main provision of Section 57 of Act, i.e. or any contract to this effect was struck down. (12) Section 59 of Act had validated all actions taken by the Central Government under the notifications and all actions shall be deemed to have been taken under the Aadhaar Act. (13) Parental consent for providing biometric information Under Regulation 3 and demographic information under Regulation 4 had to be read for enrolment of children between five to eighteen years to uphold the constitutionality of Regulations 3 and 4 of Aadhaar (Enrolment and Update) Regulations, 2016. (14) Rule 9 as amended by PMLA (Second Amendment) Rules, 2017 was not unconstitutional and did not violate Articles 14, 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the Constitution and Sections 3, 7 and 51 of the Aadhaar Act. Further Rule 9 as amended was not ultra vires to PMLA Act, 2002. (15) Circular being unconstitutional was set aside. (16) Aadhaar Act had been rightly passed as Money Bill. The decision of Speaker certifying the Aadhaar Bill, 2016 as Money Bill was not immuned from Judicial Review. (17) Section 139-AA of Act did not breach fundamental Right of Privacy as per Privacy judgment in Puttaswamy case. [1173] Justice K.S. Puttaswamy and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (26.09.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/1054/2018


JARNAIL SINGH & OTHERS -v.-LACHHMI NARAIN GUPTA & OTHERS

AIR2018SC4729 2019 1 AWC605SC 2018(6)ALT14 2018(4)BLJ225 2018(II)CLR(SC)1224 [2020(165)FLR946] ILR[2019]MP261 2018(3)JLJ716 2018(4)J.L.J.R.93 2018(5)KarLJ689 2018LabIC4509 (2018)7MLJ573 MANU/SC/1053/2018 2018(4)PLJR108 2018(4)SCT445(SC) 2018(3)SLJ13(SC) 2019(2)SLR130(SC) 2018(11)SCALE530 (2018)10SCC396 (2019)1SCC(LS)86 2019 (2) SCJ 168 (2020)1WBLR(SC)543

Case Note: Constitution - Reservation in promotion - Present reference filed for correctness of decision in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India which is in relation to equality of opportunity in matters of public employment - It had been argued that when case of Nagaraj states that State had to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness, such observation would be contrary to Indra Sawhney v. Union of India - Further, argued that creamy layer concept had not been applied in case of Indra Sawhney to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and case of Nagaraj had misread Indira Sawhney judgment to apply this concept to Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes - Whether impugned judgment of M. Nagaraj v. Union of India in relation to promotion in reservation warrant any interference. Facts: The present reference had been filed for correctness of decision in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India which is in relation to equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. It had been argued that when Nagaraj states that the State has to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness, such observation would be contrary to the Indra Sawhney v. Union of India as it has been held therein that the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are the most backward among backward classes and it was, therefore, presumed that once they are contained in the Presidential List under Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution of India, there was no question of showing backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes all over again. It was further argued that, the creamy layer concept had not been applied in Indra Sawhney to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes and Nagaraj had misread the said judgment to apply this concept to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Once the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes had been set out in the Presidential List, they shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and the said List could not be altered by anybody except Parliament under Articles 341 and 342 of Constitution of India. Held, while answering the reference: (i) The reference to class in case of Nagaraj is to the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, and their inadequacy of representation in public employment. It was clear, therefore, that Nagaraj had, in unmistakable terms, stated that the State had to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. This Court was afraid that this portion of the judgment was directly contrary to the Indra Sawhney which had held that the test or requirement of social and educational backwardness cannot be applied to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who indubitably fall within the expression backward class of citizens. [14] (ii) In fact, in case of E.V. Chinnaiah v. State of A.P. has referred to the Scheduled Castes as being the most backward among the backward classes. This was for the reason that the Presidential List contains only those castes or groups or parts thereof, which had been regarded as untouchables. Similarly, the Presidential List of Scheduled Tribes only refers to those tribes in remote backward areas who are socially extremely backward. Thus, it was clear that when Nagaraj requires the States to collect quantifiable data on backwardness, insofar as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were concerned, this would clearly be contrary to the Indra Sawhney and would have to be declared to be bad on this ground. [15] (iii) When Nagaraj applied the creamy layer test to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in exercise of application of the basic structure test to uphold the constitutional amendments leading to Articles 16(4-A) and 16(4-B), it did not in any manner interfere with Parliament's power under Article 341 or Article 342. Therefore, this part of the judgment did not need to be revisited. [17] (iv) Nagaraj had wisely left the test for determining adequacy of representation in promotional posts to the States for the simple reason that as the post gets higher, it may be necessary, even if a proportionality test to the population as a whole is taken into account, to reduce the number of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes in promotional posts, as one goes upwards. This was for the simple reason that efficiency of administration has to be looked at every time promotions were made. As has been pointed in Indra Sawhney, there may be certain posts right at the top, where reservation is impermissible altogether. For this reason, it was clear that Article 16(4-A) of Constitution had been couched in language which would leave it to the States to determine adequate representation depending upon the promotional post that was in question. [20] (v) Thus, the judgment in Nagaraj did not need to be referred to a seven-Judge Bench. However, the conclusion in Nagaraj that the State had to collect quantifiable data showing backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes, being contrary to the Indra Sawhney was held to be invalid to this extent. [21] Jarnail Singh and Ors. vs. Lachhmi Narain Gupta and Ors. (26.09.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/1053/2018


JOSEPH SHINE -v.- UNION OF INDIA

2018(3)HLR537 AIR2018SC4898 2018ALLMR(Cri)4065 2018(3)ACR2955 2018 (3) ALT (Crl.) 205 (A.P.) 2019(2)BomCR(Cri)503 2018(4)Crimes1(SC) 2019CriLJ1 IV(2018)CCR199(SC) 252(2018)DLT388 III(2018)DMC383SC ILR2018(4)Kerala79 2018(3)JLJ515 2018(6)KarLJ465 2019(2)KLT727 2018(4)MLJ(Crl)369 MANU/SC/1074/2018 2018(4)RCR(Criminal)480 2018(11)SCALE556 (2019)3SCC39 2018 (8) SCJ 371

ase Note: Constitution - Adultery - Challenge thereto - Articles 14,15,15(3) and 21 of Constitution of India, Section 497 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Present petition filed challenging constitutional validity of Section 497 of Code which makes adultery criminal offence and Section 198(2) of Code - Whether Section 497 of Code was violative of Article 14,15(1) and 21 of Constitution of India. Facts: The writ petition was filed challenging the validity of Section 497 of Indian Penal Code which makes adultery criminal offence and Section 198(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Held, while allowing the petition: Dipak Misra, C.J.I. (For himself and A.M. Khanwilkar, J.) (i) The Section 497 of Code treats a married woman as a property of the husband. It was interesting to note that Section 497 Indian Penal Code did not bring within its purview an extra marital relationship with an unmarried woman or a widow. The dictionary meaning of adultery was that a married person commits adultery if he had sex with a woman with whom he had not entered into wedlock. As per Black's Law Dictionary, adultery is the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than the offender's husband or wife. However, the provision had made it a restricted one as a consequence of which a man, in certain situations, becomes criminally liable for having committed adultery while, in other situations, he could not be branded as a person who has committed adultery so as to invite the culpability of Section 497 Indian Penal Code. Section 198 Code of Criminal Procedure deals with a person aggrieved. Sub-section (2) of Section 198 treats the husband of the woman as deemed to be aggrieved by an offence committed under Section 497 Indian Penal Code and in the absence of husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed with the leave of the court. It did not consider the wife of the adulterer as an aggrieved person. The offence and the deeming definition of an aggrieved person, as was absolutely and manifestly arbitrary as it did not even appear to be rational and it could be stated with emphasis that it confers a licence on the husband to deal with the wife as he likes which was extremely excessive and disproportionate. This Court was constrained to think so, as it does not treat a woman as an abettor but protects a woman and simultaneously, it does not enable the wife to file any criminal prosecution against the husband. Indubitably, she could take civil action but the husband is also entitled to take civil action. However, that did not save the provision as being manifestly arbitrary. That was one aspect of the matter. If the entire provision was scanned being Argus-eyed, it was noticed that on the one hand, it protects a woman and on the other, it did not protect the other woman. The rationale of the provision suffers from the absence of logicality of approach and, therefore, no hesitation in saying that it suffers from the vice of Article 14 of the Constitution being manifestly arbitrary. [23] (ii) It was discernible that the Court, with the passage of time, had recognized the conceptual equality of woman and the essential dignity which a woman was entitled to have. There could be no curtailment of the same. But, Section 497 Indian Penal Code effectively did the same by creating invidious distinctions based on gender stereotypes which creates a dent in the individual dignity of women. Besides, the emphasis on the element of connivance or consent of the husband tantamounts to subordination of women. Therefore, no hesitation in holding that the same offends Article 21 of the Constitution. [41] (iii) Section 497 of Indian Penal Code was unconstitutional and adultery should not be treated as an offence, it is appropriate to declare Section 198 of Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the procedure for filing a complaint in relation to the offence of adultery as unconstitutional. When the substantive provision goes, the procedural provision had to pave the same path. [56] Rohinton Fali Nariman, J. (Concurring) (i) The ostensible object of Section 497, as pleaded by the State, being to protect and preserve the sanctity of marriage, was not in fact the object of Section 497 at all. The sanctity of marriage could be utterly destroyed by a married man having sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman or a widow, as has been seen hereinabove. Also, if the husband consents or connives at such sexual intercourse, the offence was not committed, thereby showing that it was not sanctity of marriage which was sought to be protected and preserved, but a proprietary right of a husband. Secondly, no deterrent effect had been shown to exist, or ever to have existed, which may be a legitimate consideration for a State enacting criminal law. Also, manifest arbitrariness was writ large even in cases where the offender happens to be a married woman whose marriage had broken down, as a result of which she no longer cohabits with her husband, and may in fact, had obtained a decree for judicial separation against her husband, preparatory to a divorce being granted. If, during this period, she had sex with another man, the other man was immediately guilty of the offence. [82] (ii) The Section 497 of Code was also discriminatory and therefore, violative of Article 14 and Article 15(1). In treating a woman as chattel for the purposes of this provision, it was clear that such provision discriminates against women on grounds of sex only, and must be struck down on this ground as well. Section 198, Code of Criminal Procedure was also a blatantly discriminatory provision, in that it is the husband alone or somebody on his behalf who can file a complaint against another man for this offence. Consequently, Section 198 had also to be held constitutionally infirm. [83] (iii) In case of Sowmithri Vishnu, this Court upheld Section 497 while repelling three arguments against its continuance. This judgment also must be said to be swept away by the tidal wave of recent judgments expanding the scope of the fundamental rights contained in Articles 14, 15, and 21. Ancient notions of the man being the seducer and the woman being the victim permeate the judgment, which was no longer the case today. The moving times had not left the law behind as just seen, and so far as engaging the attention of law makers when reform of penal law is undertaken, this court hasten to add that even when the Code of Criminal Procedure was fully replaced in 1973, Section 198 continued to be on the statute book. Even as of today, Section 497 Indian Penal Code continues to be on the statute book. When these Sections are wholly outdated and had outlived their purpose, not only does the maxim of Roman law, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex, apply to interdict such law, but when such law falls foul of constitutional guarantees, it is this Court's solemn duty not to wait for legislation but to strike down such law. As recently as in Shayara Bano case, it was only the minority view that one must wait for the law to change legislatively by way of social reform. The majority view was the exact opposite, which was why Triple Talaq was found constitutionally infirm and struck down by the majority. Also, the statement in this judgment that stability of marriages was not an ideal to be scorned, could scarcely be applied to this provision, as had seen that marital stability was not the object for which this provision was enacted. On all these counts, therefore, we overrule the judgment in Sowmithri Vishnu. Equally, the judgment in V. Revathi, which upheld the constitutional validity of Section 198 must, for similar reasons, be held to be no longer good law. Therefore, Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were violative of Articles 14, 15(1), and 21 of the Constitution of India and are, therefore, struck down as being invalid. [86] Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. (i) While engrafting the provision into Chapter XX of the Penal Code-of offences relating to marriage-the legislature has based the offence on an implicit assumption about marriage. The notion which the law propounds and to which it imposes the sanctions of penal law was that the marital tie subordinates the role and position of the woman. In that view of marriage, the woman was bereft of the ability to decide, to make choices and give free expression to her personality. Human sexuality was an essential aspect of identity. Choices in matters of sexuality were reflective of the human desire for expression. Sexuality cannot be construed purely as a physiological attribute. In its associational attributes, it links up with the human desire to be intimate with a person of one's choice. Sharing of physical intimacies was a reflection of choice. In allowing individuals to make those choices in a consensual sphere, the Constitution acknowledges that even in the most private of zones, the individual must have the ability to make essential decisions. Sexuality could not be dis-associated from the human personality. For, to be human involves the ability to fulfil sexual desires in the pursuit of happiness. Autonomy in matters of sexuality was thus intrinsic to a dignified human existence. Human dignity both recognises and protects the autonomy of the individual in making sexual choices. The sexual choices of an individual cannot obviously be imposed on others in society and were premised on a voluntary acceptance by consenting parties. Section 497 denudes the woman of the ability to make these fundamental choices, in postulating that it was only the man in a marital relationship who can consent to his spouse having sexual intercourse with another. Section 497 disregards the sexual autonomy which every woman possesses as a necessary condition of her existence. Far from being an equal partner in an equal relationship, she is subjugated entirely to the will of her spouse. The provision was proffered by the legislature as an effort to protect the institution of marriage. But it proceeds on a notion of marriage which was one sided and which denies agency to the woman in a marital tie. The ability to make choices within marriage and on every aspect concerning it was a facet of human liberty and dignity which the Constitution protects. In depriving the woman of that ability and recognising it in the man alone, Section 497 fails to meet the essence of substantive equality in its application to marriage. Equality of rights and entitlements between parties to a marriage was crucial to preserve the values of the Constitution. Section 497 offends that substantive sense of equality and is violative of Article 14. [122] (ii) The procedural law which had been enacted in Section 198 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 re-enforces the stereotypes implicit in Section 497. Cognizance of an offence under Chapter XX of the Penal Code can be taken by a Court only upon a complaint of a person aggrieved. In the case of an offence punishable under Section 497, only the husband of the woman was deemed to be aggrieved by the offence. In any event, once the provisions of Section 497 were held to offend the fundamental rights, the procedure engrafted in Section 198 would cease to have any practical relevance. [123] (iii) Article 15(3) encapsulates the notion of protective discrimination. The constitutional guarantee in Article 15(3) could not be employed in a manner that entrenches paternalistic notions of protection. This latter view of protection only serves to place women in a cage. Article 15(3) did not exist in isolation. Articles 14 to 18, being constituents of a single code on equality, supplement each other and incorporate a non-discrimination principle. Neither Article 15, nor Article 15(3) allow discrimination against women. Discrimination which was grounded in paternalistic and patriarchal notions could not claim the protection of Article 15(3). In exempting women from criminal prosecution, Section 497 implies that a woman has no sexual agency and that she was seduced into a sexual relationship. Given the presumed lack of sexual agency, criminal exemption was then granted to the woman in order to protect her. The protection afforded to women under Section 497 highlights the lack of sexual agency that the Section imputes to a woman. Article 15(3) when read with the other Articles in Part III, serves as a powerful remedy to remedy the discrimination and prejudice faced by women for centuries. Article 15(3) as an enabling provision is intended to bring out substantive equality in the fullest sense. Dignity and autonomy were crucial to substantive equality. Hence, Article 15(3) did not protect a statutory provision that entrenches patriarchal notions in the garb of protecting women. [134] (iv) The state undoubtedly had a legitimate interest in regulating many aspects of marriage. That was the foundation on which the state did regulate rights, entitlements and duties, primarily bearing on its civil nature. Breach by one of the spouses of a legal norm may constitute a ground for dissolution or annulment. When the state enacts and enforces such legislation, it did so on the postulate that marriage as a social institution has a significant bearing on the social fabric. But in doing so, the state was equally governed by the norms of a liberal Constitution which emphasise dignity, equality and liberty as its cardinal values. The legitimate aims of the state may, it must be recognized, extend to imposing penal sanctions for certain acts within the framework of marriage. Physical and emotional abuse and domestic violence are illustrations of the need for legislative intervention. The Indian state had legitimately intervened in other situations such as by enacting anti dowry legislation or by creating offences dealing with the harassment of women for dowry within a marital relationship. The reason why this constitutes a legitimate recourse to the sovereign authority of the state to criminalize conduct was because the acts which the state proscribes were deleterious to human dignity. In criminalizing certain types of wrongdoing against women, the state intervenes to protect the fundamental rights of every woman to live with dignity. Consequently, it was important to underscore that this judgment did not question the authority and even the duty of the state to protect the fundamental rights of women from being trampled upon in unequal societal structures. Adultery as an offence does not fit that paradigm. In criminalizing certain acts, Section 497 had proceeded on a hypothesis which is deeply offensive to the dignity of women. It was grounded in paternalism, solicitous of patriarchal values and subjugates the woman to a position where the law disregards her sexuality. The sexuality of a woman is part of her inviolable core. Neither the state nor the institution of marriage could disparage it. By reducing the woman to the status of a victim and ignoring her needs, the provision penalizing adultery disregards something which was basic to human identity. Sexuality was a definitive expression of identity. Autonomy over one's sexuality has been central to human urges down through the ages. It had a constitutional foundation as intrinsic to autonomy. It was in this view of the matter that we have concluded that Section 497 was violative of the fundamental rights to equality and liberty as indeed, the right to pursue a meaningful life within the fold of Articles 14 and 21. [147] Indu Malhotra, J. (i) A law which deprives women of the right to prosecute, is not gender-neutral. Under Section 497, the wife of the adulterous male, could not prosecute her husband for marital infidelity. This provision was therefore ex facie discriminatory against women, and violative of Article 14. Section 497 as it stands today, cannot hide in the shadows against the discerning light of Article 14 which irradiates anything which is unreasonable, discriminatory, and arbitrary. [165.3] (ii) Article 15(3) of the Constitution is an enabling provision which permits the State to frame beneficial legislation in favour of women and children, to protect and uplift this class of citizens. Section 497 is a penal provision for the offence of adultery, an act which was committed consensually between two adults who have strayed out of the marital bond. Such a provision could not be considered to be a beneficial legislation covered by Article 15(3) of the Constitution. [167] (iii) The right to privacy and personal liberty was, however, not an absolute one, it was subject to reasonable restrictions when legitimate public interest was involved. It was true that the boundaries of personal liberty are difficult to be identified in black and white, however, such liberty must accommodate public interest. The freedom to have a consensual sexual relationship outside marriage by a married person, did not warrant protection under Article 21. [168] Joseph Shine vs. Union of India (UOI) (27.09.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/1074/2018


COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA- v.-BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND OTHERS

AIR2019SC113 2019(2)ABR56 (2019)1CompLJ1(SC) I(2019)CPJ45(SC) (2019)2MLJ44 MANU/SC/1423/2018 [2019]151SCL1(SC) 2018(15)SCALE530 (2019)2SCC521

Case Note: Anti-competitive agreement - Jurisdiction - Section 26(1) of Competition Act, 2002 - Present appeal was against order of Bombay High Court holding that, Competition Commission of India (CCI) had no jurisdiction in view of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 and authorities and Regulations made thereunder; CCI could exercise jurisdiction only after proceedings under TRAI Act had concluded/attained finality - Whether writ petitions filed before High Court of Bombay were maintainable - Whether High Court could give its findings on merits. Facts: Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited ('RJIL') had filed information under Section 19(1) of Competition Act, 2002 before Competition Commission of India ('CCI') alleging anticompetitive agreement/cartel having been formed by three major telecom operators, namely, Bharti Airtel Limited, Vodafone India Limited and Idea Cellular Limited (Incumbent Dominant Operators) ('IDOs'). Apart from IDOs, certain allegations were also made against Cellular Operators Association of India ('COAI'). CCI issued notice to these parties and after hearing RJIL, aforesaid cellular companies and COAI, it passed a common order dated April 21, 2017 in all these cases (by clubbing them together) holding a view that, prima facie case existed and an investigation was warranted into matter. It, accordingly, directed Director General to cause investigation in case. Four writ petitions came to be filed by Bharti Airtel Limited, Vodafone India Limited, Idea Cellular Limited and COAI respectively. prayed for quashing of aforesaid order and consequential action/proceedings on ground that CCI did not have any jurisdiction to deal with such a matter. Matter was heard and vide judgment dated September 21, 2017, High Court had allowed these writ petitions and quashed/set aside order dated April 21, 2017 passed by CCI and consequently notices issued by Director General of CCI had also been quashed. Bombay High Court in impugned judgment held that, Competition Commission of India (CCI) had no jurisdiction in view of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 and authorities and Regulations made thereunder; CCI could exercise jurisdiction only after proceedings under TRAI Act had concluded/attained finality; Order dated 21st April, 2017 passed under Section 26(1) of Competition Act was not an administrative direction, but rather a quasi judicial one that finally decided rights of parties and caused serious adverse consequences, because a detailed hearing had been given and many materials had been tendered in courts of hearings; On merits of matter, there was no cartelisation as alleged and COAI was exonerated; and Order of CCI was perverse and liable to be interfered with under writ jurisdiction. Held, while dismissing the appeals 1. Commission recognized role and importance of sectoral regulators and exercises its jurisdiction keeping in mind their role and responsibilities. Commission was a market regulator and had jurisdiction to look at those issues which affect competition in markets in India, including that of an alleged cartelization amongst enterprises/associations. nature of proceedings before TRAI involving ITOs on other hand different and related to whether interconnection norms and quality of service Regulations were complied with or whether contractual terms of ICAs had been breached or met. These issues were not relevant for determination in current proceedings before Commission. [11] 2. In wake of globalisation and keeping in view economic development of country, responding to opening of its economy and resorting to liberalisation, need was felt to enact a law that ensures fair competition in India by prohibiting trade practices which cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition within markets in India and for establishment of an expert body in form of Competition Commission of India, which would discharge duty of curbing negative aspects of competition, Competition Act, 2002 had been enacted by Parliament. [65] 3. Functioning of telecom companies which were granted licence under Section 4 of Telegraph Act was regulated by provisions contained in TRAI Act. TRAI was a regulator which regulated telecom industry, which was a statutory body created under TRAI Act. [77] 4. Thus, with advent of globalisation/liberalisation leading to free market economy, regulators in respect of each sector had assumed great significance and importance. It becomes ir bounden duty to ensure that such a regulator fulfils objectives enshrined in Act under which a particular regulator was created. Insofar as telecom sector was concerned, TRAI Act itself mentions objective which it seeks to achieve. It not only exercised control/supervision over telecom service providers/licensees, TRAI was also supposed to provide guidance to telecom/mobile market. 'Introduction' to TRAI Act itself mentioned that due to tremendous growth in services it was considered essential to regulate telecommunication services by a regulatory body which should be fully empowered to control services, in best interest of country as well as service providers. [78] 5. TRAI was, thus, constituted for orderly and healthy growth of telecommunication infrastructure apart from protection of consumer interest. It was assigned duty to achieve universal service which should be of world standard quality on one hand and also to ensure that it was provided to customers at a reasonable price, on other hand. In process, purpose was to make arrangements for protection and promotion of consumer interest and ensure fair competition. It was because of this reason that powers and functions which were assigned to TRAI were highlighted in Statement of Objects and Reasons. Specific functions which were assigned to TRAI, amongst other, including ensuring technical compatibility and effective interrelationship between different service providers; ensuring compliance of licence conditions by all service providers; and settlement of disputes between service providers. [79] 6. In instant case, dispute raised by RJIL specifically touched upon these aspects as grievance raised was that IDOs had not given POIs as per licence conditions resulting into non-compliance and had failed to ensure inter se technical compatibility thereby. Not only RJIL had raised this dispute, it had even specifically approached TRAI for settlement of this dispute which had arisen between various service providers, namely, RJIL on one hand and IDOs on other, wherein COAI was also roped in. TRAI was seized of this particular dispute. [80] 7. TRAI was constituted as an expert regulatory body which specifically governed telecom sector, aforesaid aspects of disputes were to be decided by TRAI in first instance. These were jurisdictional aspects. Unless TRAI found fault with IDOs on aforesaid aspects, matter cannot be taken further even if we proceed on assumption that CCI had jurisdiction to deal with complaints/information filed before it. RJIL had approached DoT in relation to its alleged grievance of augmentation of POIs which in turn had informed RJIL vide letter dated September 06, 2016 that matter related to inter-connectivity between service providers was within purview of TRAI. RJIL thereafter approached TRAI; TRAI intervened and issued show-cause notice dated September 27, 2016; and post wassuance of show-cause notice and directions, TRAI issued recommendations dated October 21, 2016 on issue of inter-connection and provisioning of POIs to RJIL. Sectoral authorities were, therefore, seized of matter. TRAI, being a specialised sectoral regulator and also armed with sufficient power to ensure fair, non-discriminatory and competitive market in telecom sector, was better suited to decide aforesaid issues. After all, RJIL's grievance was that inter-connectivity was not provided by IDOs in terms of licenses granted to them. TRAI Act and Regulations framed reunder make detailed provisions dealing with intense obligations of service providers for providing POIS. These provisions also deal as to when, how and in what manner POIs were to be provisioned. They also stipulate charges to be realised for POIs that were to be provided to another service provider. Even consequences for breach of such obligations were mentioned. [83] 8. High Court was right in concluding that till jurisdictional issues were straightened and answered by TRAI which would bring on record findings on aforesaid aspects, CCI was ill-equipped to proceed in matter. Having regard to aforesaid nature of jurisdiction conferred upon an expert regulator pertaining to this specific sector, High Court was right in concluding that concepts of "subscriber", "test period", "reasonable demand", "test phase and commercial phase rights and obligations", "reciprocal obligations of service providers" or "breaches of any contract and/or practice", arising out of TRAI Act and policy so declared, were matters within jurisdiction of Authority/TDSAT under TRAI Act only. [84] 9. CCI was specifically entrusted with duties and functions, and in process empowered as well, to deal with aforesaid three kinds of anti-competitive practices. Purpose was to eliminate such practices which were having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain competition and to protect interest of consumers and ensure freedom of trade, carried on by other participants, in India. To this extent, function that was assigned to CCI was distinct from function of TRAI under TRAI Act. Learned Counsel for Appellants were right in their submission that CCI was supposed to find out as to whether IDOs were acting in concert and colluding, thereby forming a cartel, with intention to block or hinder entry of RJIL in market in violation of Section 3(3)(b) of Competition Act. Also, whether there was an anti-competitive agreement between IDOs, using platform of COAI. CCI, therefore, was to determine whether conduct of parties was unilateral or it was a collective action based on an agreement. Agreement between parties, if it was there, was pivotal to issue. Such an exercise had to be necessarily undertaken by CCI. In Haridas Exports, this Court held that where statutes operate in different fields and had different purposes, it could not be said that there was an implied repeal of one by other. Competition Act was also a special statute which deals with anti-competition. If activity undertaken by some persons was anti-competitive and offended Section 3 of Competition Act, consequences thereof were provided in Competition Act. [89] 10. All aforesaid functions not only come within domain of CCI, TRAI was not at all equipped to deal with same. Even if TRAI also returned a finding that a particular activity was anti-competitive, its powers would be limited to action that could be taken under TRAI Act alone. It was only CCI which was empowered to deal with same anti-competitive act from lens of Competition Act. If such activities offend provisions of Competition Act as well, consequences under that Act would also follow. Therefore, contention of IDOs that jurisdiction of CCI stand totally ousted could not be accepted. Insofar as nuanced exercise from stand point of Competition Act was concerned, CCI was experienced body in conducting competition analysis. Further, CCI was more likely to opt for structural remedies which would lead sector to evolve a point where sufficient new entry was induced reby promoting genuine competition. This specific and important role assigned to CCI could not be completely wished away and 'comity' between sectoral regulator (i.e. TRAI) and market regulator (i.e. CCI) was to be maintained. [90] 11. Since matter pertained to telecom sector which was specifically regulated by TRAI Act, balance was maintained by permitting TRAI in first instance to deal with and decide jurisdictional aspects which can be more competently handled by it. Once that exercise was done and there were findings returned by TRAI which lead to prima facie conclusion that IDOs had indulged in anti-competitive practices, CCI could be activated to investigate matter going by criteria laid down in relevant provisions of Competition Act and take it to its logical conclusion. This balanced approach in construing two Acts would take care of Section 60 of Competition Act as well. [91] 12. As per RJIL as well as CCI, High Court could not have entertained writ petition against an order passed under Section 26(1) of Competition Act which was a pure administrative order and was only a prima facie view expressed rein, and did not result in serious adverse consequences. [93] 13. Section 26, under its different Sub-sections, required Commission to issue various directions, take decisions and pass orders, some of which were even appealable before Tribunal. Even if it was a direction under any of provisions and not a decision, conclusion or order passed on merits by Commission, it was expected that same would be supported by some reasoning. At stage of forming a prima facie view, as required under Section 26(1) of Act, Commission might not really record detailed reasons, but must express its mind in no uncertain terms that, it was of view that prima facie case existed, requiring issuance of direction for investigation to Director General. Such view should be recorded with reference to information furnished to Commission. Such opinion should be formed on basis of records, including information furnished and reference made to Commission under various provisions of Act. Commission was expected to express prima facie view in terms of Section 26(1) of Act, without entering into any adjudicatory or determinative process and by recording minimum reasons substantiating formation of such opinion, while all its other orders and decisions should be well reasoned. [97] 14. Such an approach could also be justified with reference to Regulation 20(4), which required Director General to record, in his report, findings on each of allegations made by a party in intimation or reference submitted to Commission and sent for investigation to Director General, as case might be, together with all evidence and documents collected during investigation. Inevitable consequence was that, Commission was similarly expected to write appropriate reasons on every issue while passing an order under Sections 26 to 28 of Act. 15. Merely because present case dealt with telecom sector would not change nature of order that was passed by CCI under Section 26(1) of Competition Act. However, it raised another dimension. Even if order was administrative in nature, question raised before High Court in writ petitions filed by Respondents touched upon very jurisdiction of CCI. As was evident, case set up by Respondents was that CCI did not have jurisdiction to entertain any such request or Information which was furnished by RJIL and two others. Question, thus, pertained to jurisdiction of CCI to deal with such a matter and in process High Court was called upon to decide as to whether jurisdiction of CCI was entirely excluded or to what extent CCI can exercise its jurisdiction in these cases when matter could be dealt with by another regulator, namely, TRAI. [96] 16. High Court was competent to deal with and decide issues raised in exercise of its power under Article 226 of Constitution. Writ petitions were, therefore, maintainable. [97] 17. Once it was held that, order under Section 26(1) of Competition Act was administrative in nature and further that it was merely a prima facie opinion directing Director General to carry investigation, High Court would not be competent to adjudge validity of such an order on merits. [98] 18. Since order of High Court was upheld on aspect that, CCI could exercise jurisdiction only after proceedings under TRAI Act had concluded/attained finality, i.e. only after TRAI returns its findings on jurisdictional aspects which were mentioned above, ultimate direction given by High Court quashing order passed by CCI was not liable to be interfered with as such an exercise carried out by CCI was premature. Appeals dismissed. [99] Disposition: Appeal Dismissed Competition Commission of India vs. Bharti Airtel Limited and Ors. (05.12.2018 - SC) : MANU/SC/1423/2018


SWISS RIBBONS PVT. LTD. & ANR.-v.-UNION OF INDIA & ORS

AIR2019SC739 2019(2)ALD147 I(2019)BC259(SC) 123(1)CWN87 [2019]213CompCas198(SC) (2019)1CompLJ273-364(SC) [2019]148CLA419(SC) 2019(2)CTC168 MANU/SC/0079/2019 [2019]152SCL365(SC) 2019(2)SCALE5 (2019)4SCC17 2019 (7) SCJ 579

Case Note: Insolvency - Validity of provisions - Sections 12A, 29A, 240A, 60, 53, 30 and 31 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 [Code], Article 14 of Constitution of India and Section 433(e) of Companies Act, 1956 - Present petitions assailed constitutional validity of various provisions of Code - Whether members of National Company Law Tribunal [NCLT] and certain members of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [NCLAT], apart from President, had been appointed contrary to present Court's judgment in Madras Bar Association (III) - Whether classification between financial creditor and operational creditor was discriminatory or violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India - Whether Section 12A was not violative of Article 14 of Constitution - Whether vested rights of erstwhile promoters to participate in recovery process of a corporate debtor had been impaired by retrospective application of Section 29A of Code - Whether Section 53 of Code violated Article 14 of Constitution. Facts: Constitutional validity of various provisions of Code was subject matter in present appeal. First and foremost argument in present case was that, members of National Company Law Tribunal [NCLT] and certain members of National Company Law Appellate Tribunal [NCLAT], apart from President, had been appointed contrary to this Court's judgment in Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, [Madras Bar Association (III)], and that therefore, this being so, all orders that were passed by such members, being passed contrary to judgment of this Court in aforesaid case, ought to be set aside. Further, such members ought to be restrained from passing any orders in future. Administrative support for all tribunals should be from Ministry of Law and Justice. Since the NCLAT, as an appellate court, had a seat only at New Delhi, this would render remedy inefficacious as persons would have to travel from Tamil Nadu, Calcutta, and Bombay to New Delhi, whereas earlier, they could have approached respective High Courts in their States. This again is directly contrary to Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, [Madras Bar Association (II)]. Apart from aforesaid technical objection, it had assailed legislative scheme that was contained in Section 7 of Code, stating that there was no real difference between financial creditors and operational creditors. According to him, both types of creditors would give either money in terms of loans or money's worth in terms of goods and services. Thus, there was no intelligible differentia between the two types of creditors, regard being had to object sought to be achieved by Code, namely, insolvency resolution, and if that is not possible, then ultimately, liquidation. It was argued that, assuming that a valid distinction existed between financial and operational creditors, there was hostile discrimination against operational creditors. First and foremost, unless they amount to 10% of aggregate of amount of debt owed, they had no voice in committee of creditors. In any case, Sections 21 and 24 of Code were discriminatory and manifestly arbitrary in that operational creditors did not have even a single vote in committee of creditors which had very important functions to perform in resolution process of corporate debtors. Further, establishment of information utilities that were set up under Code were also assailed. Next argument was that Section 12A of Code was contrary to the directions of this Court in its order in Uttara Foods and Feeds Pvt. Ltd. v. Mona Pharmachem. Lastly, a four-fold attack was raised against Section 29A, in particular, Clause (c) thereof. First and foremost, Shri Rohatgi stated that the vested rights of erstwhile promoters to participate in the recovery process of a corporate debtor have been impaired by retrospective application of Section 29A. Another argument that was made was that under Section 29A(c), a person's account might be classified as a non-performing asset [NPA] in accordance with guidelines of Reserve Bank of India [RBI], despite him not being a wilful defaulter. Also, period of one year referred to in Clause (c) was again wholly arbitrary and without any basis either in rationality or in law. Held, while disposing of the appeal 1. On 3rd January, 2018, Companies Amendment Act, 2017 was brought into force by which Section 412 of Companies Act, 2013 was amended regarding Selection of Members of Tribunal and Appellate Tribunal. Members of the Tribunal and Technical Members of Appellate Tribunal shall be appointed on recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of-- (a) Chief Justice of India or his nominee-- Chairperson; (b) a senior Judge of the Supreme Court or Chief Justice of High Court--Member;(c) Secretary in the Ministry of Corporate Affairs--Member; and (d) Secretary in the Ministry of Law and Justice--Member. Where in a meeting of Selection Committee, there was equality of votes on any matter, Chairperson shall have a casting vote. This was brought into force by a Notification dated 9th February,2018. However, an additional affidavit had been filed during course of these proceedings by Union of India. This affidavit made it clear that, acting in compliance with directions of Supreme Court in judgments of Madras Bar Association (I) and Madras Bar Association (III), a Selection Committee was constituted to make appointments of Members of the NCLT in year 2015 itself. [14] 2. Regarding submission that, NCLAT Bench only at Delhi , learned Attorney General had assured that, judgment in case of Madras Bar Association (II) would be followed and Circuit Benches would be established as soon as it was practicable. Union of India was directed to set up Circuit Benches of NCLAT within a period of 6 months from today. [16] 3. Regarding argument that, Tribunals were functioning under wrong ministry, even though eight years have passed since date of judgment in Madras Bar Association (I), administrative support for these tribunals continued to be from Ministry of Corporate Affairs. This was required to be rectified at earliest. [17] 4. With regard to classification between financial creditor and operational creditor, since equality was only among equals, no discrimination resulted if Court could be shown that, there was an intelligible differentia which separated two kinds of creditors so long as there was some rational relation between creditors so differentiated, with object sought to be achieved by legislation. [20] 5. Argument of learned Counsel on behalf of Petitioners was that in point of fact, there was no intelligible differentia having relation to objects sought to be achieved by Code between financial and operational creditors and indeed, nowhere in world had this distinction been made. [25] 6. Most financial creditors, particularly banks and financial institutions, were secured creditors whereas most operational creditors were unsecured, payments for goods and services as well as payments to workers not being secured by mortgaged documents and like. Distinction between secured and unsecured creditors was a distinction which had obtained since earliest of Companies Acts both in United Kingdom and in India. Nature of loan agreements with financial creditors was different from contracts with operational creditors for supplying goods and services. Financial creditors generally lend finance on a term loan or for working capital that enabled corporate debtor to either set up and/or operate its business. On other hand, contracts with operational creditors were relatable to supply of goods and services in operation of business. Financial contracts generally involve large sums of money. By way of contrast, operational contracts had dues whose quantum was generally less. In running of a business, operational creditors can be many as opposed to financial creditors, who lend finance for the set up or working of business. Also, financial creditors had specified repayment schedules, and defaults entitled financial creditors to recall a loan in totality. Contracts with operational creditors did not have any such stipulations. Also, forum in which dispute resolution took place was completely different. [27] 7. Most importantly, financial creditors were, from very beginning, involved with assessing viability of corporate debtor. They could, and therefore did, engage in restructuring of loan as well as reorganization of corporate debtor's business when there was financial stress, which were things operational creditors did not and could not do. Thus, preserving corporate debtor as a going concern, while ensuring maximum recovery for all creditors being objective of Code, financial creditors were clearly different from operational creditors and therefore, there was an intelligible differentia between two which had a direct relation to objects sought to be achieved by Code. [28] 8. Trigger for a financial creditor's application was non-payment of dues when they arose under loan agreements. It was for this reason that, Section 433(e) of Companies Act, 1956 had been repealed by Code and a change in approach had been brought about. Legislative policy now was to move away from concept of "inability to pay debts" to "determination of default". Said shift enabled financial creditor to prove, based upon solid documentary evidence, that there was an obligation to pay debt and that debtor had failed in such obligation. [37] 9. Since, financial creditors were in business of money lending, banks and financial institutions were best equipped to assess viability and feasibility of business of corporate debtor. Even at time of granting loans, these banks and financial institutions undertake a detailed market study which included a techno-economic valuation report, evaluation of business, financial projection, etc. Since this detailed study had already been undertaken before sanctioning a loan, and since financial creditors had trained employees to assess viability and feasibility, they were in a good position to evaluate contents of a resolution plan. On other hand, operational creditors, who provide goods and services, were involved only in recovering amounts that were paid for such goods and services, and were typically unable to assess viability and feasibility of business. [44] 10. NCLAT had, while looking into viability and feasibility of resolution plans that were approved by committee of creditors, always gone into whether operational creditors were given roughly same treatment as financial creditors, and if they were not, such plans were either rejected or modified so that, operational creditors' rights were safeguarded. A resolution plan could not pass muster under Section 30(2)(b) read with Section 31, unless a minimum payment was made to operational creditors, being not less than liquidation value. [46] 11. Operational creditors were not discriminated against or that Article 14 had not been infracted either on ground of equals being treated unequally or on ground of manifest arbitrariness. [48] 12. Main thrust against provision of Section 12A was fact that, ninety per cent of committee of creditors had to allow withdrawal. This high threshold had been explained in Insolvency Law Committee (ILC) Report as all financial creditors had to put their heads together to allow such withdrawal as, ordinarily, an omnibus settlement involving all creditors ought to be entered into. This explained why ninety per cent, which was substantially all financial creditors, had to grant their approval to an individual withdrawal or settlement. In any case, figure of ninety per cent, in absence of anything further to show that it was arbitrary, must pertain to domain of legislative policy, which had been explained by Report. If committee of creditors arbitrarily rejected a just settlement and/or withdrawal claim, NCLT, and thereafter, NCLAT could always set aside such decision under Section 60 of Code. Section 12A of Code also passed constitutional muster. [53] 13. It was settled law that, a statute was not retrospective merely because it affected existing rights; nor was it retrospective merely because a part of requisites for its action was drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. In ArcelorMittal, present Court had observed that, a resolution applicant had no vested right for consideration or approval of its resolution plan. [64] 14. No vested right was taken away by application of Section 29A. A resolution applicant who applied under Section 29A(c) had no vested right to apply for being considered as a resolution applicant. [65] 15. According to Petitioners, when immovable and movable property was sold in liquidation, it ought to be sold to any person, including persons who were not eligible to be resolution applicants as, often, it was erstwhile promoter who alone might purchase such properties piecemeal by public auction or by private contract. There was no vested right in an erstwhile promoter of a corporate debtor to bid for immovable and movable property of corporate debtor in liquidation. Further, given categories of persons who were ineligible under Section 29A, which included persons who were malfeasant, or persons who had fallen foul of law in some way, and persons who were unable to pay their debts in grace period allowed, were further, by this proviso, interdicted from purchasing assets of corporate debtor whose debts they had either wilfully not paid or had been unable to pay. Legislative purpose which permeated Section 29A continued to permeate Section when it applied not merely to resolution applicants, but to liquidation also. [69] 16. Section 29A goes to eligibility to submit a resolution plan. A wilful defaulter, in accordance with guidelines of RBI, would be a person who though able to pay, did not pay. An NPA, on other hand, referred to account belonging to a person that was declared as such under guidelines issued by RBI. Legislative policy, therefore, was that a person who was unable to service its own debt beyond grace period referred to above, was unfit to be eligible to become a resolution applicant. This policy could not be found fault with. Neither could period of one year be found fault with, as this was a policy matter decided by the RBI and which emerges from its Master Circular, as during relevant period, an NPA was classified as a substandard asset. Ineligibility attached only after this one year period was over as NPA now got classified as a doubtful asset. [70] 17. Persons who act jointly or in concert with others were connected with business activity of resolution applicant. Similarly, all categories of persons mentioned in Section 5(24A) show that such persons must be "connected" with resolution applicant within meaning of Section 29A(j). This being case, said categories of persons who were collectively mentioned under caption "relative" obviously need to have a connection with business activity of resolution applicant. In absence of showing that, such person was "connected" with business of activity of resolution applicant, such person could not possibly be disqualified under Section 29A(j). All categories in Section 29A(j) dealt with persons, natural as well as artificial, who were connected with business activity of resolution applicant. Expression "related party", therefore, and "relative" contained in definition Sections must be read noscitur a sociis with categories of persons mentioned in Explanation I, and so read, would include only persons who were connected with business activity of resolution applicant. [75] 18. An argument was also made that, expression "connected person" in Explanation I, Clause (ii) to Section 29A(j) could not possibly refer to a person who might be in management or control of business of corporate debtor in future. This would be arbitrary as explanation would then apply to an indeterminate person. This contention also required to be repelled as Explanation I sought to made it clear that, if a person was otherwise covered as a "connected person", this provision would also cover a person who was in management or control of business of the corporate debtor during implementation of a resolution plan. Therefore, any such person was not indeterminate at all, but was a person who was in saddle of business of corporate debtor either at an anterior point of time or even during implementation of resolution plan. [76] 19. Regarding exemption of micro, small, and medium enterprises from Section 29A of Code, ILC Report of March 2018 found that micro, small, and medium enterprises formed foundation of economy and were key drivers of employment, production, economic growth, entrepreneurship, and financial inclusion. [77] 20. Section 7 of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 classified enterprises depending upon whether they manufacture or produce goods, or were engaged in providing and rendering services as micro, small, or medium, depending upon certain investments made. [78] 21. Rationale for excluding such industries from eligibility criteria laid down in Section 29A(c) and 29A(h) was because qua such industries, other resolution applicants might not be forthcoming, which then would inevitably lead not to resolution, but to liquidation. Following upon Insolvency Law Committee's Report, Section 240A had been inserted in Code with retrospective effect from 6th June, 2018. [80] 22. When Code had worked hardship to a class of enterprises, Committee constituted by Government, in overseeing working of Code, had been alive to such problems, and Government in turn had followed recommendations of Committee in enacting Section 240A. This was an important instance of how executive continued to monitor application of Code, and exempted a class of enterprises from application of some of its provisions in deserving cases. [81] 23. Repayment of financial debts infused capital into economy as banks and financial institutions were able, with money that had been paid back, to further lend such money to other entrepreneurs for their businesses. This rationale created an intelligible differentia between financial debts and operational debts, which were unsecured, which was directly related to object sought to be achieved by Code. In any case, workmen's dues, which were also unsecured debts, had traditionally been placed above most other debts. Thus, unsecured debts were of various kinds, and so long as there was some legitimate interest sought to be protected, having relation to object sought to be achieved by statute in question, Article 14 did not get infracted. Challenge to Section 53 of Code must also fail. [84] Ratio Decidendi: A resolution applicant had no vested right for consideration or approval of its resolution plan Disposition: Disposed of Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (25.01.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/0079/2019


SSANGYONG ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION CO. LTD.-v.-NATIONAL HIGHWAYS AUTHORITY OF INDIA (NHAI)

AIR2019SC5041 2019(3)ArbLR152(SC) 2019 (4) CCC 491 2019(2)KLT679 (2019)5MLJ7 MANU/SC/0705/2019 2019(8)SCALE41 (2019)15SCC131

Case Note: Arbitration - Majority award - Public policy - Respondent, invited bids for construction of a four-lane bypass on National Highway - Appellant's bid was accepted - Dispute arose between parties - Appellant approached High Court for interim protection against deduction and recoveries sought to be made by Respondent by applying said Circular - High Court, restrained Respondent from implementing said Circular retrospectively - Meanwhile, dispute was referred to Dispute Adjudicating Board as envisaged under contract in which arbitral award was passed - Section 34 petition was filed by Appellant was rejected by Single Judge of High Court, in which it was held that possible view was taken by majority arbitrators which, therefore, could not be interfered with - Single Judge also went on to hold that New Series published by Ministry could be applied in case of the Appellant as base indices under New Series were available - Section 37 appeal to Division Bench of High Court yielded same result - Hence, present appeal - Whether majority award had created new contract for parties by applying unilateral circular and was liable to be set aside. Facts: The Respondent, invited bids for construction of a four-lane bypass on National Highway. The Appellant's bid was accepted vide its letter of acceptance. Thereafter dispute arose between parties. The Appellant then approached the High Court vide an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for interim protection against deduction and recoveries sought to be made by the Respondent by applying the Circular. The Delhi High Court, by its order dated 31.05.2013, restrained the Respondent from implementing the said Circular retrospectively. Meanwhile, the said dispute was referred to the Dispute Adjudicating Board as envisaged under the contract. Section 34 petition which was filed by the Appellant was rejected by the Single Judge of the High Court, by a judgment and order, in which it was held that a possible view was taken by the majority arbitrators which, therefore, could not be interfered with, given the parameters of challenge to arbitral awards. The Single Judge also went on to hold that the New Series published by the Ministry could be applied in the case of the Appellant as the base indicesunder the New Series were available. Having so held, the Single Judge stated that even though the view expressed in the dissenting award was more appealing, and that he preferred that view, yet he found that since the majority award was a possible view, the scope of interference being limited, the Section 34 petition was dismissed. A Section 37 appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court yielded the same result. Held, while appeal allowing the appeal: (i) In the guise of misinterpretation of the contract, and consequent errors of jurisdiction, it was not possible to state that the arbitral award would be beyond the scope of submission to arbitration if otherwise the said misinterpretation, could be said to have been fairly comprehended as disputes within the arbitration agreement, or which were referred to the decision of the arbitrators as understood by the authorities above. If an arbitrator was alleged to have wandered outside the contract and dealt with matters not allotted to him, this would be a jurisdictional error which could be corrected on the ground of patent illegality, which, would not apply to international commercial arbitrations that are decided under Part II of the 1996 Act. To bring in by the backdoor grounds relatable to Section 28(3) of the 1996 Act to be matters beyond the scope of submission to arbitration under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of Act would not be permissible as this ground must be construed narrowly and so construed, must refer only to matters which were beyond the arbitration agreement or beyond the reference to the arbitral tribunal. [43] (ii) Insofar as the argument that a new contract had been made by the majority award for the parties, without the consent of the Appellant, by applying a formula outside the agreement, as per the Circular, which itself could not be applied without the Appellant's consent, this ground under Section 34(2)(a)(iv) of Act would not be available, given the authorities discussed in detail. It was enough to state that the Appellant argued before the arbitral tribunal that a new contract was being made by applying the formula outside what was prescribed, which was answered by the Respondent, stating that it would not be possible to apply the old formula without a linking factor which would have to be introduced. Considering that the parties were at issue on this, the dispute as to whether the linking factor applied, thanks to the Circular was clearly something raised and argued by the parties, and was certainly something which would fall within the arbitration Clause or the reference to arbitration that governs the parties. This being the case, this argument would not obtain and Section 34(2)(a)(iv), as a result, would not be attracted. [47] (iii) However, when it comes to the public policy of India argument based upon most basic notions of justice, it was clear that this ground could be attracted only in very exceptional circumstances when the conscience of the Court was shocked by infraction of fundamental notions or principles of justice. It could be seen that the formula that was applied by the agreement continued to be applied in short, it was not correct to say that the formula under the agreement could not be applied in view of the Ministry's change in the base indices. Further, in order to apply a linking factor, a Circular, unilaterally issued by one party, could not possibly bind the other party to the agreement without that other party's consent. Indeed, the Circular itself expressly stipulates that it could not apply unless the contractors furnish an undertaking/affidavit that the price adjustment under the Circular was acceptable to them. How the Appellant gave such undertaking only conditionally and without prejudice to its argument that the Circular did not and could not apply. This being the case, it was clear that the majority award had created a new contract for the parties by applying the said unilateral Circular and by substituting a workable formula under the agreement by another formula de hors the agreement. This being the case, a fundamental principle of justice had been breached, namely, that a unilateral addition or alteration of a contract could never be foisted upon an unwilling party, nor could a party to the agreement be liable to perform a bargain not entered into with the other party. Clearly, such a course of conduct would be contrary to fundamental principles of justice as followed in this country, and shocks the conscience of this Court. However, this ground was available only in very exceptional circumstances, such as the fact situation in the present case. Under no circumstance could any Court interfere with an arbitral award on the ground that justice had not been done in the opinion of the Court. That would be an entry into the merits of the dispute which, was contrary to the ethos of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, as has been noted earlier in this judgment. [48] (iv) The judgments of the Single Judge and of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court are set aside. Consequently, the majority award was also set aside. Under the Scheme of Section 34 of the 1996 Act, the disputes that were decided by the majority award would have to be referred afresh to another arbitration. This would cause considerable delay and be contrary to one of the important objectives of the 1996 Act, namely, speedy resolution of disputes by the arbitral process under the Act. Therefore, in order to do complete justice between the parties, invoking our power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, and given the fact that there was a minority award which awards the Appellant its claim based upon the formula mentioned in the agreement between the parties, we uphold the minority award, and state that it was this award, together with interest, that will now be executed between the parties. Therefore award the claim of the Claimant in full. [49] Disposition: Appeal Allowed Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. vs. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) (08.05.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/0705/2019


DR. ASHWANI KUMAR-v.-UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER

2019 6 AWC6156SC (2019)7MLJ81 MANU/SC/1211/2019 2019(12)SCALE125 (2020)13SCC585

Case Note: Constitution - Custodial torture - Denial of guidelines - Article 21 of Constitution of India - Present application had been filed for effective and purposive legislative framework/law based upon Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by United Nations General Assembly - Applicant predicating his case on right to life and liberty and judgments of this Court had argued that custodial torture being crime against humanity which directly infract and violate Article 21 of Constitution - Whether guidelines should be framed with regard to issue of custodial torture. Facts: The Applicant had filed the application for an effective and purposive legislative framework/law based upon the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The Applicant predicating his case on the right to life and liberty and judgments of this Court had argued that custodial torture being crime against humanity which directly infract and violate Article 21 of the Constitution. Held, while dismissing the application: (i) The Respondent in his submissions had rightly urged that Article 253 of the Constitution which deals with the legislation for giving effect to international agreements, confers power on Parliament to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention, notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of Chapter XI of the Constitution. Thus, notwithstanding Articles 245 and 246 of the Constitution, Parliament had the supreme power to make laws for implementing any treaty or convention which may even encroach upon the exclusive legislative competence of the States. The executive action under Article 73 of signing and ratifying the convention could be implemented without any violation of the State's right when the legislation was passed by the Parliament under Article 253. Police and Prisons are State subjects. Ratification of the UN Convention would require enactment of laws under Article 253 of the Constitution, for mere ratification would not affect and undo the existing laws or result in the enactment of new laws. Ratification, as was well recognised, was a political act and would require consultation with the State Governments/Union Territories and subsequent deliberation of their comments by the Union of India. Union of India has pointed out that they have a reservation on Article 20 of the UN Convention. Reference was also made to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, to which India was not a party but which provisions were reflected in the Standard Operating Procedure issued by the Ministry of External Affairs in respect of Memorandum of Understanding/Agreement with foreign countries. The Standard Operating Procedure, Clause (iv) under Heading D-Treaty Making Formalities which relates to ratification, states that where a treaty did not provide for its entry into force only upon its signature and makes it subject to ratification, the treaty requires ratification. In order to ensure that India was in a position to efficiently discharge all obligations emanating from treaties/agreements, such ratification should be undertaken only after relevant domestic clauses have been amended and the enabling legislations enacted when there was absence of domestic law on the subject. [34] (ii) However, this was not to state that the courts would not step in, when required, to protect fundamental rights. It was indisputable that the right to life and the right to liberty are of foremost importance in a democratic state and, therefore, any form of torture would violate the right to life and was prohibited by Article 21 of the Constitution. Such action would be unconstitutional under Article 21 and would fail the test of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution. Indeed, the courts have been at the forefront in protecting and safeguarding individual rights. On the basis of a letter written by a journalist complaining of custodial violence suffered by women prisoners in police lock-ups in the city of Bombay, this Court in Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra had issued the guidelines to safeguard the rights of arrested persons including female prisoners to afford them protection in police lock-ups from possible torture or ill-treatment. A person detained in a prison was entitled to live with human dignity and his detention in prison should be regulated by a procedure established by law which must be reasonable, fair and just. This could be done by applying, elucidating and even creatively expanding existing laws and principles on case to case basis. Judiciary while exercising its jurisdiction in this manner was not enacting or legislating but applying the Constitution and protecting fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. [35] (iii) Legal jurisprudence had developed for providing compensation for the unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty as a public remedy in addition to claims in private law for damages by tortuous acts of public servants. In D.K. Basu, the public law remedy for award of compensation was elucidated as arising from indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article 21 and justified on the ground that the purpose of public law was not only to civilise public power but also to ensure that the citizens live under a legal system where their rights and interests are protected and preserved. For the grant of compensation, therefore, proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution were entertained when violation of the fundamental rights granted under Article 21 was established. In such cases, claims of a citizen were tried on the principle of strict liability where defence of sovereignty may not be available. [39] Ashwani Kumar vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (05.09.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/1211/2019


ROJER MATHEW -v.- SOUTH INDIAN BANK LTD. & ORS

(2020)314CTR(SC)58 2019(369)ELT3(S.C.) MANU/SC/1563/2019 2019(15)SCALE615 (2020)6SCC1

Case Note: Constitution- Validity of provision - Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 and Articles 110, 323-A and 323-B of Constitution of India, 1950 - In present batch of cases, Petitioners had questioned validity of Part XIV read with 8th and 9th Schedules of Finance Act 2017, as being ex-facie unconstitutional, arbitrary, in colourable exercise of legislative power, and offensive to basic structure of Constitution - Whether 'Finance Act, 2017' insofar as it amended certain other enactments and altered conditions of service of persons manning different Tribunals could be termed as a 'money bill' under Article 110 and consequently was validly enacted - If the answer to the above was in the affirmative then Whether Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 was unconstitutional on account of Excessive Delegation - If Section 184 was valid, Whether Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 were in consonance with Principal Act and various decisions of this Court on functioning of Tribunals - Whether there should be a Single Nodal Agency for administration of all Tribunals - Whether there was a need for conducting a Judicial Impact Assessment of all Tribunals in India - Whether judges of Tribunals set up by Acts of Parliament under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution can be equated in 'rank' and 'status' with Constitutional functionaries - Whether direct statutory appeals from Tribunals to the Supreme Court ought to be detoured - Whether there was a need for amalgamation of existing Tribunals and setting up of benches. Facts: The present lead matter was filed by Rojer Mathew, assailing the final judgment and order of the High Court of Kerala. The Petitioner had originally approached the High Court challenging the constitutional validity of Section 13 (5-A) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest (SARFAESI) Act, 2002 which permits secured creditors to participate in auction of immoveable property if it remained unsold for want of reserve bid in an earlier auction. Rojer Mathew claimed that the aforementioned provision violated his rights Under Article 300A and Article 14 of the Constitution, besides being in contravention of the Code of Civil Procedure which prohibits mortgagees from participating in auction of immovable property without prior Court permission. Held, while striking down Section 184 of Finance Act, 2017 Ranjan Gogoi, C.J.I. 1. It is apparent that the Legislature has not been provided with desired assistance so that it may rectify the anomalies which arise from provisions of direct appeal to the Supreme Court. Considering that such direct appeals have become serious impediments in the discharge of Constitutional functions by this Court and also affects access to justice for citizens, it is high time that the Union of India, in consultation with either the Law Commission or any other expert body, revisit such provisions under various enactments providing for direct appeals to the Supreme Court against orders of Tribunals, and instead provide appeals to Division Benches of High Courts, if at all necessary. Doing so would have myriad benefits. In addition to increasing affordability of justice and more effective Constitutional adjudication by this Court, it would also provide an avenue for High Court Judges to keep face with contemporaneous evolutions in law, and hence enrich them with adequate experience before they come to this Court. The Union is directed undertake such an exercise expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months at the maximum, and place the findings before Parliament for appropriate action as may be deemed fit.[223] 2. While seeking a 'Judicial Impact Assessment' of all existing Tribunals, counsels for Petitioners/Appellant(s) have underscored the exorbitant pendency before of a number of Tribunals like the CESTAT and ITAT, which they claim affects the very objective of tribunalisation. On the other hand, they also highlight an incongruity wherein numerous Tribunals are hardly seized of any matters, and are exclusively situated in one location.[224] 3. As noted by this Court on numerous occasions, including in Madras Bar Association (2014), although it is the prerogative of the Legislature to set up alternate avenues for dispute resolution to supplement the functioning of existing Courts, it is essential that such mechanisms are equally effective, competent and accessible. Given that jurisdiction of High Courts and District Courts is affected by the constitution of Tribunals, it is necessary that benches of the Tribunals be established across the country. However, owing to the small number of cases, many of these Tribunals do not have the critical mass of cases required for setting up of multiple benches. On the other hand, it is evident that other Tribunals are pressed for resources and personnel.[225] 4. This 'imbalance' in distribution of case-load and inconsistencies in nature, location and functioning of Tribunals require urgent attention. It is essential that after conducting a Judicial Impact Assessment as directed earlier, such 'niche' Tribunals be amalgamated with others dealing with similar areas of law, to ensure effective utilisation of resources and to facilitate access to justice.[226] 5. Union is directed to rationalise and amalgamate the existing Tribunals depending upon their case-load and commonality of subject-matter after conducting a Judicial Impact Assessment, in line with the recommendation of the Law Commission of India in its 272nd Report. Additionally, the Union must ensure that, at the very least, circuit benches of all Tribunals are set up at the seats of all major jurisdictional High Courts.[227] 6. The issue and question of Money Bill, as defined Under Article 110(1) of the Constitution, and certification accorded by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in respect of Part-XIV of the Finance Act, 2017 is referred to a larger Bench. Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 does not suffer from excessive delegation of legislative functions as there are adequate principles to guide framing of delegated legislation, which would include the binding dictums of this Court. The Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualifications, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 suffer from various infirmities. These Rules formulated by the Central Government under Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 being contrary to the parent enactment and the principles envisaged in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court, are hereby struck down in entirety. The Central Government is accordingly directed to re-formulate the Rules strictly in conformity and in accordance with the principles delineated by this Court in R.K. Jain, L. Chandra Kumar, Madras Bar Association and Gujarat Urja Vikas Ltd. conjointly read with the observations made in the earlier part of this decision. The new set of Rules to be formulated by the Central Government shall ensure non-discriminatory and uniform conditions of service, including assured tenure, keeping in mind the fact that the Chairperson and Members appointed after retirement and those who are appointed from the Bar or from other specialised professions/services, constitute two separate and distinct homogeneous classes. It would be open to the Central Government to provide in the new set of Rules that the Presiding Officers or Members of the Statutory Tribunals shall not hold 'rank' and 'status' equivalent to that of the Judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts, as the case may be, only on the basis of drawing equal salary or other perquisites. There is a need-based requirement to conduct 'Judicial Impact Assessment' of all the Tribunals referable to the Finance Act, 2017 so as to analyse the ramifications of the changes in the framework of Tribunals as provided under the Finance Act, 2017. Thus, it is appropriate to issue a writ of mandamus to the Ministry of Law and Justice to carry out such 'Judicial Impact Assessment' and submit the result of the findings before the competent legislative authority. The Central Government in consultation with the Law Commission of India or any other expert body shall re-visit the provisions of the statutes referable to the Finance Act, 2017 or other Acts as listed in para 174 of this order and place appropriate proposals before the Parliament for consideration of the need to remove direct appeals to the Supreme Court from orders of Tribunals. A decision in this regard by the Union of India shall be taken within six months. The Union Government shall carry out an appropriate exercise for amalgamation of existing Tribunals adopting the test of homogeneity of the subject matters to be dealt with and thereafter constitute adequate number of Benches commensurate with the existing and anticipated volume of work.[228] 7. As the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities (Qualification, Experience and other Conditions of Service of Members) Rules, 2017 have been struck down and several directions have been issued vide the majority judgment for framing of fresh set of Rules, present Court, as an interim order, direct that appointments to the Tribunal/Appellate Tribunal and the terms and conditions of appointment shall be in terms of the respective statutes before the enactment of the Finance Bill, 2017. However, liberty is granted to the Union of India to seek modification of this order after they have framed fresh Rules in accordance with the majority judgment. However, in case any additional benefits concerning the salaries and emoluments have been granted under the Finance Act, they shall not be withdrawn and will be continued. These would equally apply to all new members.[229] 8. The present batch of matters is accordingly disposed of.[230] Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. 9. Part XIV of the Finance Act 2017 could not have been enacted in the form of a Money Bill. The Rules which have been framed pursuant of the Rule making power Under Section 184 are held to be unconstitutional. However, since during the pendency of these proceedings, certain steps were taken in pursuance of the interim orders and appointments have been made, we direct that those appointments shall not be affected by the declaration of unconstitutionality. The terms and conditions governing the personnel so appointed shall however abide by the parent enactments. Upon the declaration of unconstitutionality, the conditions specified in all corresponding aspects in the parent enactments shall continue to operate.[334] 10. This Court has repeatedly emphasised the need for setting up an independent statutory body to oversee the working of tribunals. Despite the directions issued by this Court in Chandra Kumar nearly two decades ago, no action has been taken by the legislature to put in place an umbrella organisation which would be tasked with addressing the drawbacks of the system to which we have adverted above. The lack of a single authority to ensure competence and uniform service conditions has led to a fragmented tribunal system that defeats the purpose for which the system was constituted. Moreover, the co-ordinating authority for all tribunals must be the Department of Justice. Vesting that function in individual ministries has led to haphazard evolution of the tribunal structure, besides posing serious dangers to the independence of tribunals.[335] 11. It is imperative that an overarching statutory organisation be constituted through legislative intervention to oversee the working of tribunals. We recommend the constitution of an independent statutory body called the "National Tribunals Commission"39 to oversee the selection process of members, criteria for appointment, salaries and allowances, introduction of common eligibility criteria, for removal of Chairpersons and Members as also for meeting the requirement of infrastructural and financial resources. The legislation should aim at prescribing uniform service conditions for members. The Commission should comprise the following members: (i) Three serving judges of the Supreme Court of India nominated by the Chief Justice of India; (ii) Two serving Chief Justices or judges of the High Court nominated by the Chief Justice of India; (iii) Two members to be nominated by the Central Government from amongst officers holding at least the rank to a Secretary to the Union Government: one of them shall be the Secretary to the Department of Justice who will be the ex-officio convener; and (iv) Two independent expert members to be nominated by the Union government in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.[336] 12. The senior-most among the Judges nominated by the Chief Justice of India shall be designated as the Chairperson of the NTC.[337] 13. While the setting up of the NTC is within the competence of the legislature, it must be ensured that the guidelines that have been laid down by this Court to ensure the independence and efficient functioning of the tribunal system in India are observed. The independence of judicial tribunals is an inviolable feature of the basic structure of the Constitution. The procedure of selection, appointment, removal of members and prescription of the service conditions of tribunal members determine the independence of the tribunals. As we have held, in preserving the independence of the tribunals as a facet of judicial independence, the adjudicatory body must be robust: subservient to none and accountable to the need to render justice in the context of specialized adjudication. This is reflected in the need for vigilance in guarding the independence of courts and tribunals.[338] 14. Competence, professionalism and specialisation are indispensable facets of a robust tribunal system designed to deliver specialised justice. The Commission must be vested with the power to oversee the administration of all tribunals established under the enactments of Parliament to ensure the adequate manning of the tribunals with the infrastructure and staff required to meet the exigencies of the system. The Union government should also consider formulating a law to ensure the constitution of an All India Tribunal Service governing the recruitment and conditions of service of the non-adjudicatory personnel for tribunals. At present, the administrative staff of the tribunals is by and large brought on deputation. The tribunals are woefully short of an adequate complement of trained administrative personnel. Hence, there is an urgent need to set up an All India Tribunal Service in the interests of the effective functioning of the tribunal system. Though the present judgment analyses the ambit of the word "only" in Article 110(1) and the interpretation of Sub-clauses (a) to (g) of Clause (1) of Article 110 and concludes that Part XIV of the Finance Act 2017 could not have been validly enacted as a Money Bill. The qualifications of members to tribunals constitute an essential legislative function and cannot be delegated. Tribunals have been conceptualized as specialized bodies with domain-specific knowledge expertise. Indispensable to this specialized adjudicatory function is the selection of members trained in their discipline. Keeping this in mind, the prescription of qualifications for members of tribunals is a legislative function in its most essential character. The qualifications for appointment to adjudicatory bodies determine the character of the body. The adjudicatory tribunals are intended to fulfil the objects of legislation enacted by Parliament, be it in the area of consumer protection, environmental adjudication, industrial disputes and in diverse aspects of economic regulation. Defining the qualifications necessary for appointment of members constitutes the core, the very essence of the tribunal. This is an essential legislative function and cannot be delegated to the Rule making authority of the central government. It is for the legislature to define the conditions which must be fulfilled for appointment after assessing the need for domain specific knowledge.[339] Deepak Gupta, J. 15. The decision of the Hon'ble Speaker of the House of People under Article 110 (3) of the Constitution is not beyond judicial review. If two views are possible then there can be no manner of doubt that the view of the Speaker must prevail. Keeping in view the lack of clarity as to what constitutes a Money Bill, the issue as to whether Part XIV of the Finance Act, 2017, is a Money Bill or not may be referred to a larger bench.[357] 16. There can be no doubt that Parliament is not expected to deal with all matters and it can delegate certain "non-essential" matters to the executive. Every condition need not be laid down by the Legislature.[358] 17. A 7-Judge Bench of this Court in Re Article 143, Constitution of India and Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc. held that, the legislature cannot be expected to legislate on all issues and has the power to delegate non-essential functions to a delegatee. At the same time, a close reading of the judgment indicates that it was clearly held that the "essential legislative functions" cannot be delegated. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that delegation of non-essential legislative functions can be done. Even to this there is a caveat. The legislature must have control and functional powers over the delegatee. One of the known methods of exercising such powers is for the delegatee to place the rules/orders passed by it in exercise of powers delegated to it before the legislature. There should always be legislative control over delegated legislation.[360] 18. An analysis of Section 184 clearly indicates that the Parliament has delegated to the Central Government the power to make Rules to provide for the qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and allowances, resignation, removal and other terms and conditions of the Chairpersons/Members of the tribunals. The issue before us is whether by doing so Parliament has delegated "essential legislative functions" and whether Parliament has retained any control.[365] 19. Present Court in the present case dealing with the appointment of Chairpersons/Members to various Tribunals. They are enjoined upon to discharge a constitutional function of delivering justice to the people. What should be the essential qualifications and attributes of persons selected to man such high posts is, an essential part of legislative functions. Constitution could not have provided that the qualifications of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India or of the High Courts could be fixed by the Government. If these tribunals are to replace the High Courts, why should the same principles not apply to them. Laying down the qualifications of the persons eligible to hold these high posts was an essential aspect of the legislation keeping in view the importance of the tribunals, the importance of Rule of law and the importance of an independent and fearless judiciary.[358] 20. As far as providing the qualifications for appointment are concerned, these qualifications have to be provided in the legislation and could not be delegated. However, as far as the other terms and conditions such as pay and allowances are concerned, these can be delegated.[367] 21. For the sake of argument, even if it was to be said that laying down the qualifications is not an essential function then also, in view of the law laid down by this Court, the guidelines should have been found in the legislation itself. It is paradoxical that there are no guidelines for the essential qualifications, even though there are some guidelines with regard to the terms and conditions of services of Chairpersons/Members of the Tribunals.[368] 22. The previous enactments were repealed in so far as matters covered by Part XIV of the Finance Act are concerned. Therefore, it cannot be expected that the delegatee would again refer to the repealed enactments to seek the guidelines for fixing the terms and conditions, etc. of those to be appointed as Chairpersons/Members. If we exclude the judgments of this Court and the terms and conditions laid down in the repealed enactments then there are no guidelines whatsoever left for the delegatee to fall back on. The Finance Act provides no guidelines in this regard. It is absolutely silent with regard to the qualification, the eligibility criteria, experience etc. required for those who are to be appointed as Chairpersons/Members of the Tribunals. These powers have been delegated to the government.[370] 23. There being no guidelines, unfettered and unguided powers have been vested in the delegatee and, therefore, in my opinion, there is excessive delegation. As such Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 insofar as it delegates the powers to lay down the qualifications of Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, President, Vice-President, Presiding Officer or Member of the Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal or, as the case may be, other Authorities as specified in column (2) of the Eighth Schedule, suffers from the vice of excessive delegation and is accordingly struck down.[371] 24. There are various reasons why there should be one nodal agency. Tribunals are facing many problems like lack of manpower, very few benches, vacancies lying unfilled for long period, financial dependence on the department which may be litigating before the tribunal etc. These are ills which can be avoided if Tribunals fall under one umbrella organisation. One umbrella organisation will be better equipped to understand the problems faced by all the Tribunals. This could lead to standardization of Tribunals and a uniform approach to the needs of each tribunal. A large number of tribunals, especially those cast with the duty of discharging adjudicatory functions have been constituted with a view to replace the courts and in many cases the jurisdiction earlier exercised by the High Courts has been vested in such tribunals. It is, therefore, imperative that these tribunals must be manned by persons of impeccable integrity, high intellect and having vast experience in the field in which they will exercise jurisdiction. These tribunals also must have functional autonomy. This cannot be achieved unless there is a nodal body which shall look after the administrative needs of the tribunals. For more than 2 decades the Government has not thought it fit to comply with the 7-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar. These matters cannot be permitted to linger on indefinitely. Therefore, in my view, a direction must be given to the Government to set up a single nodal agency within a period of 6 months from today till which time the present system may continue. Merely giving financial autonomy to the tribunals will not do away with the need of having one common umbrella organisation to supervise all the tribunals.[375] 25. Even without carrying out any judicial impact assessment it is clear, as held in Madras Bar Association, 2010 that, tribunals in India have unfortunately not achieved full independence. When tribunals are established, they depend upon the sponsoring department for funds, infrastructure and even space for functioning. Administrative members of the tribunal are, more often than not, drawn from this department. This strikes at the very root of judicial independence because the biggest litigant or stakeholder itself becomes part and parcel of the adjudicating body which is supposed to be free, independent and fearless.[376] 26. An attempt should be made to do away with filing of first appeal as a matter of right to the Supreme Court. At present, at least 2 dozen statues provide for appeals directly to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court becomes a Court of first appeal which is highly avoidable. If the jurisdiction of the High Courts is bypassed by providing for appeals directly to the Supreme Court, soon a stage will come when we will have no High Court Judges who would have heard matters in various jurisdictions. It would be virtually impossible for them to handle such matters in the Supreme Court where the tenure of a Judge is on an average only about 4 years.[390] 27. The Judicial Impact Assessment Committee can also after assessment recommend that some tribunal(s) should be wound up and the jurisdiction of that tribunal(s) be given back to civil courts or to the High Courts or to some other tribunal. It can also suggest the merger of two or more tribunals.[391] 28. The next issue is who should carry out the judicial impact assessment. The Judicial Impact Assessment Committee should comprise of two retired judges of the Supreme Court, the senior being the Chairperson of the Committee, and one retired Chief Justice of a High Court all three to be nominated by the Chief Justice of India. Out of the three at least two should have been the Chairperson or members of tribunals. Two members of the Executive, not below the rank of Secretary, to the Government of India, one from the Ministry of Law and Justice and one from some other branch can also be members but these members should be appointed in consultation with the Chief Justice of India.[392] 29. The last issue is whether there should be a Commission or a body to oversee the appointment of members of various tribunals. It is necessary to have such a Commission which is itself an independent body manned by honest and competent persons. This body is required to select those persons who man the specialised tribunals in terms of the law laid down in various judgments of this Court.[393] 30. Serving Judges of the Supreme Court or the Chief Justice of the High Courts are already overburdened and have no time to spare. It would be much better, if they could spend their time and energy in filling up the vacancies in the High Courts rather than venturing into the field of tribunals.[394] 31. Having a very large committee would not serve the purpose. A smaller committee comprising of competent people is a better solution and, such commission should comprise of 2 retired Supreme Court Judges with the senior most being the Chairman and one retired Chief Justice of High Court to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India. There must be one member representing the executive to be nominated by the Central Government from amongst officers holding the rank of Secretary to the Government of India or equivalent. This member shall be the ex-officio convener. One expert member can be co-opted by the by full time members. This expert member must have expertise and experience in the field/jurisdiction covered by the tribunal to which appointments are to be made.[395] Industry: Banks Rojer Mathew vs. South Indian Bank Ltd. and Ors. (13.11.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/1563/2019


CENTRAL PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER, SUPREME COURT OF INDIA-v.- SUBHASH CHANDRA AGARWAL

2020(1)BLJ1 2020 (1) CCC 138 2019 (5) KHC 499 (2019)8MLJ222 MANU/SC/1561/2019 2019(16)SCALE40 (2020)5SCC481

Case Note: Right to Information - Transparency in judiciary - Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005 - Present judgment would decide appeals preferred by the Central Public Information Officer ('CPIO'), Supreme Court of India and Secretary General, Supreme Court of India, against common Respondent, and seeks to answer question as to 'how transparent was transparent enough' under Right to Information Act, 2005 ('RTI Act') in context of collegium system for appointment and elevation of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts; declaration of assets by judges, etc. - Whether concept of independence of judiciary required and demanded prohibition of furnishing of information sought - Whether information sought for amounted to interference in functioning of the Judiciary - Whether information sought for could not be furnished to avoid any erosion in credibility of decisions and to ensure a free and frank expression of honest opinion by all constitutional functionaries, which was essential for effective consultation and for taking the right decision - Whether information sought for was exempt under Section 8(1)(j) of RTI Act. Facts: Present judgment would decide appeals preferred by the Central Public Information Officer ('CPIO'), Supreme Court of India and Secretary General, Supreme Court of India, against the common Respondent, and seeks to answer the question as to 'how transparent is transparent enough' under the RTI Act in the context of collegium system for appointment and elevation of judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts; declaration of assets by judges, etc. The Appellants have contended that disclosure of the information sought would impede the independence of judges as it fails to recognise the unique position of the judiciary within the framework of the Constitution which necessitates that the judges ought not to be subjected to 'litigative public debate' and such insulation is constitutional, deliberate and essential to the effective functioning of the institution. Right to information is not an unfettered constitutional right, albeit a right available within the framework of the RTI Act, which means that the right is subject, among other conditions, to the exclusions, restrictions and conditions listed in the Second Schedule and in Sections 8 to 11 of the RTI Act. Held, while disposing of the appeal Sanjiv Khanna, J. 1. Ordinarily the relationship between the Chief Justice and judges would not be that of a fiduciary and a beneficiary. However, it is not an absolute rule/code for in certain situations and acts, fiduciary relationship may arise. Whether or not such a relationship arises in a particular situation would have to be dealt with on the tests and parameters enunciated above.[35] 2. If one's right to know is absolute, then the same may invade another's right to privacy and breach confidentiality, and, therefore, the former right has to be harmonised with the need for personal privacy, confidentiality of information and effective governance. The RTI Act captures this interplay of the competing rights under Clause (j) to Section 8(1) and Section 11. While Clause (j) to Section 8(1) refers to personal information as distinct from information relating to public activity or interest and seeks to exempt disclosure of such information, as well as such information which, if disclosed, would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of an individual, unless public interest warrants its disclosure, Section 11 exempts the disclosure of 'information or record...which relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party'. By differently wording and inditing the challenge that privacy and confidentiality throw to information rights, the RTI Act also recognises the interconnectedness, yet distinctiveness between the breach of confidentiality and invasion of privacy, as the former is broader than the latter, as will be noticed below.[36] 3. Section 11 is not merely procedural but also a substantive provision which applies when the PIO intends to disclose information that relates to or has been supplied by a third party and has been treated as confidential by that third party. It requires the PIO to issue notice to the third party who may make submission in writing or orally, which submission has to be kept in view while taking a decision. Proviso to Section 11(1) applies in all cases except trade or commercial secrets protected by law. Pertinently, information including trade secrets, intellectual property rights, etc. are governed by Clause (d) to Sub-section (1) of Section 8 and Section 9 of the RTI Act. In all other cases, where the information relates to or has been supplied by the third party and treated as confidential by that third party, disclosure in terms of the proviso may be allowed where the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interest of the third party. Confidentiality is protected and preserved in law because the public interest requires such protection. It helps and promotes free communication without fear of retaliation. However, public interest in protecting confidentiality is subject to three well-known exceptions. The first exception being a public interest in the disclosure of iniquity for there cannot be any loss of confidentiality involving a wrongdoing. Secondly, there cannot be any public interest when the public has been misled. Thirdly, the principle of confidentiality does not apply when the disclosure relates to matters of public concern, which expression is vastly different from news value or news to satiate public curiosity. Public concern relates to matters which are an integral part of free speech and expression and entitlement of everyone to truth and fair comment about it. There are certain circumstances where the public interest in maintaining confidentiality may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure and, thus, in common law, it may not be treated by the courts as confidential information. These aspects would be relevant under the proviso to Section 11(1) of the RTI Act.[61] 4. Proviso to Section 11(1) of the RTI Act is a statutory recognition of three exceptions and more when it incorporates public interest test. It states that information, otherwise treated confidential, can be disclosed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the possible harm and injury to the interest of such a third party. The expression 'third party' has been defined in Clause (n) to Section 2 to mean a person other than the citizen making a request for information and includes a public authority. Thus, the scope of 'information' under Section 11 is much broader than that of Clause (j) to Section 8 (1), as it could include information that is personal as well as information that concerns the government and its working, among others, which relates to or is supplied by a third party and treated as confidential. Third-party could include any individual, natural or juristic entity including the public authority.[62] 5. Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act prescribes the requirement of satisfaction of 'larger public interest' for access to information when the information relates to personal information having no relationship with any public activity or interest, or would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy of the individual. Proviso to Section 11(1) states that except in case of trade or commercial secrets protected by law, disclosure may be allowed if the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance any possible harm or injury to the interest of the third party. The words 'possible harm or injury' to the interest of the third party is preceded by the word 'importance' for the purpose of comparison. 'Possible' in the context of the proviso does not mean something remote, far-fetched or hypothetical, but a calculable, foreseeable and substantial possibility of harm and injury to the third party.[72] 6. Comparison or balancing exercise of competing public interests has to be undertaken in both sections, albeit under Section 8(1)(j) the comparison is between public interest behind the exemption, that is personal information or invasion of privacy of the individual and public interest behind access to information, whereas the test prescribed by the proviso to Section 11(1) is somewhat broader and wider as it requires comparison between disclosure of information relating to a third person or information supplied and treated as confidential by the third party and possible harm or injury to the third party on disclosure, which would include all kinds of 'possible' harm and injury to the third party on disclosure.[73] 7. Public interest has no relationship and is not connected with the number of individuals adversely affected by the disclosure which may be small and insignificant in comparison to the substantial number of individuals wanting disclosure. It will vary according to the information sought and all circumstances of the case that bear upon the public interest in maintaining the exemptions and those in disclosing the information must be accounted for to judge the right balance. Public interest is not immutable and even time-gap may make a significant difference. The type and likelihood of harm to the public interest behind the exemption and public interest in disclosure would matter. The delicate balance requires identification of public interest behind each exemption and then cumulatively weighing the public interest in accepting or maintaining the exemption(s) to deny information in a particular case against the public interest in disclosure in that particular case. Further, under Section 11(1), reference is made to the 'possible' harm and injury to the third party which will also have to be factored in when determining disclosure of confidential information relating to the third parties.[78] 8. The last aspect in the context of public interest test would be in the form of clarification as to the effect of Sub-section (2) to Section 6 of the RTI Act which does not require the information seeker to give any reason for making a request for the information. Clearly, 'motive' and 'purpose' for making the request for information is irrelevant, and being extraneous cannot be a ground for refusing the information. However, this is not to state that 'motive' and 'purpose' may not be relevant factor while applying the public interest test in case of qualified exemptions governed by the public interest test. It is in this context that this Court in Aditya Bandopadhyay has held that beneficiary cannot be denied personal information relating to him. Similarly, in other cases, public interest may weigh in favour of the disclosure when the information sought may be of special interest or special significance to the applicant. It could equally be a negative factor when the 'motive' and 'purpose' is vexatious or it is a case of clear abuse of law.[79] 9. In the RTI Act, in the absence of any positive indication as to the considerations which the PIO has to bear in mind while making a decision, the legislature had intended to vest a general discretion in the PIO to weigh the competing interests, which is to be limited only by the object, scope and purpose of the protection and the right to access information and in Section 11(1), the 'possible' harm and injury to the third party. It imports a discretionary value judgment on the part of the PIO and the appellate forums as it mandates that any conclusion arrived at must be fair and just by protecting each right which is required to be upheld in public interest. There is no requirement to take a fortiori view that one trumps the other.[80] 10. It cannot be doubted and debated that the independence of the judiciary is a matter of ennobled public concern and directly relates to public welfare and would be one of the factors to be taken into account in weighing and applying the public interest test. Thus, when the public interest demands the disclosure of information, judicial independence has to be kept in mind while deciding the question of exercise of discretion. Reference to the principle of judicial independence is not to undermine and avoid accountability which is an aspect present Court perceive and believe has to be taken into account while examining the public interest in favour of disclosure of information. Judicial independence and accountability go hand in hand as accountability ensures, and is a facet of judicial independence. Further, while applying the proportionality test, the type and nature of the information is a relevant factor. Distinction must be drawn between the final opinion or resolutions passed by the collegium with regard to appointment/elevation and transfer of judges with observations and indicative reasons and the inputs/data or details which the collegium had examined. The rigour of public interest in divulging the input details, data and particulars of the candidate would be different from that of divulging and furnishing details of the output, that is the decision. In the former, public interest, test would have to be applied keeping in mind the fiduciary relationship (if it arises), and also the invasion of the right to privacy and breach of the duty of confidentiality owed to the candidate or the information provider, resulting from the furnishing of such details and particulars. The position represents a principled conflict between various factors in favour of disclosure and those in favour of withholding of information. Transparency and openness in judicial appointments juxtaposed with confidentiality of deliberations remain one of the most delicate and complex areas. Clearly, the position is progressive as well as evolving as steps have been taken to make the selection and appointment process more transparent and open. Notably, there has been a change after concerns were expressed on disclosure of the names and the reasons for those who had not been approved. The position will keep forging new paths by taking into consideration the experiences of the past and the aspirations of the future. The public interest test would be applied to weigh the scales and on balance determine whether information should be furnished or would be exempt. Therefore, a universal affirmative or negative answer is not possible. However, independence of judiciary is a matter of public interest.[88] 11. In view of discussion, Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010 is dismissed and judgment dated 12th January, 2010 of the Delhi High Court which had upheld the order passed by the CIC directing the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to furnish information on the judges of the Supreme Court who had declared their assets is confirmed. Such disclosure would not, in any way, impinge upon the personal information and right to privacy of the judges. The fiduciary relationship Rule in terms of Clause (e) to Section 8(1) of the RTI Act is inapplicable. It would not affect the right to confidentiality of the judges and their right to protect personal information and privacy, which would be the case where details and contents of personal assets in the declaration are called for and sought, in which event the public interest test as applicable vide Section 8(1)(j) and proviso to Section 11 (1) of the RTI Act would come into operation.[89] 12. As far as Civil Appeal Nos. 10045 of 2010 and 10044 of 2010 are concerned, they are to be partly allowed with an order of remit to the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to re-examine the matter after following the procedure Under Section 11(1) of the RTI Act as the information relates to third parties. Before a final order is passed, the concerned third parties are required to be issued notice and heard as they are not a party before us. While deciding the question of disclosure on remit, the CPIO, Supreme Court of India would follow the observations made in the present judgment by keeping in view the objections raised, if any, by the third parties. The reference and the appeals are accordingly disposed of.[90] N.V. Ramana, J. 13. It must be kept in the mind that the transparency cannot be allowed to run to its absolute, considering the fact that efficiency is equally important principle to be taken into fold. Right to information should not be allowed to be used as a tool of surveillance to scuttle effective functioning of judiciary. While applying the second step the concerned authority needs to balance these considerations as well.[133] 14. It is to be noted that, following non-exhaustive considerations needs to be considered while assessing the 'public interest' Under Section 8 of the RTI Act- a. Nature and content of the information b. Consequences of non-disclosure; dangers and benefits to public c. Type of confidential obligation. d. Beliefs of the confidant; reasonable suspicion e. Party to whom information is disclosed f. Manner in which information acquired g. Public and private interests h. Freedom of expression and proportionality.[135] 15. N.V. Ramana, J. concurred with the conclusions reached by the majority.[135] Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. 16. The information sought by the Respondent pertains to (1) the correspondence and file notings relating to the elevation of three judges to the Supreme Court, (2) information relating to the declaration of assets made by judges pursuant to the 1997 resolution, and (3) the identity and nature of disciplinary proceedings instituted against the lawyer and judge named in the newspaper report. The third referral question requires this Court to determine whether the disclosure of the information sought is exempt under Clause (j) of Clause (1) of Section 8. In arriving at a determination on whether the information sought is exempt under Clause (j), it is necessary to (i) determine whether the information sought is "personal information" and engages the right to privacy, (ii) identify, in the facts of the present case, the specific heads of public interest in favour of disclosure and the specific privacy interests claimed, (iii) determine the justifications for restricting such interests and (iv) apply the principle of proportionality to ensure that no right is abridged more than required to fulfil the legitimate aim of the countervailing right. The process under Section 11 of the RTI must be complied with where the information sought is 'third party information'. The substantive content of the terms 'personal information' and 'public interest' have also been set out in the present judgment.[250] 17. The information sought in Civil Appeal No. 2683 with respect to which judges of the Supreme Court have declared their assets does not constitute the "personal information" of the judges and does not engage the right to privacy. The contents of the declaration of assets would fall within the meaning of "personal information" and the test set out under Clause (j) of Clause (1) of Section 8 would be applicable along with the procedure Under Section 11 of the RTI Act. In view of the above observations, Civil Appeal No. 2683 of 2010 is dismissed and the judgment of the Delhi High Court is upheld.[251] 18. Civil Appeals Nos. 10044 and 1045 of 2010 are remanded to the CPIO, Supreme Court of India to be examined and a determination arrived at, after applying the principles set out in the present judgment. The information sought in these appeals falls within the meaning of 'third party information' and the procedure under Section 11 must be complied with in arriving at a determination. Brother Justice Sanjiv Khanna has observed that: Transparency and openness in judicial appointments juxtaposed with confidentiality of deliberations remain one of the most delicate and complex areas. Clearly, the position is progressive as well as evolving as steps have been taken to make the selection and appointment process more transparent and open. Notably, there has been a change after concerns were expressed on disclosure of the names and the reasons for those who had not been approved. The position will keep forging new paths by taking into consideration the experiences of the past and the aspirations of the future. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud wish to add a few thoughts on the subject. The collegium owes its birth to judicial interpretation. In significant respects, the collegium is a victim of its own birth - pangs. Bereft of information pertaining to both the criteria governing the selection and appointment of judges to the higher judiciary and the application of those criteria in individual cases, citizens have engaged the constitutional right to information, facilitated by the RTI Act. If the content of the right and the enforcement of the statute are to possess a meaningful dimension in their application to the judiciary - as it must, certain steps are necessary. Foremost among them is that the basis for the selection and appointment of judges to the higher judiciary must be defined and placed in the public realm. This is the procedure which is followed in making appointments but also in terms of the substantive norms which are adopted while making judicial appointments. There can be no denying the fact that there is a vital element of public interest in knowing about the norms which are taken into consideration in selecting candidates for higher judicial officer and making judicial appointments. Knowledge is a powerful instrument which secures consistency in application and generates the confidence that is essential to the sanctity of the process of judicial appointments. This is essentially because the collegium system postulates that proposals for appointment of judges are initiated by the judges themselves. Essential substantial norms in regard to judicial appointments include: (i) The basis on which performance of a member of the Bar is evaluated for the purpose of higher judicial office; (ii) The criteria which are applied in determining whether a member of the Bar fulfils requirements in terms of: a) Experience as reflected in the quantum and nature of the practice; b) Domain specialization in areas which are geared to the evolving nature of litigation and the requirements of each court; c) Income requirements, if any, having regard to the nature of the practice and the circumstances prevailing in the court or region concerned; d) The commitment demonstrated by a candidate under consideration to the development of the law in terms of written work, research and academic qualifications; and e) The social orientation of the candidate, defined in terms of the extent of pro bono or legal aid work; (iii) The need for promoting the role of the judiciary as an inclusive institution and its diversity in terms of gender, representation to minorities and the marginalised, orientation and other relevant factors. The present judgment does not seek to define what the standards for judicial appointments should be. However, what needs to be emphasised is that the substantive standards which are borne in mind must be formulated and placed in the public realm as a measure that would promote confidence in the appointments process. Due publicity to the norms which have been formulated and are applied would foster a degree of transparency and promote accountability in decision making at all levels within the judiciary and the government. The norms may also spell out the criteria followed for assessing the judges of the district judiciary for higher judicial office. There is a vital public interest in disclosing the basis on which those with judicial experience are evaluated for elevation to higher judicial office particularly having regard to merit, integrity and judicial performance. Placing the criteria followed in making judicial appointments in the public domain will fulfil the purpose and mandate of Section 4 of the RTI Act, engender public confidence in the process and provides a safeguard against extraneous considerations entering into the process.[252] Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (13.11.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/1561/2019


COMMITTEE OF CREDITORS OF ESSAR STEEL INDIA LIMITED THROUGH AUTHORISED SIGNATORY-v.-SATISH KUMAR GUPTA & ORS.

II(2021)BC258(SC) [2020]219CompCas97(SC) (2020)1CompLJ1(SC) [2019]153CLA275(SC) 2019 (4) CCC 410 (2019)8MLJ524 MANU/SC/1577/2019 2019(16)SCALE319 (2020)8SCC531

Case Note: Company - Resolution plan - Maintainability thereof - National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) admitted Company Petition and resolution professional was appointed - Resolution professional invited expressions of interest from all interested resolution applicants to present resolution plans for rehabilitating corporate debtor -Resolution plans were submitted and NCLT, allow resolution plan filed by company - On appeal against said order, Appellate Tribunal held that in resolution plan there can be no difference between financial creditor and operational creditor in matter of payment of dues, and that therefore, financial creditors and operational creditors deserve equal treatment under resolution plan - It was also held that operational creditors by definition had separate classes within themselves and could be classified into sub-classes for purpose of distribution on basis of admitted amounts - Further, it was held that Committee of Creditors had not been empowered to decide manner in which distribution was to be made between one or other creditors and financial Creditors in whose favour guarantees were executed, as their total claim stands satisfied to the extent of guarantee, could not re-agitate such claims as against principal borrower - Hence, present appeal - Whether impugned order passed by Appellate Tribunal in respect of resolution plan for rehabilitating corporate debtor warrant any interference. Facts: National Company Law Tribunal admitted Company Petition and resolution professional was appointed. The resolution professional invited expressions of interest from all interested resolution applicants to present resolution plans for rehabilitating the corporate debtor. The resolution plans were submitted and NCLT, allow resolution plan filed by company. Appeal was filed against said order of NCLT. The Appellate Tribunal held that in a resolution plan there could be no difference between a financial creditor and an operational creditor in the matter of payment of dues, and that therefore, financial creditors and operational creditors deserve equal treatment under a resolution plan. Accordingly, the NCLAT has re-distributed the proceeds payable under the approved resolution plan. Securities and security interest was irrelevant at the stage of resolution for the purposes of allocation of payments. Operational creditors by definition had separate classes within themselves and can be classified into sub-classes for the purpose of distribution on the basis of the admitted amounts. Further, it was also held that the Committee of Creditors has not been empowered to decide the manner in which the distribution was to be made between one or other creditors, as there would be a conflict of interest between financial and operational creditors, financial creditors favouring themselves to the detriment of operational creditors and financial Creditors in whose favour guarantees were executed, as their total claim stands satisfied to the extent of the guarantee, could not re-agitate such claims as against the principal borrower. Held, while allowing the appeal: (i) Indeed, by vesting the Committee of Creditors with the discretion of accepting resolution plans only with financial creditors, operational creditors having no vote, the Code itself differentiates between the two types of creditors for the reasons given above. Further, as had been reflected in case of Swiss Ribbons, most financial creditors are secured creditors, whose security interests must be protected in order that they do not go ahead and realise their security in legal proceedings, but instead are incentivised to act within the framework of the Code as persons who will resolve stressed assets and bring a corporate debtor back to its feet. Argument that the expression secured creditor did not find mention in Chapter II of the Code, which deals with the resolution process, and was only found in Chapter III, which deals with liquidation, was for the reason that secured creditors as a class were subsumed in the class of financial creditors, as has been held in Swiss Ribbons). Indeed, Regulation 13(1) of the 2016 Regulations mandates that when the resolution professional verifies claims, the security interest of secured creditors was also looked at and gets taken care of. Similarly, Regulation 36(2)(d) when it provides for a list of creditors and the amounts claimed by them in the information memorandum (which was to be submitted to prospective resolution applicants), also provides for the amount of claims admitted and security interest in respect of such claims. Under Regulation 39(4), the compliance certificate of the resolution professional as to the CIRP being successful was contained in Form H to the Regulations. Secured and unsecured financial creditors were differentiated when it comes to amounts to be paid under a resolution plan, together with what dissenting secured or unsecured financial creditors are to be paid. And, most importantly, operational creditors are separately viewed from these secured and unsecured financial creditors. Thus, it could be seen that the Code and the Regulations, read as a whole, together with the observations of expert bodies and this Court's judgment, all lead to the conclusion that the equality principle could not be stretched to treating unequals equally, as that would destroy the very objective of the Code-to resolve stressed assets. Equitable treatment is to be accorded to each creditor depending upon the class to which it belongs secured or unsecured, financial or operational. [57] (ii) It was difficult to accept argument that that part of the resolution plan which states that the claims of the guarantor on account of subrogation shall be extinguished, could not be applied to the guarantees furnished by the erstwhile directors of the corporate debtor. So far as the present case was concerned, this court hasten to add that this court were saying nothing which may affect the pending litigation on account of invocation of these guarantees. However, the NCLAT judgment being contrary to Section 31(1) of the Code and this Court's judgment in State Bank of India, was set aside. [66] (iii) The impugned NCLAT judgment in holding that claims that may exist apart from those decided on merits by the resolution professional and by the Adjudicating Authority/Appellate Tribunal could now be decided by an appropriate forum in terms of Section 60(6) of the Code, also militates against the rationale of Section 31 of the Code. A successful resolution Applicant could not suddenly be faced with undecided claims after the resolution plan submitted by him has been accepted as this would amount to a hydra head popping up which would throw into uncertainty amounts payable by a prospective resolution Applicant who successfully take over the business of the corporate debtor. All claims must be submitted to and decided by the resolution professional so that a prospective resolution Applicant knows exactly what has to be paid in order that it may then take over and run the business of the corporate debtor. This the successful resolution Applicant did on a fresh slate. Thus, the NCLAT judgment must also be set aside on this count. [67] (iv) The other argument that Section 53 of the Code would be applicable only during liquidation and not at the stage of resolving insolvency was correct. Section 30(2)(b) of the Code refers to Section 53 not in the context of priority of payment of creditors, but only to provide for a minimum payment to operational creditors. However, this again did not in any manner limit the Committee of Creditors from classifying creditors as financial or operational and as secured or unsecured. Full freedom and discretion had been given, to the Committee of Creditors to so classify creditors and to pay secured creditors amounts which could be based upon the value of their security, which they would otherwise be able to realise outside the process of the Code, thereby stymying the corporate resolution process itself. [92] (v) The other argument based upon serious conflict of interest between secured and unsecured financial creditors, as the majority may get together to ride roughshod over the minority, is an argument which flies in the face of the majority of financial creditors being given complete discretion over feasibility and viability of resolution plans, which includes the manner of distribution of debts that was contained in them, subject to following the provisions of the Code relating, inter alia, to dealing with the interests of all stakeholders including operational creditors. The Committee of Creditors did not act in any fiduciary capacity to any group of creditors. On the contrary, it was to take a business decision based upon ground realities by a majority, which then binds all stakeholders, including dissentient creditors. It was important to note that the original threshold required by way of majority was seventy five percent. It was during the working of the Code that this was found to be unrealistic and therefore reduced to see the amendments made to Section 28(3) and 30(4) of the Code by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act of 2018. [93] (vi) The NCLAT judgment which substitutes its wisdom for the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors and which also directs the admission of a number of claims which was done by the resolution applicant, without prejudice to its right to appeal against the said judgment, must therefore be set aside. [94] Industry: Metals Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta and Ors. (15.11.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/1577/2019


M/S SHANTI CONDUCTORS (P) LTD.-v.-ASSAM STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD AND ORS

Case No2020(212)AIC80 2020 (141) ALR 791 2020(I)CLR(SC)530 2021(2)ICC332 MANU/SC/1778/2019 2020 149 RD344 (2020)2SCC677te

: Case Note: Civil - Barred by time - Maintainability of suit - Respondent had issued supply orders to Petitioner for supply of aluminium electrical conductors - Petitioner completed supply in pursuance of supply orders - Money Suit was filed by Petitioner in Court of Civil Judge for decree towards interest only on payment of principal amount, which had already been received by Petitioner - Trial court decreed money suit of Petitioner for sum with future interest - Appeal was filed by Petitioner against judgment of Trial court - Division Bench of High Court allowed appeal filed by Respondents and dismissed suit of Petitioner - Against judgment of Division Bench, appeal was filed by Petitioner which stand dismissed - Hence, present review petition - Whether there was any error in judgment of this Court holding that suit of Plaintiff was barred by time. Facts: The Respondent had issued supply orders to the Petitioner for supply of aluminium electrical conductors. The Petitioner completed supply in pursuance of the supply orders. A Money Suit was filed by the Petitioner in the Court for a decree of sum towards the interest only on the payment of the principal amount, which had already been received by the Petitioner. The trial court decreed the money suit of the Petitioner with future interest. The appeal was filed by the Petitioner against the judgment of the trial court. The Division Bench of the High Court allowed the appeal filed by the Respondents and dismissed the suit of the Petitioner. Against the judgment of the Division Bench, appeal was filed by the Petitioner which stand dismissed. Held, while dismissing the petition: (i) The proviso of Order 7 Rule 6, which had been added by Act 104 of 1976, which provided that the Court may permit the Plaintiff to claim exemption from the law of limitation on any ground not set out in the plaint, if such ground is not inconsistent with the grounds set out in the plaint. The proviso of Order 7 Rule 6 could not come to the rescue of the Plaintiff since, the Plaintiffs had specifically pleaded that the provisions of the Limitation Act were not applicable since Act, 1993 had overriding effect. The trial court in decreeing the suit of the Plaintiff had accepted the submission and had held that Limitation Act, 1963 was not applicable. [18] (ii) The plaint, which was a paragraph of cause of action for the suit, which refers to date beginning from the first supply order and date of last supply order, but cause of action was not claimed from the date when the last payment was received by the Petitioner. The Petitioner in the plaint had clearly not pleaded for benefit of Section 19 nor had brought necessary facts to enable the Court to consider the claim under Section 19 of Act. Thus, Petitioner was not entitled for benefit of Section 19 of the Limitation Act and there was no error in the judgment of this Court holding that the suit of the Plaintiff was barred by time. [19] (iii) The benefit of Section 14 of Limitation Act could not be claimed by the Plaintiff since writ petition, which was filed by the Association was by different entity. The question of benefit of Section 14 having been specifically considered and rejected by this Court in its judgment, there was no error apparent on the said ground. Moreover, present was a case where writ petition filed by Association was dismissed subsequent to filing of the suit by Plaintiff. Furthermore, after the judgment of the Single Judge Association had filed a writ appeal challenging the said judgment, which facts also detracts from fulfilling the conditions as required for extending the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. [20] Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. and Ors. vs. Assam State Electricity Board and Ors. (18.12.2019 - SC) : MANU/SC/1778/2019


KEISHAM MEGHACHANDRA SINGH-v.-THE HON’BLE SPEAKER MANIPUR LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY & ORS

2020(1)ALT299 MANU/SC/0062/2020 2020 (4) SCJ 41

Case Note: Election - Disqualification - Adjudication by speaker - Applications were filed for disqualification of Respondent No. 3 before Speaker of Legislative Assembly stating that Respondent No. 3 was disqualified under paragraph 2(1)(a) of Tenth Schedule - Since no action was taken by Speaker, writ petition was filed before High Court to direct Speaker to decide disqualification petition within reasonable time - High Court stated that as issue of whether High Court can direct Speaker to decide disqualification petition within certain timeframe was pending before Supreme Court - After waiting for certain period, Appellant filed writ petition before same High Court to declare that Respondent No. 3 had incurred disqualification for being member of Legislative Assembly - High Court declined to grant any relief in writ petition - Hence, present appeal - Whether disqualification petition of Respondent No.3 pending before speaker warrant any directions by this court. Facts: The Respondent No. 3, contested as a candidate and was duly elected in election of legislative assembly. Applications were filed for the disqualification of Respondent No. 3 were filed before the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly stating that Respondent No. 3 was disqualified under paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule. Since no action was taken on any of these petitions by the Speaker, writ petition was filed before the High Court in which the Petitioner prayed that the High Court direct the Speaker to decide his disqualification petition within a reasonable time. The High Court stated that as the issue of whether a High Court can direct a Speaker to decide a disqualification petition within a certain timeframe is pending before the Supreme Court the High Court could not pass any order in the matter, and the matter was ordered to be listed so as to await the outcome of the cases pending before the Supreme Court. After waiting for certain time, the Appellant, filed Writ Petition before the same High Court to declare that Respondent No. 3 has incurred disqualification for being a member of the Legislative Assembly. The High Court came to a finding that since the very same issue was pending before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to pass any order for the time being, which would include orders relating to the inaction or indecision on the part of the Speaker, as well as the issuing of a writ of quo warranto. Held, while allowing the appeal: (i) A reading of the decisions, shows that what was meant to be outside the pale of judicial review in Kihoto Hollohan case were quia timet actions in the sense of injunctions to prevent the Speaker from making a decision on the ground of imminent apprehended danger which will be irreparable in the sense that if the Speaker proceeds to decide that the person be disqualified, he would incur the penalty of forfeiting his membership of the House for a long period. Kihoto Hollohan case did not, therefore, in any manner, interdict judicial review in aid of the Speaker arriving at a prompt decision as to disqualification under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. Indeed, the Speaker, in acting as a Tribunal under the Tenth Schedule was bound to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period. What was reasonable would depend on the facts of each case, but absent exceptional circumstances for which there was good reason, a period of three months from the date on which the petition is filed is the outer limit within which disqualification petitions filed before the Speaker must be decided if the constitutional objective of disqualifying persons who have infracted the Tenth Schedule is to be adhered to. This period had been fixed keeping in mind the fact that ordinarily the life of the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assembly of the States is five years and the fact that persons who have incurred such disqualification did not deserve to be MPs/MLAs even for a single day, as found in Rajendra Singh Rana case, if they had infracted the provisions of the Tenth Schedule. [28] (ii) It was time that Parliament had a rethink on whether disqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority when such Speaker continues to belong to a particular political party either de jure or de facto. Parliament may seriously consider amending the Constitution to substitute the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies as arbiter of disputes concerning disqualification which arise under the Tenth Schedule with a permanent Tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court Judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court, or some other outside independent mechanism to ensure that such disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially, thus giving real teeth to the provisions contained in the Tenth Schedule, which are so vital in the proper functioning of our democracy. [30] (iii) It was not possible to accede to Appellant's submission that this Court issue a writ of quo warranto quashing the appointment of the Respondent No. 3 as a minister of a cabinet. A disqualification under the Tenth Schedule from being an MLA and consequently minister must first be decided by the exclusive authority in this behalf, namely, the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly. It was also not possible to accede to the argument of Appellant that the disqualification petition be decided by this Court in these appeals given the inaction of the Speaker. It could not be said that the facts in the present case were similar to the facts in Rajinder Singh Rana. In the present case, the life of the legislative assembly comes to an end only after certain period unlike in Rajinder Singh Rana case where, but for this Court deciding the disqualification petition in effect, no relief could have been given to the Petitioner in that case as the life of the legislative assembly was about to come to an end. The only relief that could be given in these appeals was that the Speaker of the Manipur Legislative Assembly be directed to decide the disqualification petitions pending before him within a period of four weeks from the date on which this judgment is intimated to him. In case no decision was forthcoming even after a period of four weeks, it would be open to any party to the proceedings to apply to this Court for further directions/reliefs in the matter. [31] Keisham Meghachandra Singh vs. The Hon'ble Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly and Ors. (21.01.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0062/2020


SUSHILA AGGARWAL AND OTHERS -v.- STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER

2020(209)AIC129 AIR2020SC831 2020ALLMR(Cri)497 2020 (111) ACC 528 2020(2)ACR1907 2020(2)ADJ322 2020(8)ADJ389 2020(2)BLJ186 2020(2)BomCR(Cri)1 2020(1)Crimes225(SC) 2020CriLJ1590 266(2020)DLT741 II(2021)DMC278SC 2020GLH(2)265 (2020)3GLR2303 ILR2020(1)Kerala517 2020(2)JLJ431 2020(1)J.L.J.R.480 2020(1)JKJ333[SC] 2020 (1) KHC 663 2020(1)KLT545 2020-2-LW(Crl)161 MANU/SC/0100/2020 2020(1)PLJR524 2020(1)RLW373(SC) 2020(1)RCR(Criminal)833 (2020)5SCC1 2018 (6) SCJ 12

Case Note: Criminal - Anticipatory bail - Determination of duration - Sections 167(2), 437(2),437(3), 438, 438(1), 438(2) and 439(2) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Present reference filed to determine duration of protection granted to person under Section 438 of Code should be limited to fixed period so as to enable person to surrender before Trial Court and seek regular bail - Whether anticipatory bail under Section 438 of Code should be limited to fixed period so as to enable person to surrender before Trial Court and seek regular bail and life of anticipatory bail should end at time and stage when Accused was summoned by court. Facts: In the light of the conflicting views of the different Benches of varying strength, the present reference had been filed to determine duration of protection granted to person under Section 438 of Code should be limited to fixed period so as to enable the person to surrender before Trial Court and seek regular bail. Held, while answering the reference: M.R. Shah, J. (i) The decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia holds the field for number of years and the same has been followed by all the Courts in the country. While granting anticipatory bail, normally conditions were imposed by the court/courts which as such are in consonance with the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Section 438(2) read with Section 437(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If breach of any of the above conditions is committed, the order of anticipatory bail would be cancelled. It would be open to the Investigating Officer to file an application for remand, and the concerned Magistrate would decide it on merits, without influenced by the grant of anticipatory bail order. However, in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre, despite the specific observations by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia that the normal Rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time, in other words in an appropriate case and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case and the stage at which the pre-arrest bail application was made, the court concerned can limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time, on absolute misreading of the judgment in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and just contrary to the observations made, an absolute proposition of law was laid down that the life of the order under Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure granting bail cannot be curtailed. Despite the clear cut observations made by the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, in the case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh, this Court had observed and held that the order of anticipatory bail has to be necessarily limit in time frame. In many cases subsequently the decision in the case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh had been followed, despite the specific observations made by the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia which, as such, were just contrary to the view taken in subsequent decisions in the cases of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre and Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh. At this stage, it was required to be noted that in the case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh, this Court had not at all considered the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia. It could not be disputed that the decision of this Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia was a Constitution Bench decision which was binding unless it was upset by a larger Bench than the Constitution Bench. Therefore, considering the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and the relevant observations, the decision of this Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre to the extent it takes the view that the life of the order under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be curtailed was not a correct law in light of the observations made by the Constitution Bench in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia. The decision of this Court in the case of Salauddin Abdulsamad Shaikh which takes an extreme view that the order of anticipatory bail had to be necessarily limited in time frame was also not a good law and is against and just contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, which was a Constitution Bench judgment. [7.4] (ii) Thus, considering the observations made by the Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, the court may, if there are reasons for doing so, limit the operation of the order to a short period only after filing of an FIR in respect of the matter covered by order and the applicant may in such case be directed to obtain an order of bail under Sections 437 or 439 of the Code within a reasonable short period after the filing of the FIR. The Constitution Bench had further observed that the same need not be followed as an invariable rule. It was further observed and held that normal Rule should be not to limit the operation of the order in relation to a period of time. The conditions could be imposed by the concerned court while granting pre-arrest bail order including limiting the operation of the order in relation to a period of time if the circumstances so warrant, more particularly the stage at which the anticipatory bail application was moved, namely, whether the same was at the stage before the FIR was filed or at the stage when the FIR was filed and the investigation was in progress or at the stage when the investigation was complete and the charge sheet was filed. However, the normal Rule should be not to limit the order in relation to a period of time. [7.5] S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (i) Where the Parliament wished to exclude or restrict the power of courts, under Section 438 of the Code, it did so in categorical terms. Parliament's omission to restrict the right of citizens, Accused of other offences from the right to seek anticipatory bail, necessarily leads one to assume that neither a blanket restriction can be read into by this Court, nor can inflexible guidelines in the exercise of discretion, be insisted upon-that would amount to judicial legislation. [63] (ii) There was no offence, per se, which stands excluded from the purview of Section 438, - except the offences mentioned in Section 438(4). In other words, anticipatory bail could be granted, having regard to all the circumstances, in respect of all offences. At the same time, if there were indications in any special law or statute, which exclude relief under Section 438(1) they would have to be duly considered. Also, whether anticipatory offences should be granted, in the given facts and circumstances of any case, where the allegations relating to the commission of offences of a serious nature, with certain special conditions, was a matter of discretion to be exercised, having regard to the nature of the offences, the facts shown, the background of the applicant, the likelihood of his fleeing justice, likelihood of co-operation or non-co-operation with the investigating agency or police, etc. There could be no inflexible time frame for which an order of anticipatory bail can continue. [75] (iii) It was held in Gursharan Singh that the release by grant of bail of an Accused under Section 167(2) amounts to deemed bail. This was borne out by Section 167(2) which states that anyone released on bail under its provision shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter. The judgment in Aslam Babalal Desai had clarified that when an Accused is released by operation of Section 167(2) and subsequently, a charge-sheet is filed, there is no question of the cancellation of his bail. In these circumstances, the mere fact that an Accused was given relief under Section 438 at one stage, per se did not mean that upon the filing of a charge-sheet, he is necessarily to surrender or/and apply for regular bail. The analogy to deemed bail under Section 167(2) with anticipatory bail leads this Court to conclude that the mere subsequent event of the filing of a charge-sheet could not compel the Accused to surrender and seek regular bail. As a matter of fact, interestingly, if indeed, if a charge-sheet was filed where the Accused is on anticipatory bail, the normal implication would be that there was no occasion for the investigating agency or the police to require his custody, because there would have been nothing in his behavior requiring such a step. In other words, an Accused, who was granted anticipatory bail would continue to be at liberty when the charge sheet was filed, the natural implication is that there is no occasion for a direction by the Court that he be arrested and further that he had cooperated with the investigation. At the same time, however, at any time during the investigation were any occasion to arise calling for intervention of the court for infraction of any of the conditions imposed under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) or the violation of any other condition imposed in the given facts of a case, recourse can always be had under Section 439(2). [77] (iv) Therefore, it was held that the protection granted under Section 438 Code of Criminal Procedure should not always or ordinarily be limited to a fixed period, it should inure in favour of the Accused without any restriction as to time. Usual or standard conditions under Section 437(3) read with Section 438(2) should be imposed if there were peculiar features in regard to any crime or offence (such as seriousness or gravity etc.), it was open to the court to impose any appropriate condition (including fixed nature of relief, or its being tied to an event or time bound) etc. The life of an anticipatory bail did not end generally at the time and stage when the Accused was summoned by the court, or after framing charges, but could also continue till the end of the trial. However, if there were any special or peculiar features necessitating the court to limit the tenure of anticipatory bail, it was open for it to do so. [84] Sushila Aggarwal and Ors. vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Ors. (29.01.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0100/2020


DHEERAJ MOR-v.-HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

AIR2020SC1084 2021(2)BLJ51 ILR2020(1)Kerala763 2020(2)J.L.J.R.104 2020LabIC1739 2020-5-LW604 MANU/SC/0208/2020 2020(2)PLJR104 2020(2)SCT242(SC) (2020)7SCC401

Case Note: Constitution - District judge - Determination of quota - Articles 14, 16, 232(2), 233, 233(2), 234 and 235 of Constitution of India - Present reference filed with regard to interpretation of Article 233 of Constitution of India as to eligibility of members of subordinate judicial service for appointment as District Judge as against quota reserved for Bar by way of direct recruitment - Petitioners who were in judicial service, had claimed that in case before joining judicial service candidate had completed seven years of practice as advocate, he/she shall be eligible to stake claim as against direct recruitment quota from Bar notwithstanding that on date of application/appointment, he or she was in judicial service of Union or State - Another category was that of persons having completed only seven years of service as judicial service - Whether members of judicial service could claim to be appointed for vacancies in cadre of District Judge, in the quota earmarked for appointment from amongst eligible Advocates. Facts: The present reference filed with regard to the interpretation of Article 233 of the Constitution of India as to the eligibility of members of the subordinate judicial service for appointment as District Judge as against the quota reserved for the Bar by way of direct recruitment. The Petitioners who were in judicial service, have claimed that in case before joining judicial service a candidate had completed seven years of practice as an advocate, he/she shall be eligible to stake claim as against the direct recruitment quota from the Bar notwithstanding that on the date of application/appointment, he or she was in judicial service of the Union or State. Yet another category was that of the persons having completed only seven years of service as judicial service. They contend that experience as a judge be treated at par with the Bar service, and they should be permitted to stake their claim. The third category was hybrid, consisting of candidates who have completed seven years' by combining the experience serving as a judicial officer and as advocate. They claim to be eligible to stake their claim against the above quota. The central argument advanced was that Article 233(2) provides two sources of recruitment, one was from judicial service, and the other was from Bar. Thus, a person in judicial service with experience of seven years practice at the Bar, before joining service (or combined with service as a judicial officer), could stake a claim under Article 233(2) as against the posts reserved for those having experience of seven years as an advocate/pleader. Held, while answering the reference: Arun Mishra, J. (i) For direct recruitment as District Judge as against the quota fixed for the advocates/pleaders, incumbent had to be practicing advocate and must be in practice as on the cut-off date and at the time of appointment he must not be in judicial service or other services of the Union or State. For constituting experience of seven years of practice as advocate, experience obtained in judicial service could not be equated/combined and advocate/pleader should be in practice in the immediate past for seven years and must be in practice while applying on the cut-off date fixed under the Rules and should be in practice as an advocate on the date of appointment. The purpose was recruitment from bar of a practicing advocate having minimum seven years' experience. [45] (ii) The Rules debarring judicial officers from staking their claim as against the posts reserved for direct recruitment from bar were not ultra vires as Rules were subservient to the provisions of the Constitution. [46] (iii) Therefore, answer the reference as under: (i) The members in the judicial service of the State could be appointed as District Judges by way of promotion or limited competitive examination. (ii) The Governor of a State is the authority for the purpose of appointment, promotion, posting and transfer, the eligibility is governed by the Rules framed under Articles 234 and 235. (iii) Under Article 232(2), an Advocate or a pleader with seven years of practice could be appointed as District Judge by way of direct recruitment in case he was not already in the judicial service of the Union or a State. (iv) For the purpose of Article 233(2), an Advocate had to be continuing in practice for not less than seven years as on the cut-off date and at the time of appointment as District Judge. Members of judicial service having seven years' experience of practice before they have joined the service or having combined experience of seven years as lawyer and member of judiciary, are not eligible to apply for direct recruitment as a District Judge. (v) The Rules framed by the High Court prohibiting judicial service officers from staking claim to the post of District Judge against the posts reserved for Advocates by way of direct recruitment, could not be said to be ultra vires and are in conformity with Articles 14, 16 and 233 of the Constitution of India. (vi) The decision in Vijay Kumar Mishra providing eligibility, of judicial officer to compete as against the post of District Judge by way of direct recruitment, could not be said to be laying down the law correctly. The same was hereby overruled. [47] S. Ravindra Bhat, J. (i) Since the Constitution itself makes a distinction between advocates on the one hand, and judicial officers, on the other, the argument of discrimination is insubstantial. If one examines the scheme of appointment from both channels closely, it was evident that a lions' share of posts were to be filled by those in the judicial service. For the past two decades, only a fourth of the posts in the cadre of District Judges (in every State) were earmarked for advocates, the balanceto be filled exclusively from amongst judicial officers. Half was to be filled on the basis of seniority cum merit, whereas twenty five percent was to be filled by departmental examination. This examination is confined to members of the judicial service of the concerned State. The decision of this Court in All India Judges' Association and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., reduced the limited departmental examination quota (out of turn promotion quota) from twenty five percent to ten percent. Thus, cumulatively, even today, judicial officers were entitled to be considered for appointment, by promotion, as District Judges, to the extent of seventy five percent of the cadre relating to that post, in every State. It was therefore, held that the exclusion-by the rules, from consideration of judicial officers, to the post of District Judges, in the quota earmarked for Advocates with the requisite standing, or practice, conforms to the mandate of Articles 233-235, and the Rules were valid. [80] (ii) The Constitution makers were aware that the judicial branch had to be independent, and at the same time, reflect a measure of diversity of thought, and approach. This was borne out by eligibility conditions spelt out clearly in regard to appointments at every level of both the lower and higher judiciary: the District court, the High Courts and the Supreme Court. In regard to judicial positions in each of these institutions, the Constitution enables appointments, from amongst members of the Bar, as its framers were acutely conscious that practising advocates reflect independence and are likely offer a useful attribute, i.e. ability to think differently and have novel approaches to interpretation of the laws and the Constitution, so essential for robustness of the judiciary, as well as society as a whole. [82] (iii) The Constitution makers, in the opinion of this Court, consciously wished that members of the Bar, should be considered for appointment at all three levels, i.e. as District judges, High Courts and this Court. This was because counsel practising in the law courts have a direct link with the people who need their services, their views about the functioning of the courts, is a constant dynamic. Similarly, their views, based on the experience gained at the Bar, injects the judicial branch with fresh perspectives, uniquely positioned as a professional, an advocate has a tripartite relationship one with the public, the second with the court, and the third, with her or his client. A counsel, learned in the law, had an obligation, as an officer of the court, to advance the cause of his client, in a fair manner, and assist the court. Being members of the legal profession, advocates are also considered thought leaders. Therefore, the Constitution makers envisaged that at every rung of the judicial system, a component of direct appointment from members of the Bar should be resorted to. For all these reasons, it was held that members of the judicial service of any State could not claim to be appointed for vacancies in the cadre of District Judge, in the quota earmarked for appointment from amongst eligible Advocates, under Article 233. [84] (iv) Therefore, it was held that under Article 233, a judicial officer, regardless of her or his previous experience as an Advocate with seven years' practice could not apply, and compete for appointment to any vacancy in the post of District Judge, her or his chance to occupy that post would be through promotion, in accordance with Rules framed under Article 234 and proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India. [87] Ratio Decidendi: The members of the judicial service of any State cannot claim to be appointed for vacancies in the cadre of District Judge, in the quota earmarked for appointment from amongst eligible Advocates, under Article 233 of Constitution. Disposition: Disposed of Dheeraj Mor vs. Hon'ble High Court of Delhi (19.02.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0208/2020


INTERNET AND MOBILE ASSOCIATION OF INDIA v.RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

AIR2021SC2720 2020(2)CTC528 (2020)3MLJ541 MANU/SC/0264/2020 [2020]158SCL448(SC) (2020)10SCC274

Case Note: Banking - Virtual currency - Restriction on ban - Sections 3(1), 8(4) and 22(1) of Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 - Respondent-Bank issued Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies which directed entities regulated by RBI not to deal with or provide services to any individual or business entities dealing with or settling virtual currencies and to exit relationship, if they already had one, with such individuals/business entities, dealing with or settling virtual currencies (VCs) - Following said Statement, RBI also issued circular directing entities regulated by RBI not to deal in virtual currencies nor to provide services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling virtual currencies and to exit relationship with such persons or entities, if they were already providing such services to them - Hence, present petition - Whether impugned Circular directing entities regulated by RBI not to deal in virtual currencies nor to provide services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling virtual currencies liable to be set aside on ground of proportionality. Facts: The Reserve Bank of India issued a Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies which directed the entities regulated by RBI not to deal with or provide services to any individual or business entities dealing with or settling virtual currencies and to exit the relationship, if they already have one, with such individuals/business entities, dealing with or settling virtual currencies (VCs). Following the said Statement, RBI also issued a circular, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 35A read with Section 36(1)(a) and Section 56 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 and Section 45JA and 45L of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and Section 10(2) read with Section 18 of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, directing the entities regulated by RBI not to deal in virtual currencies nor to provide services for facilitating any person or entity in dealing with or settling virtual currencies and to exit the relationship with such persons or entities, if they were already providing such services to them. The Petitioner challenging the said Statement and Circular and seeking a direction to the Respondents not to restrict or restrain banks and financial institutions regulated by RBI, from providing access to the banking services, to those engaged in transactions in crypto assets. Held, while allowing the petitions: (i) There could be no quarrel with the proposition that RBI had sufficient power to issue directions to its regulated entities in the interest of depositors, in the interest of banking policy or in the interest of the banking company or in public interest. If the exercise of power by RBI with a view to achieve one of these objectives incidentally causes a collateral damage to one of the several activities of an entity which did not come within the purview of the statutory authority, the same could not be assailed as a colourable exercise of power or being vitiated by malice in law. To constitute colourable exercise of power, the act must have been done in bad faith and the power must have been exercised not with the object of protecting the regulated entities or the public in general, but with the object of hitting those who form the target. To constitute malice in law, the act must have been done wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or probable cause. The impugned Circular did not fall under the category of either of them. [6.122] (ii) The argument that other stakeholders such as the Enforcement Directorate which was concerned with money laundering, the Department of Economic Affairs which was concerned with the economic policies of the State, SEBI which is concerned with security contracts and CBDT which was concerned with the tax regime relating to goods and services, did not see any grave threat and that therefore RBI's reaction was knee-jerk, was not acceptable. Enforcement Directorate can step in only when actual money laundering takes place, since the statutory scheme of Prevention of Money Laundering Act deals with a procedure which was quasi-criminal. SEBI could step in only when the transactions involve securities within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956. CBDT would come into the picture only when the transaction related to the sale and purchase of taxable goods/commodities. Every one of these stakeholders has a different function to perform and were entitled to have an approach depending upon the prism through which they were obliged to look at the issue. Therefore, RBI could not be faulted for not adopting the very same approach as that of others. [6.128] (iii) The examples provided in report of the European Central Bank show that there are VC Schemes set up by entities such as Nintendo, in which consumers can purchase points online by using a credit card or in retail stores by purchasing a Nintendo points card which could not be converted back to real money. The Report also shows that one VC by name Linden Dollars was issued in a virtual world called Second life, where users create avatars (digital characters), which could be customized. Second life had its own economy where users can buy and sell goods and services from and to each other. But they first need to purchase Linden dollars using fiat currency. Later they could also sell Linden dollars in return for fiat currency. Therefore, it was clear that the very same virtual currency could have a unidirectional or bidirectional flow depending upon the scheme with which the entities come up. Moreover, the question whether anonymous VCs alone could have been banned leaving the pseudo-anonymous, was for experts and not for this Court to decide. In any case, the stand taken by RBI is that they had not banned VCs. Hence, the question whether RBI should have adopted different approaches towards different VCs does not arise. [6.135] (iv) RBI is not just any other statutory authority. It was not like a stream which cannot be greater than the source. The RBI Act, 1934 is a pre-constitutional legislation, which survived the Constitution by virtue of Article 372(1) of the Constitution. The difference between other statutory creatures and RBI is that what the statutory creatures can do, could as well be done by the executive. The power conferred upon the delegate in other statutes can be tinkered with, amended or even withdrawn. But the power conferred upon RBI under Section 3(1) of the RBI Act, 1934 to take over the management of the currency from the central government, cannot be taken away. The sole right to issue bank notes in India, conferred by Section 22(1) could not also be taken away and conferred upon any other bank or authority. RBI by virtue of its authority, is a member of the Bank of International Settlements, which position cannot be taken over by the central government and conferred upon any other authority. Therefore, to say that it was just like any other statutory authority whose decisions cannot invite due deference, is to do violence to the scheme of the Act. In fact, all countries had central banks/authorities, which, technically have independence from the government of the country. To ensure such independence, a fixed tenure is granted to the Board of Governors, so that they are not bogged down by political expediencies. In the United States of America, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve is the second most powerful person next only to the President. Though the President appoints the seven-member Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, in consultation with the Senate, each of them was appointed for a fixed tenure of fourteen years. Only one among those seven was appointed as Chairman for a period of four years. As a result of the fixed tenure of fourteen years, all the members of Board of Governors survive in office more than three governments. Even the European Central Bank headquartered in Frankfurt has a President, Vice-President and four members, appointed for a period of eight years in consultation with the European Parliament. World-wide, central authorities/banks are ensured an independence, but unfortunately Section 8(4) of the RBI Act, 1934 gives a tenure not exceeding five years, as the central government may fix at the time of appointment. Though the shorter tenure and the choice given to the central government to fix the tenure, to some extent, undermines the ability of the incumbents of office to be absolutely independent, the statutory scheme nevertheless provides for independence to the institution as such. Therefore, there was no argument that a policy decision taken by RBI did not warrant any deference. [6.141] (v) The concern of RBI was and it ought to be, about the entities regulated by it. Till date, RBI had not come out with a stand that any of the entities regulated by it namely, the nationalized banks/scheduled commercial banks/cooperative banks/NBFCs has suffered any loss or adverse effect directly or indirectly, on account of the interface that the VC exchanges had with any of them. As held by this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Indian Hotel and Restaurants Association, there must have been at least some empirical data about the degree of harm suffered by the regulated entities (after establishing that they were harmed). It was not the case of RBI that any of the entities regulated by it had suffered on account of the provision of banking services to the online platforms running VC exchanges. [6.172] (vi) It was no doubt true that RBI had very wide powers not only in view of the statutory scheme of the enactments, but also in view of the special place and role that it had in the economy of the country. These powers could be exercised both in the form of preventive as well as curative measures. But the availability of power was different from the manner and extent to which it can be exercised. The power of RBI to take a pre-emptive action, this court was testing in this part of the order the proportionality of such measure, for the determination of which RBI needs to show at least some semblance of any damage suffered by its regulated entities. But there was none. When the consistent stand of RBI was that they had not banned VCs and when the Government of India was unable to take a call despite several committees coming up with several proposals including two draft bills, both of which advocated exactly opposite positions, it was not possible to hold that the impugned measure is proportionate. [6.173] (vii) Therefore, the Petitioners were entitled to succeed and the impugned Circular was liable to be set aside on the ground of proportionality. Accordingly, the writ petitions are allowed and the Circular was set aside. The Statement though challenged in one writ petition, was not in the nature of a statutory direction and hence the question of setting aside the same did not arise. [7.1] Disposition: Petition Allowed Industry: Media and Entertainment Industry: Banks Internet and Mobile Association of India vs. Reserve Bank of India (04.03.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0264/2020


INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY-v.-MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC

AIR2020SC1496 2020ALT (Rev.) 35 2020(3)ALT47 2020(3)BLJ1 2020 (3) CCC 296 ILR[2020]MP2179 2020(2)JLJ75 2020(3)J.L.J.R.50 2020(2)JKJ1[SC] MANU/SC/0300/2020 2020(I)OLR687 2020(2)PLJR206 2020(4)RCR(Civil)668 (2020)8SCC129 2020 (3) SCJ 391


MADRAS BAR ASSOCIATION -v.- UNION OF INDIA & ANR

[2020]159CLA468(SC) 2021(3)CTC207 2021(1)ESC152(SC) 2020(374)ELT817(S.C.) ILR2021(1)Kerala172 2021(1)J.L.J.R.132 2021-4-LW1 (2020)8MLJ584 MANU/SC/0903/2020 2020(4)PLJR497 [2021]164SCL636(SC) 2021(2)SLR796(SC) (2021)7SCC369

Case Note: Constitution -Validity of Statute - Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities [Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members] Rules, 2020 (2020 Rules) - Vires thereof challenged as being violative of Articles 14, 21 and 50 of the Constitution of India, 1950 - Impugned Rules deal with the qualification and appointment of members by recruitment, procedure for inquiry into misbehavior, House Rent Allowance and other Conditions of Service - Constitutionality thereof also contended to be violative of the principles of separation of powers and independence of the judiciary - Whether the impugned rules liable to be declared as ultra vires? Facts: The present matter pertains to constitutionality of various provisions concerning the selection, appointment, tenure, conditions of service, and ancillary matters relating to various tribunalswhich act in aid of the judicial branch.The core controversy arose was consideration about the constitutional validity of the "Tribunal, Appellate Tribunal and other Authorities [Qualification, Experience and Other Conditions of Service of Members] Rules, 2020" (2020 Rules). Held, while disposing the Appeals: The Appeals were disposed with directions namely, (i) The Union of India shall constitute a National Tribunals Commission which shall act as an independent body to supervise the appointments and functioning of Tribunals, as well as to conduct disciplinary proceedings against members of Tribunals and to take care of administrative and infrastructural needs of the Tribunals, in an appropriate manner. (ii) Instead of the four-member Search-cum-Selection Committees provided for in Column (4) of the Schedule to the 2020 Rules with the Chief Justice of India or his nominee, outgoing or sitting Chairman or Chairperson or President of the Tribunal and two Secretaries to the Government of India, the Search-cum-Selection Committees should comprise of the members as directed. (iii) Rule 4(2) of the 2020 Rules shall be amended to provide that the Search-cum-Selection Committee shall recommend the name of one person for appointment to each post instead of a panel of two or three persons for appointment to each post. Another name may be recommended to be included in the waiting list.(iv) The Chairpersons, Vice-Chairpersons and the members of the Tribunal shall hold office for a term of five years and shall be eligible for reappointment with necessary amendments as directed in Rule 9(2); (v) The Union of India to make serious efforts to provide suitable housing to the Chairman or Chairperson or President and other members of the Tribunals or to pay house rent allowance, as directed; (vi) The 2020 Rules shall be amended to make advocates with an experience of at least 10 years eligible for appointment as judicial members in the Tribunals; (vii) The members of the Indian Legal Service shall be eligible for appointment as judicial members in the Tribunals as per conditions laid; (viii) Rule 8 of the 2020 Rules shall be amended to reflect that the recommendations of the Search-cum-Selection Committee in matters of disciplinary actions shall be final and to be implemented by the Central Government; (ix) The Union of India shall make appointments to Tribunals within three months from the date on which the Search-cum-Selection Committee completes the selection process and makes its recommendations; (x) The 2020 Rules shall have prospective effect and will be applicable from 12.02.2020, as per Rule 1(2) of the 2020 Rules; (xi) Appointments made prior to the 2017 Rules are governed by the parent Acts and Rules which established the concerned Tribunals; (xii) Appointments made under the 2020 Rules till the date of this judgment, shall not be considered invalid, insofar as they conformed to the recommendations of the Search-cum-Selection Committees in terms of the 2020 Rules; (xiii) In case the Search-cum-Selection Committees have made recommendations after conducting selections in accordance with the 2020 Rules, appointments shall be made within three months from today and shall not be subject matter of challenge on the ground that they are not in accord with this judgment.(xiv) The terms and conditions relating to salary, benefits, allowances, house rent allowance etc. shall be in accordance with the terms indicated in, and directed by this judgment; (xv) The Chairpersons, Vice Chairpersons and members of the Tribunals appointed prior to 12.02.2020 shall be governed by the parent statutes and Rules as per which they were appointed. The 2020 Rules shall be applicable with the modifications directed in the preceding paragraphs to those who were appointed after 12.02.2020. [53] Writ Petitions, Transfer Petitions, Civil Appeals and all the Applications are disposed of as per the directions passed.Dispensation of justice by the Tribunals can be effective only when they function independent of any executive control: this renders them credible and generates public confidence. To ensure that the Tribunals should not function as another department under the control of the executive, repeated directions have been issued which have gone unheeded forcing the Petitioner to approach this Court time and again. It is high time that such practice is put to an end. It is crucial that these tribunals are run by a robust mix of experts, i.e. those with experience in policy in the relevant field, and those with judicial or legal experience and competence in such fields. The functioning or non-functioning of any of these tribunals due to lack of competence or understanding has a direct adverse impact on those who expect effective and swift justice from them. The role of both the courts as upholders of judicial independence, and the executive as the policy making and implementing limb of governance, is to be concordat and collaborative. This Court expects that the present directions are adhered to and implemented, so that future litigation is avoided.The Government is, accordingly, directed to strictly adhere to the directions given and not force the Petitioner-Madras Bar Association to knock the doors of this Court again.[55] Disposition: Disposed of Madras Bar Association vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors. (27.11.2020 - SC) : MANU/SC/0903/2020